



The Princeton Theological Review

CONTENTS

The Headings of the Psalms	I
R. D. WILSON	
The Relation of Religion to Science and Philosophy	38
J. GRESHAM MACHEN	
Is Jesus God? — Part II	67
F. D. JENKINS	
The Rational Argument for Immortality	96
FLOYD E. HAMILTON	
Notes and Notices	124
Hoen's Letter on the Eucharist and its Influence upon Carlstadt, Bucer and Zwingli, A. HYMA	
Reviews of Recent Literature	132
Survey of Periodical Literature	171

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS
PRINCETON

LONDON: HUMPHREY MILFORD
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

1926

The Princeton Theological Review

EDITED FOR

THE FACULTY OF PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

BY

OSWALD T. ALLIS

Each author is solely responsible for the views expressed in his article

Notice of discontinuance must be sent to the Publishers; otherwise subscriptions will be continued

Subscription rate, Two Dollars a year, single copies Sixty Cents

Entered as Second Class Mail Matter at Princeton, N. J.

BOOKS REVIEWED

BURKETT, F. C., <i>Christian Beginnings</i>	132
<i>Constitution of the Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A., The</i>	167
CRAIN, O. E., <i>The Credibility of the Virgin Birth</i>	134
DICKIE, J., <i>The Fundamental Principles of the Reformed Church</i> ...	157
DUBOIS, H., <i>De Kant à Ritschl</i>	147
HALDEMAN, I. M., <i>Dr. Harry Emerson Fosdick's Book "The Modern</i> <i>Use of the Bible"</i>	169
HAAS, J. A. W., et al, <i>Theological Studies</i>	157
HAWLEY, C. A., <i>The Teaching of the Prophets</i>	136
HERRMANN, W., <i>Dogmatik</i>	149
JACOBS, C. M., <i>The Story of the Church</i>	145
JEFFERSON, C. E., <i>Cardinal Ideas of Isaiah</i>	141
MCALLISTER, J. G., <i>Borderlands of the Mediterranean</i>	169
MERRILL, W. P., <i>Liberal Christianity</i>	160
MOUZON, E. D., <i>The Program of Jesus</i>	139
MÜLLER, K., <i>Kirchengeschichte</i>	143
SMITH, C. R., <i>The Bible Doctrine of Wealth and Work</i>	170
SNEATH, E. H., <i>Shall We Have a Creed?</i>	148
ZWEMER, S. M., <i>The Law of Apostasy in Islam</i>	168

The Princeton Theological Review

JANUARY, 1926

THE HEADINGS OF THE PSALMS

It is the purpose of this article to treat of the reliability of the headings of the Psalms; to show that, as far as the evidence goes, there is a reasonable ground for believing that the headings are what they purport to be.

No one can doubt that comparative literature and history are in favor of the probability of psalms having been composed in Hebrew as early as the time of Jacob. Before Abram left Ur of the Chaldees, the Sumerians and Egyptians had hundreds of poems used in the temple worship of their gods.¹ And the Hebrew language was certainly used in Palestine and Syria long before the time of Thothmes III.² That Jacob may have composed the blessing recorded in Gen. xlix. is not, therefore, a question of language so much as one of predictive prophecy. That Moses could have composed and written Exodus xv, Deut. xxxii and xxxiii and the other poetical parts of the Pentateuch and, also, the 90th Psalm may for like reason be maintained and believed. So, likewise, the songs of Deborah and Hannah (Judg. v and 1 Sam. ii) may, for ought anyone *knows* to the contrary, have been composed by these two women, as the superscriptions indicate. As to David himself 2 Sam. i. 17 expressly attributes to

¹ Frequent references to songs and musical instruments used in the temples occur already in the time of Gudea. See F. Thureau-Dangin, *Die Sumerischen und Akkadischen Königsinschriften* (*passim*). For music among the ancient Egyptians, see especially Erman, *Aegypten und Aegyptisches Leben im Altertum*. I. 340 f, II. 521 f.

² Thothmes III, on his inscriptions at Karnak which describe his conquests in Asia, gives a list of the cities of Palestine and Syria conquered by him. This list is still preserved on three of the pyla or gates. The names of the cities are almost all certainly Hebrew. See W. Max Müller, in *Die Palestinaliste Thutmosis III.*

him the lament over Saul and Jonathan; and in xxiii. 1 he is not merely called the sweet psalmist of Israel, but the short poem recorded in verses 2-7 are said to have been the last words of this anointed of the God of Jacob. In Chapter xxii. 1, it is said, that David spake the words of the song recorded in verses 2-51 in the day that the Lord delivered him out of the hand of all his enemies and out of the hand of Saul. Besides, whatever date may be assigned to Chronicles it is certain that the author states expressly that David delivered into the hands of the Levitical singers the psalm contained in 1 Chr. xvi. 8-36 to be sung at the services in honor of the bringing of the ark to the city of David; and it is further stated in Chapter xv that he organized the singers and players of instruments who took part in these services. Solomon his son is said in 1 Kings iv. 32 (v. 12) to have spoken three thousand proverbs and of songs a thousand and five. Isaiah, also, has left us the songs found in Chapters v, xii and xxxv; and the text ascribes the second chapter of Jonah and the third of Habakkuk to Jonah and Habakkuk respectively. But not only may these songs have been composed and written in these times, it is equally sure that they may have been copied and handed down, for it is absolutely certain not merely that poems written in Egypt and Babylonia hundreds of years at least before the time of Moses have been handed down to our day but also that the art of copying and preserving manuscripts was in vogue hundreds of years before the time of Moses.³

Thus, we find that the *prima facie* evidence of the Pentateuch, Judges, 1 and 2 Samuel, Isaiah, Jonah, Habakkuk, and Chronicles, assures us that lyrical poetry was in vogue among the Israelites of the earliest times and that they assign poems to Jacob, Moses, Balaam, Deborah, Hannah and David; and state that many poems were written by Solomon. Why, then, we may ask, is it intrinsically impossible to suppose that the headings of the psalms are right in assigning

³ See Breasted's *Egypt* and Langdon's *Sumerian and Babylonian Psalms*.

psalms of the psalter to Moses, David and Solomon? And why may not the headings of the psalms have been composed at, or near, the time when they were composed?

For we know for a certainty that writing was an art practised in both Babylon and Egypt for many centuries before the time of Jacob and Moses; that the Hebrew language was written in Egyptian as early at least as the time of Thothmes III, and in cuneiform as early as the El-Amarna letters;⁴ and that documents in both cuneiform and Egyptian were handed down by copyists for hundreds or even thousands of years.⁵

Further, we know that the Egyptians and Babylonians had vocal as well as instrumental music in use in their temples a thousand years and more before the time that Solomon built his temple, or before David is said to have sung 1 Chron. xvi. 8-36 at the time when the ark was taken to Jerusalem.⁶

For anyone, especially anyone who admits that David was the author of the lament over Saul and Jonathan, to deny that he may have been poet enough to write the psalms attributed to him, is absurd. The odes and epodes of Horace are 120 in number. Burns wrote more than 500 lyrical poems, Goethe about 800 small poems and Charles Wesley more than 6000 hymns.⁷

To deny the authorship of any of the 73 psalms attributed to David on the ground of the form in which they are composed is exceedingly perilous in view of the multiplicity of forms employed by poets like Schiller and Browning and in view, also, of our ignorance of the principles of Hebrew

⁴ See W. Max Müller's lists as above (note 2) and Winckler, *Tell-El-Amarna Letters*, Knudtzon, *Die El-Amarna-Tafeln*, and Böhl, *Die Sprache der Amarna Briefe mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Kanaanismen*.

⁵ See my article on "Scientific Biblical Criticism" in this REVIEW for July 1919.

⁶ See Frank, *Studien zur Babylonischen Religion*, and Langdon's, Thureau-Dangin's, Breasted's and Erman's works cited above.

⁷ Surely, the variety of subject, thought and metre, in the poems ascribed to David does not exceed that found in Cowper, Byron, Browning and Tennyson.

poetry. To deny the authorship of the psalms to their alleged composers on the ground that they contain theological ideas that were not known to the Hebrews till long after the time of the author to whom they are assigned in the headings is to assume a knowledge of the history of the Hebrew religion which the critics cannot show that they possess.⁸ On the contrary, to justify their assumptions as to

⁸ The precarious and subjective grounds by means of which this alleged unsuitability of the ideas of the psalms to the times when the alleged authors lived may be seen in Driver's *Literature of the Old Testament*, pp. 377-387. "Not unfrequently," says he, "the psalms ascribed to David presuppose the circumstances or character of a later age." "Many also of the Psalms, it is difficult not to feel, express an intensity of religious devotion, a depth of spiritual insight, and a maturity of theological reflexion, beyond what we should expect from David or David's age." "As we should not gather from the history that he was exposed to a succession of trials and afflictions of the kind represented in the Psalms ascribed to him, so we should not gather from it that he was a man of the deep and intense spiritual feeling reflected in the Psalms that bear his name. Every indication converges to the same conclusion, viz., that the 'Davidic' Psalms spring, in part, from many different periods of Israelitish history from the time of David himself downward; and that in the varied moods which they reflect—despondency, trouble, searchings of heart, penitence, hope, confidence, thankfulness, exultation; or the various situations which they shadow forth—distress, sickness, oppression or persecution, deliverance,—they set before us the experience of many men, and of many ages of the natural life." This is a perfect gem of the method of criticism pursued by the destructive critics of the Old Testament records. It is purely *psychological*. Dr. Driver uses the same kind of criticism when he says that Isaiah could not have written chapters xxiv-xxvii of the book that bears his name because they "spring out of a different (and later) vein of thought from Isaiah's" (*Ibid.* p. 220); or when he says that Obadiah 15-21 "seems to display the tone and thought of a much later age" (p. 220); or that it is not "easy to imagine" an Assyrian king like that of Jonah (p. 324); or that "a difference of tone and manner in different parts of Micah tell against identity of authorship" (p. 332); or that parts of chapter iii of Zephaniah "express the ideas and hopes of a later age than that of Zephaniah." Those who think that Dr. Driver and his fellow critics could possibly know enough about the mind and thoughts of David, Isaiah, the kings of Assyria, and the prophets of Israel to tell us what they could or could not have thought about, are welcome to their opinion. They forget that God spoke through the prophets. They have neglected to read Shakespeare; for he seems to have had occasionally a new thought and he runs the whole gamut of human experience. Why may not a poet of Israel have done the same?

the development of ideas, it is necessary arbitrarily to reject the *prima facie* evidence of nearly all the documents of the Old Testament and to change the text and meaning thousands of times, not on the ground of documentary evidence but, with malice aforethought and largely upon purely subjective reasons, in order to support their otherwise groundless hypotheses.⁹

These critics write as if there *must* have been a gradual and discernible development in the literature, science, art, and religion, of the ancient Hebrews. Not finding a development that suits their views of how it must have been, they proceed to rearrange the documents and to pervert their obvious sense so as to support their views. Do they not know that the most flourishing era in Egyptian literature and religion was from the 12th to the 19th dynasty?¹⁰ Do they not know that the finest poetry, the most complete code of laws, the best works on magic and the worship of the gods, had reached their highest point in the age of Hammurabi?¹¹ Are

⁹ The writer of this article is heartily in favor of a textual criticism based upon documentary evidence or even upon analogical considerations derived from palaeography, or history; but the kind followed by Professor Cheyne in his *Critica Biblica* or by Professors Voltz and George Adam Smith in their Commentaries on Jeremiah or by Professor Moffatt in the preparation of his so-called version of the Hebrew Bible, goes beyond the bounds of common sense and of the laws of evidence. These brilliant men are all suggestive, but they do not know everything; and one thing they do not know is what these old Israelites thought and said and did, if they did not think and say and do what the documents of the Old Testament, the only records we have concerning them, say that they thought and said and did. When we professors go beyond the evidence of the documents, we are just as liable to err through ignorance as the greatest ignoramus. Truth is stranger than fiction, and no one can imagine history, or text, or document.

¹⁰ See Breasted, *History of the Ancient Egyptians*, pp. 322, 340.

¹¹ In his *Recueil de Lois Assyriens* Director Scheil says in comparing these Assyrian laws with the code of Hammurabi: "Les deux documents sont toutes à l'honneur de la société babylonienne de l'an 2100, et peu flatteuse pour la société assyrienne de 1400-1200 avant J. C." The Creation Tablets, the Flood Tablets, the Birth-Omens, came from, at, or before, the time of Hammurabi. Gudea's royal inscriptions are much like those of Nebuchadnezzar. (See King, *Seven Tablets of Creation*, Jen-

not the annals of Tiglath-Pileser I as classical as those of Assurbanipal? Or, if they prefer classical analogies, did not Homer's works, though first of all in time among the epics of the ancient world, continue till the end to excel all other works of like character? And who so readable today along his line as Herodotus, the father of history? And was not Thucydides, one of the earliest of Greek historians, so great a master of method and style as that our own great English historian, Macauley, could find no model so fit for imitation both in style and method? No. It is not true, that even in merely human productions, we can trace in history a development from the worse to the better and the best along chronological or evolutionary lines. Dante, Cervantes, and Camoens; Chaucer, Shakespeare and Milton, all cry out against any such kind of literary development.

And when we come to the great religions of the world, the same is even more true. The highest point of development among the Egyptians and Babylonians was about 2000 B.C.¹² The earliest writings of the Hindoos, Parsees, Buddhists, Chinese and Mohammedans were the best and purest.¹³ Among the Hebrews themselves, there has been nothing that deserves, from either a literary, or religious point of view, to be classed among the great outstanding productions of Moses, David, Isaiah and Jeremiah.¹⁴

Among the Christians, also, the religious works of the first century have never been equalled by those that have followed and the theological system derived from the Scriptures

sen, *Assyrisch-Babylonische Mythen und Epen*, Dennefeld, *Geburts-Omina*, Thureau-Dangin, *Sumerische und Akkadische Königsinschriften* and Langdon-Zehnpfund, *Neubabylonische Königsinschriften*).

¹² See above note 10.

¹³ See *Hinduism* by Professor Monier Williams; *Buddhism* by T. W. Rhys Davids; *Confucianism* by R. K. Douglas; *Islam* by J. W. H. Stobart and for the Parsees Ed. Meyer in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* XXI, 210.

¹⁴ For confirmation of this statement, see Halper's *Post-biblical Hebrew Literature*. On page 7 of vol. II, the author says "the literary quality of post-biblical works cannot approach the sublimity and beauty of the Bible."

was almost fully perfected in the first five centuries of our era.¹⁵ The creeds have changed but little in the last 1500 years.¹⁶

We see, then, how futile it is to argue as if the development of the Israelitish faith and worship must have been along a certain line and always from the lower to the higher, the better to the best, and as if the greatest of Israel's religious laws must have been at the latter end of the Old Testament times.

But it is argued, there is little trace in the books of Samuel and Kings, or even in the prophets, of the singers and their psalms. This is an argument from silence, and an argument from silence on the part of a document proves nothing with regard to either the knowledge of an author, or the occurrence of a fact. The most important point is, What is the purpose of the author?, and the next point in importance is, What are the amount and sources of his information about the matter in discussion? Take, for example, the books of First and Second Kings. The main purpose of the author certainly is to give us a short synchronous history of the kings of Judah and Israel, similar to the synchronous accounts of the kings of Babylon and Nineveh.¹⁷ While not annalistic, the books of Kings may be compared not merely with the synchronistic but also with the annalistic accounts of the kings of Nineveh.¹⁸ The sources of information for the author of Kings are said to have been especially the Books of the Acts (1 Ki. xi. 41), or the Books of the Chronicles (1 Ki. xiv. 19) of the various kings of Judah and Israel. The sources of the synchronistic accounts of Nineveh and Babylon were in like manner the annalistic accounts of

¹⁵ The Council of Chalcedon was held in the year A.D. 451. The Greek, Roman and Protestant churches all have agreed in accepting the decrees of this and the three preceding councils.

¹⁶ See Schaff, *Creeds of Christendom*.

¹⁷ See for the Babylonian Synchronous History *Die Keilinschriftliche Bibliothek* (abbrev. KB.) II 275-285.

¹⁸ See Lotz for Tiglath-Pileser I; Winckler for Sargon, Streck for Assurbanipal and KB. for many other kings of Assyria.

the different reigns of the Assyrian kings (of which we have very full records for the reigns of Tiglath-Pileser I, Assurnasirpal, the Shalmanesers, and others) and various inscriptions of the Babylonian kings from Nebuchadnezzar I to Nabunaid.¹⁹

Now, when we examine the Babylonian Chronicle, we find not a single reference of any kind to music, song, or any kind of religious service.²⁰ The Assyrio-Babylonian Synchronistic History refers once to offerings;²¹ but never to any kind of musical service or instrument. The annals and other inscriptions of the Assyrian kings speak a number of times of music in connection with the triumphal entrances of the kings into Nineveh after a successful campaign,²² but seldom, if ever, of any religious service with musical accompaniment, and the records of the Babylonian kings are almost devoid of musical terminology or activities.²³

Yet, we know that during the reigns of all of these kings and, indeed, from the time of the kings preceding Hammurabi and Abraham, music, both instrumental and vocal, was a usual and essential part of the religious services in all the temples both of Babylonia and Elam.²⁴

¹⁹ See KB. *in loc.* and Langdon-Zehnpfund, *Neubabylonische Königsinschriften*.

²⁰ KB. II. 272-285.

²¹ KB. I. 194-203, Vol. IV. Shamshi-Ramman king of Assyria came up to Kula, Babylon and Barsippa and made clean offerings (*kiru niki illuti lu epus.*)

²² For example, when Assurbanipal returned to Nineveh with the head of Teumman, king of Elam, he entered with the prisoners and the booty which he had acquired accompanied by singers making music (*itti amêlu narê êpeš ningûti*). Cf., Streck, *Assurbanipal*, Vol. II, 125. In II. 117, Ish-tar tells the king to "eat food, drink wine, make music (*ningutu*), (and) praise my godhead." On page 267, it is said that his assembled troops went around the temple of Esaggil making music day and night, when he made his entry into the temple.

²³ The only word for singing in the New Babylonian inscriptions is *zamaru* and it is used of the cry of the people when Nabunaid became king: "Father of the land. There is none like him."

²⁴ See the Sumerian and Accadian royal inscriptions of the times before Abraham. See the "list" (*Verzeichniss*, etc.) of names by Langdon in

The conclusion to be drawn from this long array of parallels from comparative literatures is that it is not necessary to suppose that the psalms and instrumental accompaniments were not in use in the religious services of the tabernacle and in the temple of Solomon because such matters were not mentioned in the chronicles of the kings of Judah and Israel, or in the books of Samuel and Kings which were derived from them. On the other hand, our books of Chronicles, which give not merely the history of kings and wars, but, also, among other things, are full of matters concerning the temple, the priests, and all the religious services, give many references to the musical part in the ceremonies and worship.²⁵ The laws of Moses and the psalms of praise would be in the special care of the priests and Levites and would be kept in the temple archives or library, just as among the Babylonians and Assyrians, whereas the royal records would be kept in the library of the palace and the temple records in the libraries of the temples.²⁶ We know that the chronicles of the kings of Israel and Judah survived the destruction of Samaria and Jerusalem.²⁷ Why may not the chronicles of the temple and the psalms of the sanctuary in like manner have been saved?

Words for songs, singing and singers occur in 340 pages of the royal inscriptions of Tiglath-Pileser I,²⁸ Sargon II,²⁹

Thureau-Dangin, *Sumerische und Akkadische Königsinschriften*, especially under *balangu*, "lyre." See, also, Frank, *Studien zur Babylonischen Religion*, p. 229 f.

²⁵ Thus Chronicles mentions *nēbel* 10 times, Sam-Kings only 3; *kinnôr* 12 times to 5 times in Sam-Kings; *m'siltayim* 11 times to Sam-Kings none; *h'šôš'rôth* 16 times to Sam-Kings 3; *m'shôrêr* 12 times to none.

²⁶ Assurbanipal had two great libraries at Nineveh, one in his palace, and the other in the temple of Nebo. See Streck, *Assurbanipal* II 355-375; also, Dennefeld, *Geburts-Omina*, p. 40.

²⁷ We know this because we have the synchronistic history in the books of Kings, and these can be tested from the Egyptian documents of Shishak, Necho and others; from the Mesha inscriptions; and from the Assyrian records.

²⁸ See Lotz, *Die Inschriften Tiglath-Pileser's I.* and KB. I, 14-49.

²⁹ See Winckler, *Keilschrifttexte Sargons*, and Peiser in KB. II, 34-81.

Assurbanipal³⁰ and other kings of Nineveh,³¹ four times in all;³² and in the New-Babylonian royal inscriptions³³ but once in 148 pages; whereas words of the same kind occur in the 218 pages of Samuel-Kings 12 times. Notwithstanding this silence of the inscriptions every one admits that songs were sung in the Babylonian and Assyrian worship from the earliest to the latest times. The Hebrew records mention singing, songs, or singers once on every 22 pages; the Assyrian, once on every 54 pages; the Babylonian, once on every 148 pages. Besides, the Hebrew prophets from Isaiah to Zephaniah inclusive have words for these ideas 66 times in 308 pages; whereas the post-captivity prophets have only one word and that but once in 21 pages.³⁴ Further, hymns and instrumental music are known to have been used in the temple services of the Egyptians from the earliest times;³⁵ but singers, male or female, are mentioned in the four large volumes of Breasted's *Egypt* only six times and these all from the 12th to the 22nd dynasty.³⁶

In view of these facts, is it not time for the critics to revise some of their opinions with regard to the argument from silence? Will they not be frank enough to admit, that, for all they *know* from sources outside the psalms themselves, they may have been written and used from Moses down to Malachi?

When we come to examine the psalms themselves for indications of post-captivity origin, we are astonished at their

³⁰ See Streck's *Assurbanipal* and KB. II, 152-269.

³¹ That is, Assurnasirpal, Shalmanassar II, Ramman-nirari, Tiglath-Pileser IV, Sennacherib and Esarhaddon (KB. I and II).

³² To wit, in Assurbanipal's Cylinder B. VI. 21, 46 and in Sennacherib's *Prism Inscription* I. 30 (where the singers are captives taken from the king of Babylon) and in III. 38, 39, where they refer to captives taken from Hezekiah, king of Judah.

³³ See *Die Neubabylonische Königsinschriften*, 276, II *ema uzammaru*, "while they sang (and shouted)."

³⁴ Zech. ii. 10 (14), "Sing and be glad O daughter of Zion." The word for "sing" is *rānan*.

³⁵ See Breasted's Erman's, and Wilkinson's works on Egypt.

³⁶ See the index (vol. V) to Breasted's *Egypt*.

paucity. In order to make this clear to our readers, we have prepared the following table, which gives the names of persons, nations, mountains, rivers and cities mentioned in the Psalter.

PROPER NAMES IN THE PSALMS

	Book I	Book II	Book III	Book IV	Book V
Aaron			77 ²⁰	99 ⁶ , 105 ²⁶ 106 ¹⁶	115 ¹⁰ , 12, 118 ³ , 133 ² , 135 ¹⁹ 116 ¹⁷
Abiram					
Abraham		47 ⁹		105 ^{6,9,42}	
Amalek			83 ⁷		
Ammon			83 ⁷		
Assur			83 ⁸		
Babylon			87 ⁴		137 ^{1,8}
Bashan	22 ¹²	68 ¹⁵ bis, 22			135 ¹¹ , 136 ²⁰
Benjamin		68 ²⁷	80 ²		
Canaan				106 ³⁸	135 ¹¹
David		72 ²⁰	78 ⁷⁰ , 89 ^{20,35} , 89 ⁴⁹		122 ⁵ , 132 ^{1,11} , 132 ¹⁷ , 144 ¹⁰
Edom		60 ^{8,9}	83 ⁶		108 ^{9,10} , 137 ⁷
Egypt		68 ³¹	78 ^{12,43,51} , 80 ⁸ , 81 ^{5,10}	105 ³⁸ , 106 ^{7,21}	114 ¹ , 135 ^{8,9} , 136 ¹⁰
Ephratah					132 ⁶
Ephraim		60 ⁷	78 ^{9,67} , 80 ²		108 ⁸
Ethiopia		68 ³¹	87 ⁴		
Gebal			83 ⁷		
Gilead		60 ⁷			108 ⁸
Hagarenes			83 ⁶		
Ham			78 ³¹	105 ^{23,27} 106 ²²	
Hermon		42 ⁶	89 ¹²		133 ³
Horeb				106 ¹⁹	
Isaac				105 ⁹	
Ishmael			83 ⁶		
Israel	14 ⁷ bis, 22 ³ , 22 ²³ , 25 ²² , 41 ¹³	50 ⁷ , 53 ⁶ , 59 ⁵ 68 ^{8,26,34,35} , 69 ⁶	71 ²² , 72 ¹⁸ , 73 ¹ , 76 ¹ , 78 ^{5,21,31,41} , 78 ^{55,59,71} , 80 ² , 81 ^{4,8} , 81 ^{11,13} , 83 ⁴ , 89 ⁸	98 ³ , 103 ⁷ , 105 ^{10,23} , 106 ⁴⁸	114 ² , 115 ^{9,12} , 118 ² , 121 ⁴ , 122 ⁴ , 125 ⁵ , 128 ⁶ , 130 ⁷ , 131 ³ , 135 ⁴ , 135 ^{12,19} , 136 ^{11,14,22} , 147 ^{2,19} , 148 ¹⁴ , 149 ²

	Book I	Book II	Book III	Book IV	Book V
Jabin			83 ⁹		
Jacob	14 ⁷ , 20 ¹ , 22 ²³ 24 ⁶	44 ⁴ , 46 ^{7, 11} 47 ⁴ , 53 ⁶ 59 ¹³	75 ⁹ , 76 ⁶ , 77 ¹⁵ , 94 ⁷ , 99 ⁴ , 78 ^{5, 21, 71} 79 ⁷ , 81 ^{1, 4} , 84 ⁸ , 85 ¹ , 87 ²	105 ^{6, 10, 23}	114 ^{1, 7} , 132 ² , 132 ⁵ , 135 ⁴ , 146 ⁵ , 147 ¹⁹
Jerusalem		51 ¹⁸ , 68 ²⁹	79 ^{1, 3}	102 ²¹	116 ¹⁹ , 122 ^{2, 3} , 122 ⁶ , 125 ² , 128 ⁵ , 135 ²¹ , 137 ^{5, 6, 7} , 147 ^{2, 12} , 114 ^{3, 5}
Jordan		42 ⁶			
Joseph			77 ¹⁵ , 78 ^{6, 7} , 80 ¹	105 ¹⁷	
Judah		48 ¹¹ , 60 ⁷ 68 ²⁷ , 69 ³⁵	76 ¹ , 78 ⁶⁸	97 ⁸	108 ⁸ , 114 ²
Kadesh	29 ⁸				
Kedar					120 ⁵
Lebanon	29 ^{5, 6}	72 ¹⁶		92 ¹² , 104 ¹⁶	
Levi					135 ²⁰
Lot			83 ⁸		
Manasseh		60 ⁷	80 ²		108 ⁸
Melchizedek					110 ⁴
Meribah			81 ⁷		
Mesech					120 ⁵
Midian			83 ⁹		
Mizar		42 ⁶			
Moab		60 ⁸	83 ⁶		108 ⁹
Moses			77 ²⁰	99 ⁶ , 103 ⁷ , 105 ²⁶ , 106 ^{16, 23, 32}	
Naphtali		68 ²⁷			
Og					135 ¹¹ , 136 ²⁰
Ophir		45 ⁹			
Oreb & Zeeb			83 ¹¹		
Pharaoh					135 ⁹ , 136 ¹⁵
Philistines			87 ⁴		
Phinehas				106 ³⁰	
Rahab			87 ⁴ , 89 ¹⁰		
Salem			76 ²		
Salmon		68 ¹⁴			
Samuel				99 ⁶	
Sheba					
(& Seba)		72 ^{10, 15}			
Shechem		60 ⁶			108 ⁷
Shiloh			78 ⁶⁰		

	Book I	Book II	Book III	Book IV	Book V
Sihon					135 ¹¹ , 136 ¹⁹
Sinai		68 ^{8,17}			
Sirion	29 ⁶				
Sisera			83 ⁹		
Succoth		60 ⁶			108 ⁷
Tabor			89 ¹²		
Tarshish		48 ⁷ , 72 ¹⁰			
Tyre		45 ¹²	83 ⁷ , 87 ⁴		
Zeba & Zalmunna			83 ¹¹		
Zebulun		68 ²⁷			
Zion	2 ⁶ , 9 ^{11,14} , 14 ⁷ , 20 ²	48 ^{2,11,12} , 50 ² , 51 ¹⁸ , 53 ⁶ , 65 ¹ , 69 ³⁵	74 ² , 76 ² , 78 ⁶⁸ , 84 ⁷ , 87 ^{2,5}	97 ⁸ , 99 ² , 102 ^{13,16,21}	110 ² , 125 ¹ , 126 ¹ , 128 ⁵ , 129 ³ , 132 ¹³ , 133 ³ , 134 ³ , 135 ²¹ , 137 ¹ , 137 ³ , 146 ¹⁰ , 147 ¹² , 149 ²
Zoan			78 ^{12,43}		

To this table we shall add two others giving the times which the names and titles of the Deity occur in the Psalter and in other parts of the Old Testament.³⁷

A. SIMPLE NAMES FOR GOD

	Jeho- vah	Ado- nay	Elo- him	Eloah	El	Elyon	Shad- day
PENTATEUCH							
Genesis	146	7	164	0	3	0	1
Exodus	377	6	63	0	1	0	0
Leviticus	304	0	4	0	0	0	0
Numbers	389	1	9	0	9	1	2
Deuteronomy	527	0	38	1	2	0	0
	1743	14	278	1	15	1	3
HEXATEUCH							
P	785	0	95	0	0	0	0
JE	579	14	157	0	13	0	3
D	600	0	40	2	4	1	0
	1964	14	292	2	17	1	3

³⁷ These tables are from pp. 461-464 of the article entitled "The Names of God in the Old Testament" which was published in this REVIEW July 1920.

	Jeho- vah	Ado- nay	Elo- him	Eloah	El	Elyon	Shad- day
HISTORICAL BOOKS							
Joshua	225	1	19	0	0	0	0
Judges	179	2	40	0	0	0	0
Ruth	18	0	0	0	0	0	2
1 Samuel	415	0	52	0	0	0	0
2 Samuel	154	0	32	0	2	0	0
1 Kings	253	2	49	0	0	0	0
2 Kings	278	2	49	1	0	0	0
1 Chronicles	172	0	71	0	0	0	0
2 Chronicles	375	0	86	1	0	0	0
Ezra	37	0	13	0	1	0	0
Nehemiah	17	0	28	0	2	0	0
	2123	7	439	2	5	0	2
PROPHETS							
Isa. I-XXXIX	228	21	6	0	5	1	1
Isa. XL-LXVI	193	1	10	1	13	0	0
Jeremiah	670	0	27	0	1	0	0
Ezekiel	193	4	18	0	3	0	1
Daniel	7	11	72	2	1	0	0
Hosea	43	0	4	0	2	0	0
Joel	29	0	0	0	0	0	1
Amos	59	4	1	0	0	0	0
Jonah	22	0	12	0	0	0	0
Obadiah	7	0	0	0	0	0	0
Micah	37	1	1	0	2	0	0
Nahum	13	0	0	0	0	0	0
Habakkuk	12	0	0	2	0	0	0
Zephaniah	32	0	0	0	0	0	0
Haggai	28	0	0	0	0	0	0
Zechariah	143	1	1	0	1	0	0
Malachi	46	1	1	0	2	0	0
	1762	44	153	5	30	1	3
POETICAL BOOKS							
Psalms I.	271	12	20	1	11	4	0
II.	26	14	155	1	5	3	1
III.	43	14	44	0	14	9	0
IV.	101	1	6	0	4	4	1
V.	223	4	9	1	6	1	0
	664	45	234	3	40	21	2

	Jeho- vah	Ado- nay	Elo- him	Eloah	El	Elyon	Shad- day
Job	32	1	16	39	54	0	31
Proverbs	84	0	3	1	1	0	0
Lamentations	31	14	0	0	0	2	0
Ecclesiastes	0	0	40	0	0	0	0
Song	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	<hr/> 811	<hr/> 60	<hr/> 293	<hr/> 43	<hr/> 95	<hr/> 23	<hr/> 33
TOTALS							
Pentateuch	1743	14	278	1	15	1	3
Historical Books ..	2123	7	439	2	5	0	2
Prophets	1762	44	153	5	30	1	3
Poetical Books	811	60	293	43	95	23	33
	<hr/> 6439 ^a	<hr/> 125	<hr/> 1163	<hr/> 51	<hr/> 145	<hr/> 25	<hr/> 41

B. COMPOSITE NAMES FOR GOD*

	Jehovah	Adonay	Elohim	Eloah	El	Sabaoth	
Genesis	28	2	10	0	17	0	0
Exodus	4	0	7	0	6	0	0
Leviticus	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Numbers	1	0	2	0	1	0	0
Deuteronomy	7	2	1	1	11	0	0
Joshua	15	1	1	0	4	0	0
Judges	8	2	0	0	0	0	0
Ruth	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
1 Samuel	22	0	3	0	1	5	5
2 Samuel	11	6	4	0	2	6	5
1 Kings	24	1	3	0	0	3	1
2 Kings	13	0	0	0	1	2	2
1 Chronicles	19	0	8	0	0	3	3

^a *Jah* occurs twice in the Hexateuch (J E), forty times in the Psalms (once in Book II, twice in Book III, seven times in Book IV, thirty times in Book V). Cf. also Song viii. 6 (Cheyne, *Bampton Lectures*, p. 298).

* In this table all the compound names are given which *begin* with Jehovah, Adonay, etc., and only these. This accounts for the difference between the figures for column one and three as compared with those given on p. 463 of the article referred to above. In that article column one gives only the occurrences of "Jehovah-Elohim," while column three gives all the combinations of Elohim and not merely those in which it occurs at the beginning.

	Jeho- vah	Ado- nay	Elo- him	Eloah	El	Sabaoth	
2 Chronicles	48	0	8	0	0	0	0
Ezra	7	0	4	0	0	0	0
Nehemiah	3	0	3	1	3	0	0
Psalms	20	4	5	1	19	16	7
Job	0	0	0	2	0	0	0
Isa. i-xxxix	47	11	6	0	4	56	41
Isa. xl-lxvi	12	13	6	0	2	6	4
Jeremiah	85	10	6	0	2	83	34
Lamentations	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Ezekiel	0	217	7	0	3	0	0
Daniel	0	3	1	2	2	0	0
Hosea	1	0	0	0	1	1	0
Joel	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Amos	7	18	0	0	0	9	0
Jonah	2	0	0	0	1	0	0
Obadiah	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Micah	1	2	3	0	0	1	1
Nahum	2	0	0	0	1	2	2
Habakkuk	2	1	1	0	0	1	1
Zephaniah	2	0	1	0	0	2	1
Haggai	13	0	0	0	0	14	12
Zechariah	51	1	0	0	0	53	50
Malachi	25	0	1	0	1	24	24
Ecclesiastes	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Song	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Esther	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Proverbs	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	481 ^b	295	91	7	83	287 ^c	193 ^d
HEXATEUCH							
P	4	0	4	0	8	0	0
JE	39	2	17	0	17	0	0
D	12	3	0	1	10	0	0
	55	5	21	1	35 ^e	0	0

^b *Jah* occurs in combinations twice in the Psalms and three times in Isaiah, cf. *op. cit.*, p. 466.

^c This column includes all titles in which *Sabaoth* (hosts) occurs.

^d This column gives only the occurrences of the title, Jehovah of Sabaoth.

^e The four occurrences in Gen. xiv. make up the total of 35 for the Hexateuch enumerated above.

		Jeho- vah	Ado- nay	Elo- him	Eloah	El	Sabaoth
PSALMS							
Book	I.	0	0	6	0	1	2
	II.	0	4	9	0	7	6
	III.	1	1	7	0	8	8
	IV.	0	0	1	0	4	1
	V.	0	3	2	1	2	2
		<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
		1	8	25	1	22	19
							7

From these tables we obtain the following noteworthy testimony:

1. The only men named are: Aaron, Abiram, Abraham, David, Isaac, Israel, Jabin, Jacob, Lot, Levi(?), Moses, Melchizedek, Og, Phinehas, Sihon, Samuel, Sisera, Zeba and Zalmunna.

2. The nations and tribes, countries and cities, mentioned are: Ammon, Ashur, Amalek, Babel, Bashan, Benjamin, Canaan, Egypt, Edom, Ephraim, Ephratah, Ethiopia, Gebal, Gilead, Hagarenes, Ham, Israel, Ishmaelites, Jacob, Judah, Joseph, Jerusalem, Kedar, Kadesh, Manasseh, Moab, Midian, Meribah, Meshech, Naphtali, Ophir, Philistines, Rahab, Shechem, Shiloh, Succoth, Salem, Tarshish and Tyre.

3. The only mountains and rivers mentioned are Hermon, Horeb, Jordan, Lebanon, Mizar, Zion, Sinai, Sirion and Tabor.

4. As to the names and titles of God, we refer our readers not merely to the above tables, but to our article in the July number of this REVIEW for 1920, where a full discussion of the names for God in the Old Testament will be found. It is only necessary to state here, that no argument for the date of a psalm can be derived from the use of any one of the names for the Deity. And, if this be so, then any reader of the Old Testament will know that there is not one proper name in all the Psalter that may not have been used already in the time of David, king of Israel. Even in the case of

Psalm cxxxvii, it is not the use of Babylon, but the context, that shows us that the psalm was probably written in the generation after the captivity.

But, if all of these psalms were written late, what shall we say about the omission of all reference to Solomon and Shishak, to Hezekiah and Sargon and Sennacherib, to Jeremiah and Nebuchadnezzar, to Zerubbabel and Cyrus, to Ezra and Nehemiah? If they were written in Persian and Greek times, what about the absence of all direct mention of oppression under the kings of the Assyrians and Babylonians, of the Persians and Greeks? Is it not remarkable that whereas Melchizedek and Aaron and Phinehas are named, no mention occurs of Jehoiada or Hilkiah, or Jeshua, or Simon; that while Moses and Samuel are referred to, no allusion is made to Nathan, Elijah, Elisha, Isaiah, Hosea, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, Jonah, Daniel, or any of the prophets?

Had Horace sung only of Romulus and Numa's peaceful reign, or Tarquin's tyrant rule, or Cato's noble death; had he with grateful heart spoken only of Regulus and the Scauri, of "Paulus lavish of his manly soul" and of Fabricius brave, "of Curius, with locks unkempt, mighty in war and great Camillus too," we might have thought that the poet had lived in the second century B.C. But when he proceeds to celebrate the "Julian star, conspicuous among the lesser fires of night," and speaks of the "triumph just" over the humbled Parthians and Seres and Indians "who skirt the land that hails the rising sun"; when he assures us, that the host of Dacian Cotiso has perished, that the Medes in deadly feud contend among themselves, that the Cantabri are subdued and that the Scythian with bow unstrung prepares to fly, that Alexandria has opened wide its harbors to Augustus, and that the Nile, who hides his fountain head, and the Danube and the Tigris, swift as arrow head obey him, and that Britons and faithless Parthians are added to his sway so that while Caesar lives no one would dread the frost-chilled Scythian, or the brood which rugged Germans rear,

we know that Horace must have written odes as late as the time of Maecenas and Augustus.³⁸

So, if the psalms had been full of references to the heroes of faith down to the Maccabean times; if like Ben Sira (Ecclesiasticus) they had contained a brilliant eulogy of Simon, the High Priest,³⁹ or like First Maccabees had lauded the glories of Mattathias and his gifted sons,⁴⁰ we would be compelled to admit that some of them at least were from the second century B.C. But, as it is, there is no proof from the proper names alone that any one of the psalms was written later than the tenth century B.C.

But not merely is there no proof of lateness in the case of the proper names, it is equally true of the common terms in the Hebrew of the psalms. It has been the custom of critics of these psalms to pick out words occurring once, or a few times only, in the Hebrew of the Old Testament documents and found besides only in documents of the Old Testament admitted, or assumed, to be late (especially, words found besides in the Hebrew of the Talmud), and to affirm that these words prove that a given document must have been written in the post-Nehemian period of Old Testament literature.⁴¹

WORDS ALLEGED TO BE LATE

We are prepared to maintain that a large part of the words that are thus produced as evidence of the late date of documents containing them cannot themselves be proved to be late. For, first, no one can maintain that because a word occurs in a late document the word itself is therefore late; for in this case, if a late document was the only survival of

³⁸ See any edition of Horace but especially *The Poems of Horace* by A. Hamilton Bryce, LL.D., F.R.S.E. *et cet.*

³⁹ Ecclesiasticus, i.

⁴⁰ See the whole of First Maccabees.

⁴¹ The next three pages are taken, with some alterations from the writer's second article on "Scientific Biblical Criticism" published in this REVIEW in July 1919, pp. 417 ff.

a once numerous body of literature, every word in it would be late; which is absurd. Nor, secondly, can one maintain that a document is late merely because it contains words which do not occur in earlier ones, which are known to us. Every new find of Egyptian Aramaic papyri gives us words not known before except, if at all, in documents written hundreds of years later. Nor, thirdly, is a word to be considered as evidence of the lateness of a document in which it occurs simply because it occurs again in documents known to be late, such as the Hebrew parts of the Talmud. And yet, this is frequently affirmed by the critics. Thus Dr. Driver mentions about twenty of such words to prove that Daniel and Jonah are later by centuries than the times of which they treat. In this Dr. Driver was simply following in the footsteps of the German scholars who preceded him. It may be considered a sufficient answer to such alleged proofs to affirm (what anyone with a Hebrew concordance can confirm for himself) that Daniel, Jonah, Joel, and the Psalter, and other documents of the Old Testament have no larger percentage of such words than those which they assign to an early date, and that Is. xxiv-xxvii and Psalm lxxix, which they consider to be among the latest parts of their respective books are distinguished from most of the other parts of the Old Testament by having no such words at all. Finally, it is obvious that a kind of proof that will prove almost everything to be late, and especially the parts considered late to be early, is absurd and inadmissible as evidence in a case designed to prove that some documents are later than others because they contain words of this kind. For it is certain that if all are late, then none are early—a conclusion which would overthrow the position of all critics, radical as well as conservative; and since this conclusion is desired and maintained by none, it must be dismissed as *absurd*.

In proof, however, that such words are found in every book, and in almost every part of every book, of the Old Testament we subjoin the following tables. These tables are based on special concordances of every book and of every

part of every book of the Old Testament, prepared by and now in the possession of the writer of this article. In accordance with the laws of evidence, that "witnesses must give evidence of facts," that "an expert may state general facts which are the result of scientific knowledge, and that an expert may give an account of experiments [hence, also, of investigations] performed by him for the purpose of forming his opinion,"⁴² it may add force and clearness to the evidence about to be presented, if an account is first given of the way in which the facts upon which the tables are based were collected. One whole summer was spent in gathering from a Hebrew concordance all the words in the Old Testament that occur there five times or less, giving also the places where the words occur. A second summer sufficed for making from this general concordance a special concordance for each book. In the third summer, special concordances were made for J, E, D, H, and P, for each of the five books of the Psalter and for each of the psalms; for each of the parts of Proverbs, and of the alleged parts of Isaiah, Micah, Zechariah, Chronicles, Ezra, Nehemiah; and for such parts as Gen. xiv and the poems contained in Gen. xlix, Ex. xv, Deut. xxxii, xxxiii and Judges v. Then, each of the words of this kind was sought for in the Hebrew of the post-biblical Jewish writers and the percentage of the Old Testament words found in the post-biblical literature was taken.

A study of these percentages should convince everyone that the presence of such words in a document is no proof of its relative lateness.⁴³

⁴² Stephen, *The Law of Evidence*, pp. 100, 103, 112.

⁴³ In explanation of these tables it may be said that they are prepared with special reference to the critical analysis of the Old Testament. Thus, the Pentateuch is arranged according to the documents J, E, D, H and P, and the Proverbs are divided into seven portions (following Driver's *Literature of the Old Testament*). The first column of the tables gives for each book, or part of a book, the number of words occurring five times or less in the Old Testament that are found in it; and the second column, the percentage of these words that are to be found in the same sense in the Hebrew of the Talmud.

TABLE OF HEBREW WORDS

Number of words Per- occur- cent- ring in age O.T. of these five words times in or less Talmud			Number of words Per- occur- cent- ring in age O.T. of these five words times in or less Talmud		
Proverbs xxxi 1-9	0	00.0	Micah iii	15	33.3
Zechariah iii	0	00.0	Proverbs x-xxii. 16	80	33.8
Isaiah xxiv-xxvii	0	00.0	Proverbs xxii. 17-		
Obadiah	7	14.3	xxiv	30	36.7
Isaiah xxxvi-ix	7	14.3	Sam.-Kings	356	37.2
Judges-Ruth	107	15.8	Habakkuk	34	38.2
Nahum	6	16.7	Joel	28	39.3
Ezra i-vi	6	16.7	Jonah	15	40.0
Micah ii	11	18.2	Hosea	65	41.5
Isaiah xxxiv-v	5	20.0	Jehovist (J)	162	44.4
Isaiah xiii-xiv	10	22.2	Zephaniah	31	45.2
Isaiah (1st pt.)	121	22.3	Amos	50	46.0
Malachi	13	23.1	Elohist (E)	119	48.7
Ezekiel	335	24.9	Proverbs xxxi 10-31	6	50.0
Lamentations	56	25.0	Holiness Code (H)	48	50.0
Haggai	4	25.0	Chronicles	144	51.5
Ezra vii-x	8	25.0	Proverbs xxv-xxix	52	51.9
Zechariah ii	16	25.0	Esther	57	52.6
Isaiah xl-lxvi	62	25.8	Priest Code (P)	192	3.1
Proverbs i-ix	69	27.5	Deuteronomist		
Daniel	47	29.8	(D)	154	53.2
Zechariah i	22	30.8	Proverbs xxx	15	53.5
Zechariah iii	12	30.8	Song of Songs	99	54.6
Micah i	22	31.8	Nehemiah	48	56.3
Job	374	31.0	Ecclesiastes	77	57.1
Jeremiah	278	32.1	Memoirs of Nehe-		
Psalms	514	33.1	miah	27	59.3

A glance at this table shows that there are 514 such words in the Psalter and that 33.1 per cent. of these words are found in the Hebrew of the Talmud. The special concordances which I have prepared show further that 27 of the psalms have no words of the kind, 27 of them have one each, 22, two; 16, three; 43, four; 11, five; 12, six; 5, seven; 7, eight; the 88th has nine; the 45th and 89th, eleven each; 35th

and 73rd, twelve each; the 54th has thirteen; the 139th, fourteen; the 68th, nineteen, and the 119th, twenty-five.

But, that the occurrence of such words in a document is no proof of the lateness of that document is shown by the fact that some of the parts claimed by the critics as the earliest have a larger percentage of them than those that are classed as late. Thus J has 44.4, E 48.7, and D 53.2 per cent.; Amos 46., Hosea 41.5, and Prov. x-xxii 33.8 per cent.; whereas, Prov. xxxi. 1-9, Zech. (3rd part), and Is. xxiv-xxvii, which the critics date as post-captivity, have no words of this kind.

But, leaving this general survey of the vocabulary and coming down to particular instances, is it not extraordinary that if all, or many, of the psalms had been written after the capture of Jerusalem by Nebuchadnezzar, only one direct reference is made to that event? The approximate dates of the Sibylline Oracles, of the parts of Enoch, of the Psalms of Solomon, and of other apocryphal and pseudepigraphical literature of the Jews, are fixed by the allusions to past or passing events; why not apply the same criteria to the psalms?

Taking up, then, first of all, the references to the captivity we find that, as has just been intimated, the psalms are almost entirely free from them. Two roots and their derivatives are found in Hebrew to express the idea of "take captive" *gālā* (גָּלָה) and *shāvā* (שָׁבָה). *Gālā* and its derivatives *gōlā* and *gālûth* are never found in the psalms. *Shāvā* and its derivatives *sh'vî*, *shavyā*, *sh'vîth* are never found. The only one occurring is *sh'vûth* in xiv. 7 (liii. 7), lxxxv. 2, cxxvi. 4. But, this does not prove that these psalms must have been written after the fall of Jerusalem; for Philistines, Moabites, Ammonites, Egyptians, Syrians, Edomites, and Assyrians, had been taking Israelites captive ever since the beginning of their history. This very word *sh'vûth* is used in Hos. vi. 11, Am. ix. 14, Joel iv. 1, Zep. ii. 7, iii. 20 and Deut. xxx. 3; *shavya* is used in Deut. xxi. 11, xxxii. 42, *sh'vî*, in Ex. xii. 29, Num. xxi. 2, xxxi. 12, 19, 26, Deut. xxi. 10, 13, xxviii.

41; *sh'vîth*, in Num. xxi. 29, Zep. ii. 7; and the root in Gen. xiv. 14, xxxi. 26, xxxiv. 29, Ex. xxii. 9 E, Num. xxi. 1, xxiv. 22, xxxi. 9, Jud. v. 12, 1 Sam. xxx. 2, 3, 5 and Ob. 11. The other root, *gālā*, is used in Amos i. 5, v. 5, 27, vi. 7 *bis*, vii. 11, 17, Is. v. 13, Mi. i. 16, Na. ii. 8, Jud. xviii. 30, 2 Sam. xv. 19; the derivative *gôlā* is found in Am. i. 15. Na. iii. 10 and *gālûth* in Am. i. 6 *bis*, 9, Ob. 20 *bis*.

Furthermore, it is passing strange that, in all the references and allusions to the political circumstances of the writers and people, a king is so often spoken of as the ruler of the land; whereas *paḥath*, *sagan* and *satrap* and all the designations of Babylonian, Persian and Greek rulers are absent.⁴⁴ Besides, it is noteworthy that if the psalms were written after the Captivity, in the period when the high priests were the supreme national rulers, no allusion whatever should be made to their having exercised their high prerogatives.⁴⁵ One of the Simons is eulogized by Ben Sira in a manner surpassing what he gives to any other of the fathers of Israel,⁴⁶ Josephus mentions at least fifteen high priests who functioned from Jeshua to the year 150 B.C.⁴⁷ But not one of all these great leaders of the church of the second temple is deemed worthy of mention by any of the numerous authors of the alleged post-captivity psalms!

Again, if the psalms were written at a time when the whole life of the people centered about the law and the priestly regime and the national religion, it is surprising that the things for which men lived and died are scarcely noted in

⁴⁴ Pharaoh is mentioned in Ps. cxxxv. 9, cxxxvi. 15. In post-captivity works we find the Pharaoh of the oppression mentioned in the prayer of Nehemiah (ix. 10) and the daughter of Pharaoh in 1 Chron. iv. 18 and 2 Chron. viii. 11 of the wife of Solomon; but there is no direct reference to any post-captivity heathen king, ruler, or governor, by name or otherwise, in any of the Psalms.

⁴⁵ Josephus is full of such references.

⁴⁶ See above note 39.

⁴⁷ The High Priests mentioned by Josephus are in order Jeshua, Joacim, Eliashib, Judas, John, Jaddua, Onias, Hezekiah, Simon, Eleazar, Manasseh, Onias, Simon, Onias, Jesus, Jason, Onias, Menelaus, Onias, Alcimus, Judas, Jonathan.

the psalms. The Sabbath is never mentioned except in the heading of Ps. lxii. The Passover, Tabernacles, and Purim are never referred to, and the pilgrim festivals (*ḥaggîm*) but twice.⁴⁸ The words for offering (*korban*), heave and wave offering, and fire offering do not occur. The word for bloody sacrifice (*zebah*) occurs only in Book I, iv. 5, xxvii. 6, xl. 6; II. l. 5, 8, li. 10, 17, 19; IV. cvi. 28; and V. cvii. 22, cxvi. 17. Except in Ps. cxix, the word for law is found only five times in Book I, four in Book III and twice in Book IV.

It is very singular, also, that the word for singers *m'shôrêr* which occurs 9 times in Chronicles, 5 times in Ezra and 14 times in Nehemiah is never found in the psalms.⁴⁹ Instead, we find *shârîm* (lxviii. 25, lxxxvii. 7), a word found also in 2 Sam. xix. 35, 1 Ki. x. 12. All the musical instruments mentioned in the psalms are mentioned also in pre-captivity documents.⁵⁰

And, finally, no argument for the lateness of a psalm can be derived from the names for God's dwelling place found in it; for every one of the eleven, or more, words used to denote this idea is found in pre-exilic literature.⁵¹

It has, indeed, been alleged that the *mô'ēd* (מועד) of Ps.

⁴⁸ Ps. lxxxii. 3 (4), xlii. 4 (5).

⁴⁹ *Shârîm* occurs in 2 Sam. xix. 35, 1 Ki. x. 16, Ezek. xl. 44, Ecc. ii. 8, 2 Chron. ix. 11, xxiii. 13, xxxv. 25, and Pss. lxviii. 25, lxxxvii. 7; whereas, *m'shôrêr* is found only in 1 Chron. vi. 33, ix. 33, xv. 16, 19, 27, 2 Chron. v. 13, xx. 21, xxix. 28, xxxv. 15, Ezra ii. 41, 61, 70, vii. 7, x. 24, Neh. vii. 1, 67, 73, x. 29, xi. 22, 23, xii. 28, 29, 42, 45, 46, 47, xiii. 5, 10.

⁵⁰ For example *nēbel* (Am. v. 23, vi. 5, Is. v. 12, 1 Sam. x. 5, 2 Sam. vi. 5, 1 Kings x. 12); *kinnôr* (Is. i-xxxix. 5 times, Sam. 4 times, 1 Kings x. 12, and elsewhere); *ûgāb* (Gen. iv. 21 J); *tôf* (Is. I, 3 times, Jer. xxxi. 4, 1 Chron. xiii. 8, Job xxi. 12, Jud. xi. 34, Ek. xxviii. 13, Gen. xxxi. 27, Ex. xv. 20 *bis*); *salsēl* (2 Sam. vi. 5); *shôfār* (Ho., Jo., Am., Is., Jud., Sam., Kings); and *ḥašoś'roth* (Ho. v. 8, 2 Kings xi. 14 *bis*). The only word for a musical instrument found in the psalms and not in other pre-captivity literature is *'āsôr* "an instrument of ten strings" (Ps. xxxiii. 2, xcii. 4, cxliv. 9); but this word does not occur in this sense anywhere but in these psalms.

⁵¹ These words are; *'ôhel* (tent); *bayith* (house; house of Jehovah; house of God); *hêkāl* (temple); *miqdāsh* (holy place); *ma'on* and *me'onah* (habitation); *miškān* (tabernacle); *sôk* (booth); *qôdesh* (sanctuary); *d'bir* (oracle); and *shebeth* (dwelling).

lxxiv. 8 shows that this psalm was written in the time of the Maccabees. This allegation is without any real evidence either in history, or language. Wellhausen himself thought that it was most probable that the synagogue originated during the exile.⁵² But the reasons given—that in the strange environment synagogues must be presupposed in order to account for the religious fervor of the exiles—are equally good for the exiles carried away by Tiglath-Pileser and other Assyrian kings.⁵³ The need of a place of worship and instruction, of singing and prayer, must always have existed for those who could not go up to Jerusalem. It was one of the principal duties of the Levites to teach the law and, being scattered throughout all Israel, they must have had houses of some sort to teach in.⁵⁴

However, this is all conjecture. The fact is that Ps. lxxiv. 8 is the only place in the Old Testament that a *mô'ēd* in the sense of building is mentioned. But, why is this an argument for the late date of the Psalms, even if, with the critics, we put two-thirds, or three-fourths, of the Hebrew literature after the captivity? Synagogues are not mentioned in the Apocrypha nor in the voluminous literature of the Pseudepigrapha, nor in the Zadokite Fragments. There is no more evidence for houses of the kind having been burned down, or even of their having existed, between 50 B.C. and 550 B.C. than between 550 B.C. and 1100 B.C.—except in this one verse. Certainly, in New Testament times they all believed

⁵² *Prolegomena*, 2nd Ed. p. 193.

⁵³ Tiglath-Pileser IV says that he killed Pekah king of the Beth-'Omri and carried the whole of its inhabitants to the land of *Assuri* (KB. II. 33), and Sennacherib says (KB. II. 95) that he put Hezekiah under tribute, captured 46 of his cities and carried captive 200150 persons from them.

⁵⁴ In 2 Chron. xxxv. 3 it is said to have been one of the duties of the Levites in Josiah's time to teach all Israel, and in 2 Chron. xxx. 22 it is said that Hezekiah encouraged the Levites who taught the good knowledge of the Lord. In 2 Chron. xix. 8-10, Jehoshaphat appoints them to instruct the people in the law and commandment, the statutes and judgments of the Lord, so that they should not trespass and incur His wrath.

that "from the first generations onward Moses had in every city those who proclaimed him, being read in the synagogues every Sabbath day" (Acts xv. 17).⁵⁵

As to the word *mô'ēd* in Ps. lxxiv. 8, there is no doubt that it generally means "a time appointed, a season, a festival." But the form may just as well denote an appointed place, or a place for holding a festival. This is true in all the Semitic languages.⁵⁶ The word, in the sense of "place of meeting," is, however, no proof of lateness; for it is not found in this sense in later Hebrew, in Aramaic, or in any Semite language or dialect. While the word, therefore, is evidence that there were synagogues before the psalm was written, it is no evidence at all as to *when* the psalm was written. The Targum renders the word in Ps. lxxiv. 8 by *me'ar'āyyā*; a word occurring in this sense no where else in the Aramaic of the Targum and Talmud.⁵⁷ The root word means "to meet," "to keep a festival." In this passage the Targum agrees literally with the Hebrew: "they burnt the places on which they kept the festivals." Jerome has "they have burnt all the solemnities of God." Symmachus reads: "they have burned all the ordinances of God in the land." The Syriac Peshitto renders the clause by, "they destroyed all his festivals," as do, also, the Lxx, Arab., Eth., Lat.-Vulg. For the synagogue building the Aramaic of the Targum uses *beth urpana* or *beth kenish-ta*; the Syriac, *beth shabbetha*; the Ethiopic, *makrab*; the Arabic, *jami al-yahud*. It seems evident that not much of an

⁵⁵ We have taken the meaning of *archaios* in Acts xv. 17 to be what Cremer maintains in his *Biblico-Theological Lexicon of New Testament Greek*.

⁵⁶ For example in Arabic *masrab* place for drinking, *maktab* a place where writing is taught, *majlis* time or place of sitting (Wright, *Arabic Grammar*, p. 221); in Ethiopic, *maḥram* temple (Dillmann, *Aethiop. Gram.*, p. 194); in Assyrian, *malaku* where one goes, *mushabu* where one dwells (Delitzsch *Ass. Gram.*, p. 171); in Syriac, *mauthebo* where one sits, *maškan* tent (Nöldeke, *Syriac Gram.*, p. 126).

⁵⁷ Compare Lewy, *Chaldäisches Wörterbuch* and Brederek, *Concordance to Onkelos*. For synagogue as a place the Arameans commonly use words compounded with *beth*, such as *beth ulpana* (house of learning) or *beth shabbetha* (sabbath-house).

argument for the date of a document can be obtained from a word used in a sense in which it never occurs in any other document of any language, dialect, or time. It is very strange, if it meant the synagogue building, that the Lxx and the translation of the Targum, and the Syriac versions, and Symmachus and Jerome and all the learned Jews who assisted them, should have been ignorant of this meaning. Their very ignorance of its apparent meaning is, therefore, a proof for the early date of the psalm in which it is found.

It is further alleged on the part of the critics that there are Aramaic loan-words scattered here and there in the Psalter and that these Aramaisms prove the lateness of the psalms in which they occur. This line of argument is fallacious, because it assumes that Aramaisms in a Hebrew document show the lateness of the document, and because it assumes in the case of most of these words that they are Aramaic, whereas it cannot be proved that they are Aramaic at all. In proof of these two statements in general we refer to the article on "Aramaisms in the Old Testament" published in the April number of this REVIEW for 1925.

Of the 356 words discussed in that article 75 are found in the Psalter. Counting repetitions the numbers of words and occurrences of the words in the five books of the Psalter are as follows:

	I	II	III	IV	V	Total
Words	16	30	12	14	26	98
Occurrence	29	43	15	21	37	145

Of these 75 words, only 15 can with any justification be called Aramaisms; and of these only 8 occur in psalms ascribed to David and one more in a heading of a Davidic psalm. These nine words are: (1) ^anāḥā (אָנָה); (2) ^anāqā (אָנָקָה); (3) d'mûth (דְּמוּת); (4) millā (מִלָּה); (5) kôshārā (כּוֹשָׁרָה); (6) ḥ^anukkā (חֲנֻכָּה); (7) nāḥath (נָחַת); (8) ḥāwā (חֹוָה); (9) 'essaq (אֶסֶק).

1. Of the first word, ^anāḥā, it may be said that the root occurs in Arabic and Assyrian and in the Hebrew of Ex. ii. 23, Joel i. 18, Is. xxiv. 7, Prov. xxix. 2, Lam. i. 4, 8, 11, 21

and Ezekiel ix. 4, xxi. 6 *bis*, 7 and the form in Is. xxi. 2, xxxv. 10, li. 11, Jer. xlv. 3, Lam. i. 22, and Job iii. 24 and xxiii. 2. Who knows enough to say, in view of this evidence for a primitive Semitic root that David could not have used this word?

2. The second word *'anāqā* is found in the Bible outside the Psalms only in Mal. ii. 13 and the root in Jer. li. 52 and Ezek. ix. 4, xxiv. 17, xxvi. 15. Neither root nor form has been found in the pre-Christian Aramaic either of the Bible or of the inscriptions; nor are they found in the Targum of Onkelos, nor in New Hebrew, nor in New Aramaic. In Syriac the simple stem is not used and the noun and verb occur first in the Peshitto version, which was not made, probably, before the second century A.D. What kind of scientific criticism is this, that will affirm that the Old Testament Hebrew writers borrowed a word or root from the Aramaic when so far as we know from documents (and there is no other way of knowing) the word occurs in Biblical Hebrew at least 700 years before it is found in any Aramaic document of any time or place? To call such guesswork science would be laughable, if it were not monstrous.

3. As to the third word *d'mûth*, we have shown in our articles on the "Scientific Criticism of the Old Testament" that the ending *ûth* is found in Babylonian frequently and as early as the time of Hammurabi. The Hebrew root is found in Is. i. 9, x. 7, Jud. xx. 5, 2 Sam. xxi. 5 and in twenty-seven other places in the Old Testament and the noun in 2 Ki. xvi. 10, Is. xiii. 4, sixteen times in Ezekiel, and seven other places in the Old Testament Hebrew. It does not occur in the Aramaic of the Old Testament nor of the inscriptions, nor anywhere else till the second century A.D.

4. As to the fourth of these words *millā*, it is found in Prov. xxiii. 9 and 2 Sam. xxiii. 2, as well as Ps. xix. 4 and cxxxix. 4. Besides these four places, the word occurs only in Job, a book of doubtful age.

5. If *kôshārā* be taken in the sense of "prosperity," as in the Revised version, it may be compared with the Babylonian

word *kushir* found twice in the Omen Tablets from the time of Abraham. If it be taken in the sense of "chains," as in the King James version, it may be compared to the Babylonian word *kušurru* "band."⁵⁸

6. As for the word for "dedication" (*h^anukkā*, Ps. xxxi.), it is not found in Babylonian, Arabic, Syriac, Mandaean, Palmyrene, Nabatean or Palestinian Syriac, Egypto-Aramaic, or Phenician. The only places it occurs in any Aramaic dialect are in the Samaritan transliteration of the Hebrew and in the Samaritan Targum and the Targum of Onkelos for Num. vii. 10, 11, 84, 88, Deut. xx. 5 *bis* and in the Targum of the Pseudo-Jonathan for Numbers vii.; and in Dan. iii. 2, 3, Ezra vi. 16, 17. In 1 Kings viii. 63 and Ps. xxx. 1, the Aramaic Targum transliterates it. In 1 Kings viii. 63, 1 Chr. vii. 5, 2 Chr. vii. 9 and in Num. and Deut. the Syriac renders by *ḥadash*.⁵⁹ In view of the evidence, it seems that we have here an example of a Hebraism in Aramaic rather than of an Aramaism in Hebrew.⁶⁰

⁵⁸ Found in the phrase *kusurra esirma* "bind with a bandage," with which may be compared *kusur libbi lišbat* "let him seize the band (?) of my heart" (See Haupt in ZK. III 276, and Scheil in ZA. x. 205 and Muss Arnolt, *Handwörterbuch*, p. 451). Dennifeld in his *Geburtsomina*, xxx. R 26 and 27 gives *kušir illak* and *la kušir illak* "he will go with or without ease, or success" (Lauterkeit?). Besides, this root and its derivatives are not found in Aramaic till A.D. 137 and in the Targum of Onkelos, and of the Samaritans. The Hadad inscription of 722 B.C. and the Egyptian papyri (Cowley Aramaic Papyri of the Fifth Century B.C. p. 138) use *Yāshar* (ישר).

⁵⁹ Literally, *ḥadash* means "to make new" and *busomo* "sweetness, joy." In Neh. xii. 27, the Syriac fails to translate the first occurrence and renders the second by *busomo*.

⁶⁰ I have compared the vocabulary of the Aramaic of the Targum and Talmud with the Syriac-Aramaic and I find there are about 600 words in the New Aramaic as given in Dalmau's *Aramäisch-Neuhebräischer Wörterbuch*, which are found in the Hebrew of the Old Testament but not in Syriac. Since the Targums are a translation of the Hebrew Old Testament made by and for Jews and since the Talmud is a Jewish commentary on the Hebrew Old Testament; and since both Targums and Talmud were made hundreds or thousands of years after the originals were written, it seems to me that we ought to call such words Hebraisms in Aramaic and not Aramaisms in Hebrew. I can see how

7. In the case of *nāḥath*, it is doubtful if it ever occurs in the Psalter in the sense of the Aramaic word meaning "to come down." To be sure, this might be the root of forms found in Pss. xviii. 35, xxxviii. 2 (3) *bis* and lxv. 10 (11); but these forms may just as well be taken from *hāthath*, *nū^ah* or *nāḥaḥ*. Only in the margin do the English versions suggest that the verb may have the idea of "come down."⁶¹

8. The *hāwā* of Ps. xix. 3 may be the same as the Babylonian *emu*⁶²; but more probably it is connected with *amu* "to speak." Compare the Palestinian Syriac *ḥama*, "to see." Outside of Ps. xix. 3, it occurs only in Job xv. 17, xxxii. 10, 17, xxxvi. 2.

9. The *'essaḥ* of Ps. cxxxix. 8 is probably the same as the Babylonian *šaḫu* "to be high" frequently used in connection with heaven.⁶³

However, if our readers prefer to look upon some of these words as Aramaisms, let them remember that there is no reason why a poet of David's time may not have used Ara-

the Targums and Talmud could have borrowed from the Old Testament; but I cannot get it through my head how the Old Testament writers could have borrowed from the Targums and Talmud. I can see how it is possible that Professors Voltz, Smith and Moffatt may have corrupted the text of Jeremiah; but I cannot see how Jeremiah can properly be accused of corrupting the true and original text of Voltz, Smith and Moffatt.

⁶¹ The verb *nāḥath* may possibly be found in Pss. xviii. 35, xxxviii. 3 *bis*, lxv. 11. It may, also, be the root of forms in 2 Sam. xxii. 35, 2 Kings vi. 9, Prov. xvii. 10, Joel iv. 11, Jer. xxi. 13. It is a singular fact, that the ancient versions are agreed as to the root and meaning in no one of these nine places, and that they point the consonants as if the root were *ḥatat*, *ḥut*, *ḥata*, *ḥit*, *nuaḥ*, *naḥa*; or probably in the Syriac "he shall come" of Jer. xxi. 13 and in the Targum of Prov. xvii. 10 as from *naḥat*.

⁶² Amiaud in *Rev. d'Assyriologie* II, 11. The *m* changes to *w* according to the rule given in Delitzsch's *Assyrische Grammatik* §§ 102-104.

⁶³ *'essaḥ* is usually connected with the Aramaic *selak* "to go up." It may just as well come from a root *sanāḫu* "to reach, arrive at," a word very common in the letters of Hammurapi. (See King, *The Life and Letters of Hammurapi*) Or, more probably, it is from a root equivalent to the Babylonian *šaḫu* "to go up," used frequently of going up to heaven. (See Muss-Arnolt, p. 1097).

maisms, inasmuch as David and Solomon ruled over all the Arameans as far as the Euphrates, including Damascus, Hamath, Maachah and Zobah.⁶⁴

We see, therefore, from the analogy of Egyptians, Sumerians, Babylonians, and Assyrians, that the presumption is in favor of the Hebrews having had psalmody in their religious services from the beginning of their existence. We have seen, further, that this presumption from analogy is supported by the allusions to music and song found in the prophets and historical writings of the Old Testament, and that there is nothing against it in the language or ideas of the psalms themselves. We are now prepared to examine the *prima facie* evidence of the headings of the psalms as presented in the Hebrew text as it has come down to us. We have shown above that there is no reason for supposing that these psalms may not originally have had headings and that the text of these headings may not have been correctly copied and transmitted from the time of their authors, just as in the case of Egyptian and other ancient heathen authors, but it may be best to show from several analogies outside the psalter that headings for psalms were customary in ancient times. We shall, therefore, give three analogies of headings, two from heathen sources and one from the Bible outside the psalter.

The first of these analogies are the odes of Horace. Our readers will readily see for themselves that every ode of Horace contains a superscription containing the name of the person to whom the ode is addressed, most frequently the name of Augustus, or Maecenas. These headings are useful in helping us to understand the character and purpose of the particular ode to which they are prefixed.

A more striking analogy are the Sumerian and Babylonian psalms. Since many of these originated before the time of Abraham, they are of especial interest in their bearing on the subject of the headings of the psalms, because they show that

⁶⁴ See my article on "Aramaisms in the Old Testament" in this REVIEW for April 1925, and Kraeling, *Aram und Israel*.

long before the time of David it was natural and common to have such headings. To be sure, the Sumerian psalms have in subscription what the Hebrew psalms and Horace's odes have in superscription; but, we find that the purpose was the same in both. For, the Sumerian hymns sometimes mention the name of the author, the musical instrument employed as accompaniment, the tune to which it was to be sung, or the collection to which it belonged, the kind of musical composition, the god in whose worship the psalm was sung, and the purpose of the psalm.⁶⁵

Lastly, that headings were customary in Hebrew poetry outside the psalter is evident all through the Old Testament, as the following examples show:

1. In Ex. xv. 1, it is said, that "Moses and the children of Israel sang this song to Jehovah" and in vs. 20 that Miriam the prophetess took a timbrel and all the women went after her with timbrels and dances singing the song.

2. In Deut. xxxi. 30, it is said, that "Moses spake the words" of the song recorded in chapter xxxii, which follows.

3. In Deut. xxxiii. 1, it is said; "This is the blessing with which Moses the man of God blessed the children of Israel before his death."

4. In Judges v. 1, it is said; "Then sang Deborah and Barak," etc. There follows the beautiful psalm of verses 2-31.

5. In 1 Sam. ii. 1, it is said: "And Hannah prayed and said." Then, her prayer follows in poetical form (vss. 1-10).

6. In 2 Sam. i. 17, it is said that "David lamented with this lamentation over Saul and over Jonathan his son."

7. In 2 Sam. xxii. 1, it is said; "David spake the words of this song in the day that the Lord delivered him," etc.

⁶⁵ From Langdon's work on the Sumerian and Babylonian Psalms, we learn that the psalms were addressed to the gods Bau, Enlil, Ningirgulu, Ramman and Tammuz; that the authors of some of the Psalms are named; that musical instruments are mentioned in the subscriptions; that different names for the different kinds of psalms are employed; that the purpose of the psalm is often stated; and that there were different series or books of psalms.

8. According to Jon. ii. 2, Jonah prayed and said in poetry verses 3-10.

9. In Habakkuk iii. 1, the superscription reads: "The prayer of Habakkuk, the prophet, upon Shigionoth."

10. The Book of Proverbs begins with the title: "The proverbs of Solomon the son of David, king of Israel." Chap. x. has the heading: "The proverbs of Solomon." Chap. xxv. has the heading: "These also are proverbs of Solomon, which the men of Hezekiah king of Judah copied out." So, also, chaps. xxx. and xxxi. have special headings: as, also, "The Song of Songs which is Solomon's."

11. The occasion and authorship of the psalms recorded in Gen. xlix, and Isaiah v. xii. xxxviii and elsewhere are also definitely stated.

12. The fact that the prophecies of Isaiah and the other prophets usually begin with a heading would lead us to expect to find that the nine strictly poetical works should also have them. And, indeed, according to the *prima facie* evidence of the text that has come down to us 136 out of 150 of the Psalms have some kind of a title, or heading; and we shall now proceed to investigate these headings, with a view to determining their trustworthiness as witnesses to the author and age, and to the purpose and occasion of the psalms.

HEADINGS OF THE PSALMS

For the convenience of treatment we shall first consider these titles or headings, from three points of view—their kinds, their vocabulary and their text; and then we shall show the bearing of our conclusions upon the history of the Psalter.

I. KINDS OF HEADINGS

(1) The following psalms have for a heading only the name of the author preceded by the preposition "by" (*Lamedh*); to wit, "by David" (xxv-xxviii, xxxv, xxxvii, ciii, cxxxviii, cxliv); "by Solomon" (lxxii). [10]

(2) "A psalm" (*mizmôr*) (xcviii). [1]

(3) "Hallelujah" [cvi (?), cxi, (?), cxii, cxiii, cxxxv, cxlvi-cl]. [10]

(4) "A psalm" (*mizmôr*) + "by David" (xv, xxiii, xxiv, xxix, ci, cx, cxli, cxliii); + "by Asaph" (1, lxxiii, lxxix, lxxxii). [12]

(5) "A prayer" (*t'phillā*) + "by David" (xvii, lxxxvi); + "by Moses the man of God" (xc). [3]

(6) "A maschil" + "by David" (xxxii); + "by Asaph" (lxxiv, lxxviii); + "by Ethan the Ezrahite" (lxxxix). [4]

(7) "A michtam" + "by David" (xvi). [1]

(8) "A hymn" (*t'hillāh*) + "by David" (cxlv.). [1]

(9) "A song" + "a psalm" + "by David" (cviii); "by Asaph" (lxxxiii); "by the sons of Korah" (xlviii, lxxxvii).⁶⁶ [4]

(10) "To the precentor (*m'naṣṣēah*)" + "by David" (xi, xiv). [2]

(11) "To the precentor" + "a psalm" + "by David" (xiii, xix, xx, xxi, xxxi, xl, xli, lxiv, cix, cxxxix, cxl); + "by the sons of Korah" (xlvii, xlix, lxxxv). Of these xl, xlvii, xlix, lxxxv, cix, and cxxxix put "a psalm" after the name of the author. [14]

(12) "To the precentor" + "*l* or '*al Jeduthun*" + "a psalm" + "by David" (xxxix, lxii). [2]

(13) "To the precentor" + "a psalm" + "by David" + "a song" (*shîr*) (lxv). [1]

(14) "To the precentor" + "by David" + "a psalm" + "a song" (lxviii). [1]

(15) "To the precentor" + "a song" + "a psalm" (lxvi). [1]

(16) "To the precentor" + "with musical instruments" + "a psalm" + "a song" (lxvii). [1]

(17) "To the precentor" + the name of a musical instrument + "a psalm" + "by David" (iv, v, vi, viii, xii, lxi); + "by Asaph" (lxxxix); + "by the sons of Korah" (lxxxiv).⁶⁶ [8]

(18) "To the precentor" + the tune (?) + "a psalm" + "by David" (ix, xxii). [2]

(19) "To the precentor" + "by the sons of Korah" + "upon Alamoth" + "a song" (xlvi). [1]

(20) "To the precentor" + "upon Shoshannim," + "by David" (lxix). [1]

⁶⁶ In (9) and (17) psalms xlviii, lxi, lxxxix, lxxxiv, have the name of the author before "a psalm."

- (21) "To the precentor" + "by David" + the purpose of the psalm (lxx). [1]
- (22) "A psalm" + the purpose of the psalm (c). [1]
- (23) "A prayer" + the purpose (?) of the psalm (cii). [1]
- (24) "A psalm" + "a song" + "for the sabbath day" (xcii). [1]
- (25) "A psalm" + "by David" + the time or occasion (iii) or purpose (xxxviii). [2]
- (26) "A psalm" + "a song" + "at the dedication of the house" + "by David" (xxx). [1]
- (27) "By David" + the occasion of the psalm (xxxiv). [1]
- (28) "A psalm" + "by David" + the place it was written (lxiii). [1]
- (29) "A maschil" + "by David" + "when he was in the cave" + "a prayer" (cxlii). [1]
- (30) "A *shiggaion*" + "by David" + the occasion (vii). [1]
- (31) "A song (*shîr*) of the ascents" (cxx, cxxi, cxxiii, cxxv, cxxvi, cxxviii-cxxx, cxxxii, cxxxiv). [10]
- (32) "A song of the ascents" + "by David" (cxxii, cxxiv, cxxxi, cxxxiii); + "by Solomon" (cxxxvii). [5]
- (33) "To the precentor" + "a psalm" + "by David" + the occasion (li). [1]
- (34) "To the precentor" + "a maschil" + "by the sons of Korah" (xlii); + "by David" + "when Doeg the Edomite came in," etc. (lii). [2]
- (35) "To the precentor" + "on musical instruments" + "machil" + "by David" (lv); + the occasion (liv). [2]
- (36) "To the precentor" + "by the servant of the Lord" + "by David" (xxxvi); + the occasion (xviii). [2]
- (37) "To the precentor" + "on musical instruments" + "a psalm." + "by Asaph" + "a song" (lxxvi). [1]
- (38) "To the precentor" + "Destroy not" (*'al tashhîth*) + "by David" + "a michtam" (lviii). [1]
- (39) Same as No. 38 + the occasion (lvii, lix). [2]
- (40) "To the precentor" + "upon Jonath-elem-rechokim" + "by David" + "michtam" + the occasion (lvi). [1]
- (41) "To the precentor" + "*'al maḥalath*" + "a maschil" + "by David" (liii). [1]
- (42) "To the precentor" + "*'al-tashhîth*" + "a psalm" + "by Asaph" + "a song" (lxxv). [1]

(43) "To the precentor" + "'*el-shoshannim-eduth*" + "by Asaph" + "a psalm" (lxxx). [1]

(44) "To the precentor" + "'*al shushan-eduth*" + "michtam" + "by David" + the purpose, "to teach" + the occasion (lx). [1]

(45) "To the precentor" + "'*al Jeduthun*" + "by Asaph" + "a psalm" (lxxvii). [1]

(46) "To the precentor" + "'*al shoshannim*" + "by the sons of Korah" + "a maskil" + "a song of loves" (xlv). [1]

(47) "To the precentor" + "by the sons of Korah" + "a maschil" (xliv). [1]

(48) "A song" + "a psalm" + "by the sons of Korah" + "to the precentor" + "'*al mahalath*" + "to respond" + "a maschil" + "by Ethan the Ezrahite" (lxxxviii). [1]

(49) No heading, to wit: i, ii, x, xxxiii, xliii, lxxi, xci, xciii-cxvii, xcix, civ, cv, cvi (?), cvii, cxi (?), cxiv, cxv, cxvi, cxvii, cxviii, cxix, cxxxvi, cxxxvii. Of course cv, cvii, cxviii and cxxxvi begin with "Give thanks" and civ with "Bless ye." [26]

The testimony to be derived from the vocabulary and text of the headings must be reserved for another article. We shall close this article by asking the reader to consider if it has not been shown that so far as the evidence has been produced there is no reason for concluding that the psalms may not have been written at the times and by the authors mentioned in the headings.

Princeton.

R. D. WILSON.

THE RELATION OF RELIGION TO SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

A REVIEW*

The distinguished president of the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary has made a distinct and very important place for himself in the modern religious world. He has come to be spokesman not merely for the Southern Baptist Church or for the Baptist Churches in America, but also, to a considerable extent, for the Baptist Churches throughout the world. And there are many in other communions also who look to him as to their spiritual guide. Nevertheless, spokesman though he is for a large section of the evangelical Christian Church, he has yet preserved a full measure of individuality both in thought and expression; and in addition to other graces of style, a delightful humor, manifested especially in spoken discourse, is fruitful also in his published work, though if it is there exercised directly at all, it is exercised so gently as not to mar in the slightest the real gravity and sincerity of the discussion.

It is not surprising to find that this latest work of so distinguished an author is an important contribution to religious literature and that it is a very delightful book to read. Dr. Mullins has placed the Christian public distinctly in his debt.

With a very large part of what the author says we are in heartiest agreement. He sees clearly that the religious issue of the present day is not between two varieties of evangelical Christianity, but between Christianity on the one hand and something that is radically opposed to Christianity on the other. He insists, also, upon a genuine theism, as over against that pantheizing way of thinking which is so prevalent at the present time. "What is the difference," he asks, "between a

**Christianity at the Cross Roads*. By E. Y. MULLINS, D.D., LL.D., President and Professor of Theology, Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, Louisville, Ky. President of the Baptist World Alliance. Author of *Why is Christianity True?*, *The Christian Religion in Its Doctrinal Expression*, *Freedom and Authority in Religion*, *The Axioms of Religion*, etc. New York: George H. Doran Company, [1924]. Pp. 289.

God locked out of the world, and a God locked in?"¹ The God of Dr. Mullins is a transcendent, as well as an immanent, God; he is no mere additional name for the totality of the universe, but the Creator and Ruler of all.

Such a genuine theism, our author sees further, involves the possibility of miracles; Dr. Mullins rejects resolutely that "compromise" between Christianity and the new "religion of biology" which is found in a religion based upon a "non-Christian theism":

One of the most unfortunate phases of the present situation is that there are leaders of thought, calling themselves Christian, who are merely theists. The danger lies in putting the Christian label on a non-Christian or half-Christian world-view. This so-called Christian or half-Christian world-view classes Jesus with Plato, Buddha, Socrates and other great teachers. His knowledge of God was due to his human instinct, not to a unique relation as divine Son to an eternal Father. His supernatural works and resurrection from the dead are disallowed as contrary to natural law. The future life is accepted, but no appeal is made in its defense to the resurrection of Christ.²

Dr. Mullins correctly sees that this non-Christian theism is in actual practice unstable. At this point he agrees with what seems to us to be perhaps the root idea of Bishop Gore's recent trilogy—the idea, namely, that although theoretically no doubt theism may be held without an acceptance of the miracles of the New Testament and without an acceptance of the supernatural revelation which the Bible records, yet practically it always tends under such conditions to fall back into some lower view: those who reject the miracles may try to be theists, but their theism often turns out to be merely a "higher pantheism." Dr. Mullins puts the thing very well in a passage which is the continuation of the one that we have just quoted:

This form of so-called Christian [really non-Christian] theism is always under the influence of the law of physical continuity. It feels constantly the backward pull of Naturalism. It begins well but comes to a bad end. It sets out to recognize human personality with its meaning, and ends by denying the resurrection of the body and leaving a half instead of a

¹ P. 105.

² P. 121.

whole man. It sets out with the idea of the personality of God and pares down the conception almost beyond recognition in particular applications.³

But this non-Christian theism (which tends to become no theism at all) not only is unstable, but also fails utterly to satisfy man's religious needs:

If the idea of a personal God is to be of any value for men, God must be a Being who can *do* things. An idle God who does nothing is of no avail. And a God who can do no more than nature does is of no avail. In that event we are locked up hopelessly in the chain of continuity along with God.⁴

Thus our author pleads not only for theism, but for a consistent theism; and a consistent theism involves the acceptance of the Biblical miracles, their attestation being what it is. Dr. Mullins presents cogently the attestation of the miracles: and, what is more, he does not explain them away; he does not speak of them as being manifestations of some "higher law," but allows them apparently to remain as immediate acts of God to be distinguished sharply from His works of providence. It is true, he does say in arguing against a certain type of modern biologist:

Now a consistent logic would see in this supernatural revelation through Christ, the next stage in the upward course of the universe. A well-poised judgment, a judicial frame of mind, would see the new stage as the necessary outcome of the old.⁵

If these sentences are intended to represent the author's own view they are disappointing, and certainly they are out of accord with the rest of the book. Dr. Mullins does not elsewhere represent the supernatural revelation through Christ as the necessary result of a previous upward course of the universe; but he would represent it, if we understand him aright, as involving a redemption from sin, and a redemption from sin that was absolutely mysterious and undeserved. We hope that the author at this point is intending merely to

³ Pp. 121 f.

⁴ P. 127.

⁵ P. 150.

construct an *argumentum ad hominem* against the naturalistic biologists, and not to present his own view.

Another point of our agreement with Dr. Mullins is found in his clear recognition of the grounding of Christianity in historical facts. He does, it is true, at times separate fact from doctrine in a way that we regard as subject at least to misunderstanding:

I shall not deal primarily with theological doctrines. I am chiefly concerned here with the Christian facts.⁶

And again:

By the Christian religion, I mean that religion of which Jesus Christ is the center and of which the New Testament is the record. I do not mean any doctrinal system which has arisen since the New Testament was written. So far as this argument is concerned the Nicene and Chalcedonian decisions as to the Person of Christ and the Godhead, might be blotted out of existence. So also might other schemes of doctrine, the Calvinistic, Arminian and so on. The main question concerns the realities set forth in the record of the life and work of Jesus Christ. All the vital and essential elements of the doctrinal systems would come back if we should make a new start from the facts. And while I have the profoundest appreciation of the need and value of correct doctrines, nevertheless the argument of this book is concerned primarily with facts rather than formal systems of doctrine.⁷

And again:

The purpose here has been to make clear the issue now before the religious world. Fundamentally it is an issue as to the facts of Christian history, and the facts of Christian experience. A doctrine of incarnation, of sin and atonement, of the deity of Christ, of regeneration and justification and so on through the great circle, is implicit in all that has been said. But the strength of the Christian position is the stability of the foundations in the New Testament records, the deeds of Christ in history, and the experience of redemption through his power. Doctrines are inevitable as arising out of these facts. Indeed a statement of many of the facts is virtually the statement of the doctrines. But for the purposes in view in the present discussion, formal doctrinal discussion has not been necessary.⁸

In these passages there is in our judgment an element that is good, and there is also an element that is misleading.

The element that is misleading is found, as has already

⁶ P. 24.

⁷ P. 43

⁸ Pp. 272 f.

been intimated, in the undue separation between fact and doctrine. Dr. Mullins sometimes gives the impression that what we have in the New Testament are the bare facts, while the doctrinal interpretation of the facts is left to later generations. It is hardly to be supposed that such is actually his meaning, but certainly he does give that impression. At any rate the impression is quite incorrect. It is certainly not true to say that the New Testament presents merely the facts and leaves it to later generations to set forth the meaning of the facts. On the contrary the New Testament sets forth the meaning of the facts, as well as the facts themselves; and it sets forth the meaning of the facts as a result of supernatural revelation. From the beginning, the apostles said not merely, "Christ died"—that would have been a bare fact—but they said, "Christ died for our sins," and that was a doctrine. And so we do not think at all that the Nicene and Chalcedonian creeds are merely inferences from the facts that are set forth in the Bible. On the contrary they are systematizations of the doctrinal instruction that was given by the inspired writers themselves. Also we are not for a moment satisfied with regarding the Calvinistic system (which happens to be the system that we hold) as a mere inference from Biblical facts. On the contrary it is a systematization of what the Bible says in the sphere not merely of bare facts but of doctrine. And we do not think that devout Arminians would be satisfied with regarding *their* system as merely an inference from the facts. They regard it as a systematization of what the Bible teaches. The only question is whether the Bible teaches Arminianism or Calvinism. We think that it teaches Calvinism; the Methodists think that it teaches Arminianism; but in either case the system arose not by a mere independent process of reflection upon the data provided by Biblical facts, but by an effort to gather up the doctrinal instruction that is actually contained in the Biblical books.

In the last passage that we have quoted it is said: "Fundamentally it is an issue as to the facts of Christian history, and the facts of Christian experience." We have just been dis-

cussing this passage so far as it concerns the relation which doctrine sustains to the facts of history. But it also seems to concern the relation which doctrine sustains to "the facts of Christian experience." Dr. Mullins says: "But the strength of the Christian position is the stability of the foundations in the New Testament records, the deeds of Christ in history, and the experience of redemption through his power." And then he continues: "Doctrines are inevitable as arising out of these facts." Here again we think that the words are at least misleading. Does the author mean that we have (1) the bare historical facts, (2) the experience of redemption through Christ's power (that is, "the facts of Christian experience"), and then (3) "the doctrines"? Does he mean that doctrine is logically subsequent to the facts of Christian experience? We can hardly think that that is his meaning, in view of the whole tenor of his book. But in this passage, and perhaps in some other places, he might seem to an unwary reader to be creating that impression.

At any rate the impression would certainly be unfortunate. It is quite incorrect to say that not only the historical facts about Christ but also the facts of Christian experience come first and then the doctrinal interpretation of these facts comes afterwards. On the contrary it is of the very essence of Christianity that doctrine comes (logically though not temporally) before Christian experience. The presentation of the bare fact that "Christ died" never was an instrument in saving a single soul; what saves souls—and what has saved souls from the very beginning of the Church's life—is the blessed *doctrine* that "Christ died *for our sins*." Doctrine, in other words, is not a mere inference from the gospel, but it is itself the gospel.

We do not think that Dr. Mullins has made that quite clear; and certain paragraphs of his, if taken by themselves, might seem to contradict it. Such is the element that we think to be misleading in his exposition of the relation between facts and doctrine. But in that exposition there is also an element that we hold to be good; and we turn gladly to the pleasanter duty of pointing out what that element is.

The thing that our author is driving at in his insistence upon the factual, as distinguished from doctrinal, character of his present discussion is that the Modernism of the present day differs from evangelical Christianity not merely in its interpretation of the facts but also in its attitude to the facts themselves. The impression is constantly produced, at least upon the lay mind, that the Modernist theologians accept the facts about Christ and merely present a new interpretation of the facts. Dr. Mullins' book brings a most forcible and salutary correction of any such impression. The real issue is not so much whether the meaning which the New Testament and the creeds of the Church assign to the great redeeming events is correct, but whether the events really took place. Was Christ born of a virgin? Did he work miracles? Did his body emerge from the tomb by the power of God? Modernism says "No"; Christianity says "Yes." It is not merely a question of "interpretation," but it is primarily a question of fact; it is not a question what the meaning of the New Testament is but whether what the New Testament says is true or false. Dr. Mullins deserves the thanks of the Church for having made the issue so clear.

Accordingly, we rejoice in the testimony to the facts of the New Testament record (and also really to the redemptive significance of the facts) which is contained in this notable book. At the same time we should not be giving to the book the consideration that it deserves if we did not point out the measure of our disagreement with it. Such a book deserves more than perfunctory praise; it deserves really careful consideration. And careful consideration, here as frequently, involves a certain amount of disagreement.

It ought to be observed, however, that the disagreement, though it is not altogether without importance, is distinctly a disagreement between friends. In the time of crisis that now appears in the Church, we have often been obliged to argue with men who (despite friendly personal relations) are, in the sphere of principle, not our friends, but opponents of everything that we hold most dear. It is therefore rather refreshing

to engage, for once, in argument with a true friend. Such argument, it may be hoped, may lead, if not at once to agreement, at least to better mutual understanding and ultimately to a better common service of the evangelical cause.

The central point with regard to which we disagree with Dr. Mullins is found in his sharp separation between the spheres of science and philosophy and religion:

What are the rights involved in the modern controversy about religion? There are at least three great rights to be considered: the rights of science, the rights of philosophy, and the rights of religion. No one will dispute the general statement that the right of each of these is freedom to pursue its own task in its own way. Confusion and conflict arise when these tasks and the corresponding rights are forgotten. . . .

Physical science deals with nature. It observes facts and phenomena. It traces sequences and causes. It explains events in nature by antecedents. It assumes continuity in all events. It rigidly limits itself to explanation in one particular way. In a word, science works with the principle of causality.

Philosophy, on the other hand, seeks to find satisfaction for the reason. It assumes the facts and data supplied by science and experience. Its chief aim is to find a single principle which will explain the universe. . . . Philosophy works with the principle of rationality.

Religion differs from science and philosophy in that its chief quest is for God and salvation from sin. Religion is a personal relation. It seeks adjustment with the infinite life. . . . Religion works with the principle of personality.⁹

It is true, Dr. Mullins does admit that science, philosophy and religion "are harmonious and should coöperate" and that they are alike in that they "all seek to know the truth." He also admits that there are points of contact and overlapping between them. "Religion," he says, "is not irrational, science is not concerned to deny personality, and philosophy must take account of both." "There is," he continues, "necessarily a higher unity in which some day these three will meet when their tasks are done."¹⁰

Meanwhile, however, the three are each of them, according to our author, autonomous; and when one of them "has attempted to invade the sphere of the other, trouble has

⁹ Pp. 30-32.

¹⁰ P. 32.

arisen.”¹¹ “Christians make a mistake when they invade the scientific sphere and seek to impose alien principles and criteria and to make demands based on unwarranted assumptions.”¹² On the other hand, “it is also true that science and philosophy commit an equally grievous sin when they attempt to invade the religious realm.”¹³

This principle of the sharp separation between science and philosophy and religion leads, we think, logically into an abyss of skepticism. Of course we do not for a moment mean to imply that Dr. Mullins carries it out to any such dire conclusion. On the contrary he contradicts it almost at every turn: indeed the very centre of his book, with its insistence upon the factual basis of Christianity, is really a protest against his own separation between religion and science; and his exultant theism is really a protest against his own separation between religion and philosophy. Yet the false principle—deserted though it is at many points by a salutary inconsistency in which we heartily rejoice—is present, and again and again it turns up to mar the clearness of the author’s defence of the Christian faith. It is not merely a momentary phenomenon in Dr. Mullins’ thinking, but has entered rather deeply into his entire attitude in the crisis of the present day. Consideration of it is necessary in any careful view of the present book.

Let us see, in the first place, how the supposed separation between science and religion works out. Of course as it is ordinarily interpreted it at once destroys the entire doctrinal or factual basis of the Christian religion. The conflict between science and religion, it is often said, may be very easily settled: religion may hold to a realm of ideals; but science must be given the entire realm of facts. It is perfectly evident that our author does not acquiesce in any such settlement of the conflict as that: for he insists that certain facts, such as the appearance of Jesus upon the earth and His

¹¹ P. 32.

¹² P. 33.

¹³ P. 33.

resurrection from the dead, are absolutely necessary to the Christian religion. But what is to be made of a passage like the following:

So-called conflicts between science and the Bible are all imaginary. The Bible is the inspired literature of religion. Science is the uninspired literature of nature. These two literatures move on different levels. They can never collide any more than an eagle flying high in the air can collide with a lion walking on the earth.¹⁴

Or this:

So also with science and religion. They are distinct in the forms of reality with which they deal: matter and spirit. They are distinct in their aims—classified knowledge of nature, and redemption. They are distinct in the principles of causation which they wield: continuity and freedom. They are distinct in their methods of verification: objective experimentation and spiritual experience. But underneath all these diversities there is a common unifying bond: the desire for truth. For science truth is formulated knowledge of the world. For religion it is the clearly expressed meaning of the immediate experience of God. As there is no way to merge the differences in the unity, so there is no way to cancel the unity by the differences.¹⁵

Such assertions, we are compelled to believe, lead logically to skepticism. But fortunately they are not true. We agree, to be sure, that the "so-called conflicts between science and the Bible are all imaginary"; but we think that these conflicts are all imaginary not because the Bible does not teach things with which science has a right to deal, but because what the Bible says about those things is true. There are, indeed, many departments of science with which the Bible does not deal; but in the departments into which it does enter it does, we think, represent the facts as they are.

Our meaning may become plain if we take as an example the resurrection of Christ. That event, if it really took place, was an event in the external world: a certain tomb near Jerusalem first contained the body of Jesus and then became empty. Is the question whether it became empty, and is the related question whether natural causes can be found for its becoming empty, to be regarded as a matter for scientific in-

¹⁴ P. 26.

¹⁵ P. 56.

vestigation or not? Do these questions belong to science? And if they do belong to science, do they also belong to religion?

This last question, according to the letter of what Dr. Mullins says, would have to be answered in the negative. Religion, according to our author, deals with "spirit" as distinguished from "matter."¹⁶ But the question of the resurrection of our Lord, in accordance with the common-sense definition of "resurrection" which Dr. Mullins certainly holds, does concern "matter"; it concerns the emergence or non-emergence of the body from the tomb. Therefore, because of the sharp separation between the spheres of science and of religion, it cannot be a religious question at all.

Such is the logical conclusion to be drawn from the utterances to which we object. Yet the conclusion is emphatically rejected by Dr. Mullins himself: almost the root idea of his book is that the Christian religion is based upon external happenings like the resurrection of Jesus from the tomb.

We are therefore forced apparently upon the other horn of the dilemma: since the question of the resurrection of Christ is certainly a religious question, and since religion and science are quite distinct in their subject-manner, it cannot be a scientific question; there can be no scientific certitude, whatever religious certitude there may be, with regard to the miracle of the resurrection.

Now just exactly this position is held by a very large body of persons in the modern world; indeed it is on the basis of this position that the modern attack upon the factual basis of Christianity to a very considerable extent has come. All that can be established by science—that is, scientific history—it is said, is simply the belief of the disciples in the resurrection; and the question what caused that belief is a question not for scientific history but for "faith." The practical result of such a position is of course skepticism; for very naturally, when "faith" is thus deprived of its proper basis in knowl-

¹⁶ P. 56.

edge, it fails to establish anything whatever, and the miracle is given up.

What is Dr. Mullins' attitude toward such assertions? Logically he ought to agree with them; for they seem to follow quite logically from his sharp separation between science and religion. But as a matter of fact we are glad to say that he does nothing of the kind. In an interesting passage he seems to express his sharp dissent from those students of the New Testament who "repudiate the right of the critical scholar to indulge in dogmatic negations [and, we may add, affirmations] about the supernatural elements in the New Testament":

As I see it, the view of these critics as to the relation of historical science to supernatural facts, is incorrect. If it is meant that we do not fully understand supernatural causes I raise no objection. We do not fully understand any causes, natural or supernatural. In so far as a man's attitude will influence his interpretation of the historical data, I raise no question. We all bring a subjective element to bear upon facts. But to affirm that a supernatural event, like the resurrection of Jesus, lies outside the realm of historical research, is to rob history of its most vital factor. . . . Thus we come to the absurd conclusion that the Christian movement in history, the most momentous of all movements, arose out of something which lies outside the range of historical research.¹⁷

These are golden words. It is true, we cannot give unqualified approval to what immediately follows them, where supernatural events like the resurrection of Christ are brought into analogy with the new factors which the evolutionary hypothesis is obliged to recognize. Such an analogy may be held to obscure the sharp distinction between miracles and those works of God which, however "new" and however surprising to us they may be, are part of the natural order. But the words that we have just quoted are themselves, we think, thoroughly sound, and they constitute a complete refutation of the sharp separation between religion and science to which we object. It should be noticed in particular that the author refers to historical research as "historical science." Such a use of the word "science" is, we think, quite correct;

¹⁷ Pp. 181 f.

science can establish, and if it be truly scientific will actually establish, the resurrection of our Lord. Yet the resurrection of our Lord is vitally important for religion. The Bible then, in recording the resurrection, most emphatically does teach science; and the separation between science and religion breaks down.

We are in harmony therefore with Dr. Mullins himself (in other elements of his thinking) if we disagree with him rather sharply when he says: "The greatest recent gain in thought about religion and science is the increasing recognition of the distinctiveness of their spheres."¹⁸ For our part we hold that the notion of the distinctiveness of the spheres of science and religion, far from being a great recent gain, is one of the chief forms that have been assumed by modern unbelief, and that its increasing prevalence is one of the most disastrous features of our time. It is highly significant that this notion of the separation between religion and science is held by a certain distinguished biologist whose rejection of the supernatural our author is refuting with much learning and skill. Dr. Mullins himself quotes the passage:¹⁹ "Strictly speaking, science and religion deal with different subjects. The purpose of science is knowledge, of religion faith and conduct." "The organ of science primarily is intellect, of religion the emotions and will; the goal of science is mechanism, of religion spirit." To do our author justice he does not himself formulate the separation between science and religion in the way in which it is formulated by this advocate of naturalism.²⁰ But with the separation itself he himself, in some places in his book, formally at least, agrees; and in doing so he has adopted one of the chief shibboleths of modern skepticism. The biologist of whom we have just spoken has a right to represent "the increasing recognition

¹⁸ P. 59.

¹⁹ P. 86.

²⁰ Indeed, on p. 108, he seems to be polemic against it. "The fact is," he says, "that religion includes cognition or knowledge as well as emotion."

of the distinctiveness" of the spheres of religion and science as "the greatest recent gain in thought about religion and science"; certainly it is the greatest recent gain in thought from his point of view: but when a Christian theologian regards it so he is introducing a skeptical lever into the foundation of his Christian belief, which if allowed to remain will cause the entire building to fall.

The inconsistency which we have just found in Dr. Mullins' book may be due partly to his employment of the word "science" now in a broader and now in a narrower sense. At one time, as we have already observed, he uses it in a sense broad enough to include historical research; but at another time apparently it designates merely such sciences as physics and biology, or at any rate only those methods of research that operate merely with the doctrine of "physical causation." But for our part, we are unable to regard even physics and biology as being without rights in the sphere of religion; and at any rate we deprecate the narrowing of the use of the word "science." That word ought to be used in a sense broad enough to include, for example, theology. Theology, we think, is just as scientific as chemistry; and if we fail to recognize its scientific character we are in danger of delivering ourselves over to that anti-intellectualism which is now attacking the Christian religion at its roots, and which is also, by the way, leading rapidly in the modern world into a very lamentable intellectual decline. Dr. Mullins shares our conviction that Christianity is based upon truth; and it is in the interests of that conviction that we ask him to give up the separation between religion and science.

But if the separation of science from religion is unwarranted, so also, it may be remarked in passing, is the separation of science from philosophy. Dr. Mullins seems, in one place at least,²¹ to be supposing that there is such a thing as a "modern scientific criticism" of the New Testament which is independent of philosophical presuppositions, and the results of which can safely be accepted by men of differing

²¹ P. 196.

shades of philosophical and religious opinion—a modern scientific criticism which has established, for example, the “two-document theory” as to the synoptic gospels. As a matter of fact we do not think that such a neutral, purely scientific criticism exists. The study of the New Testament, even in the sphere of literary criticism, and certainly in the sphere of historical criticism, cannot get along without presuppositions; and the presuppositions of much of the criticism which our author apparently accepts as purely “scientific” are often really naturalistic—proceed, that is, upon the basis of a philosophy which Dr. Mullins himself rejects. Everywhere we are led to the same conclusion—the relations between science and religion and between science and philosophy are very much closer than our author seems to suppose; the independence of science is by no means so complete as he is inclined to represent it as being. That conclusion is certainly not dishonoring to science. On the contrary we object to the independence of science only because we insist that the sphere in which science moves is so very broad. That sphere is broad enough to include even the knowledge of God that He has given us in nature and in His Word. There is a breadth and sweep about true science of which many scientists have no conception; true science takes account, not merely of some, but of all of the facts. And if it takes account of all of the facts it will not neglect what God has told us about Himself.

We are not at all sure but that Dr. Mullins would himself agree with us here; but there are passages in his book which seem to make the thing obscure; there are passages in his book where he seems to present what we are constrained to regard as an incorrect view of the separation of science both from philosophy and from religion.

Equally unfortunate, we think, and equally inconsistent with the real aim of the book, are certain things that are said about philosophy. At times philosophy, like science, is given an unwarranted independence, and, as is also the case with science, in being given independence is at the same time narrowed and degraded.

"Philosophy," Dr. Mullins says, "works with the principle of rationality; religion with personality."²² But what can be made out of such a disjunction? How can religion possibly work with the principle of personality without also working with the principle of rationality, which personality certainly involves? And how can philosophy possibly work with the principle of rationality without also working with the principle of personality, if, as Dr. Mullins believes, it is objectively true that a personal God is the author of all being?

But it is necessary to look a little more closely at this principle of "rationality." And when we look at it a little more closely, it seems to lead to a skeptical conclusion so far as philosophy is concerned. Any one of a number of contradictory philosophies is apparently regarded as good (*qua* philosophy) equally with any other, provided only it hangs together:

The philosopher is free to select his world-view on any level of reality from matter up to man and personality. It is perfectly legitimate, from the standpoint of reason, for a man to attempt to prove that matter is the fundamental reality, and that all else is reducible thereto. It is, of course, quite as legitimate to begin with man and spirit and personality and freedom, and explain all things from this point of view—or indeed from any intermediate point between matter and man. I am not here speaking of the cogency of the logic of the respective views, but only of the intellectual rights involved. The rights of reason cannot be gainsaid.²³

One sentence in this passage is, we confess, to us quite obscure. "I am not here speaking," Dr. Mullins says, "of the cogency of the logic of the respective views, but only of the intellectual rights involved." We confess that we do not see how any philosophy can possess "intellectual rights" if its logic is not cogent. But in general, despite what inconsistencies there may be in detail, the impression seems to be produced by Chapter viii of the book that philosophies must necessarily differ and that in the field of philosophy no one system can be established against the others; that any one of a number of contradictory systems can be regarded equally with the others as a "sound metaphysic":

²² P. 164.

²³ Pp. 160 f.

The chief point here is that the great number of metaphysical systems indicates the variety in the perfectly legitimate forms of rationality. Philosophy, planting its feet firmly on scientific fact, or some fact of experience, moves out to the frontiers. By speculative thought it seeks to solve the ultimate problems. As a result of this effort there are now in existence a dozen or more world-views.

We recur now to our question: which of these many world-views answers to the requirements of a "sound metaphysic"? Each philosopher undoubtedly would claim that his own system does so; and if we are sound in our definition of philosophy, every one of them would be right. Each begins with a valid assumption or type-phenomenon. Each pursues legitimate method in constructing his system. Each world-view is unified and coherent, and attempts to explain all phases of being. No one of these contradictory systems can be read out of court on the ground that it is not "a sound metaphysic." It follows, therefore, that the phrase is meaningless when employed to discredit the evangelical Christian faith. That faith gives rise to its own metaphysic which bears perfectly valid credentials in the intellectual and philosophical realm. It is one of a dozen or more systems, all of which, of course, are not equally true, but which are equally "sound" as metaphysical efforts to explain the world.²⁴

Here again we confess to a certain amount of bewilderment: we do not see how two systems can be equally "sound" and not equally "true." But the main tenor of the passage, as of the whole chapter, is, we fear, fairly plain; it involves a discrediting of philosophy as a merely academic exercise to which religion can be more or less indifferent:

And this brings us to the crucial point. Religion cannot wait upon philosophy, because philosophy cannot supply a stable basis for religion. Every great religious verity is constantly called in question in philosophic thought. An adequate view of the soul is set forth strongly supported by rational arguments. But at once it is attacked and apparently destroyed by some other system. A clear demonstration of a personal God is set forth. But at once on some other assumption it is questioned and the clouds of uncertainty gather about the idea. We prove by philosophic reasoning the immortality of the soul. Before our ink dries on the page we hear the cynical reply of some "modern" man who asks: "Who are you to imagine that your survival after death is of any importance to the universe?" And not only so, he proceeds to construct a philosophic or speculative disproof of immortality which seems to many to be based upon a metaphysic just as "sound" as any other.

I am not implying in all this any question as to the rights of philosophy. Let men strive for as many insights as they will. Let the systems evolve into as many varieties as may be. Let the antagonisms and con-

²⁴ Pp. 162 f.

traditions become as sharp and decisive as temperament and assumption and speculative acumen may necessitate. In it all something is going on distinct from religion. The process is one which religion cannot employ save in a secondary way. This is not because religion is against reason but because it broadens reason into something richer and more conformable to human need than is the case with philosophy.²⁵

It will be observed that Dr. Mullins admits that philosophy has its "rights." But if those rights are only what they are here said to be, then they are but sorry "rights" after all, and philosophy is degraded from its high estate.

In order to see whether this account of the relation between philosophy and religion is true or false, it may be well, as in the case of the relation between science and religion, to take an example. In the former case we took as our example the question of the resurrection of Christ: that question, we saw, is a matter for scientific consideration, and yet is of vital importance to religion; by it therefore the separation between science and religion is disproved. In the present case we choose as our example the question of the existence of a personal God.

The question of the existence of a personal God belongs, Dr. Mullins will admit, to religion. There are, indeed, many persons in the modern world who would make no such admission; religion, these persons hold, is an ineffable experience which is not indissolubly connected with any particular intellectual conception of the nature of God. But with such persons Dr. Mullins certainly does not agree: he is neither a pragmatist nor a mystic; the Christian religion, he certainly holds, could never conceivably exist without a conviction on the part of its adherents that there is a personal God, Maker and Ruler of the world.

How, then, should the existence of such a God be established? The old answer to that question was that it should be established by the so-called "theistic proofs," in which an inference is drawn from the existence and from the character of the world to a personal Creator and Ruler. With these proofs must no doubt be included the "moral argu-

²⁵ Pp. 172 f.

ment" which infers from the presence of the moral law in the conscience of man the existence of a great Lawgiver.

Now evidently the consideration of these proofs belongs to philosophy; if this does not belong to it, nothing does. Philosophy, if it be philosophy at all, must at least consider (whatever answer it may give) the question whether the universe is to be explained ultimately by the existence of a personal God.

If then the theistic proofs belong to philosophy, the question becomes important what place Dr. Mullins assigns to these proofs. If he regards them as basically important to religion, then after all he has restored philosophy to what we regard as its rightful place. What then is his attitude to the philosophic proofs of the existence and personality of God?

It is not altogether easy to answer this question. Dr. Mullins quotes from Julian Huxley as follows:

There remains to search in the external world to find if possible a foundation of fact for the belief drawn from the inner world of mind, to test the conceptions of a supreme being or supereminent power against ever more and more touchstones of reality, until the most skeptical shall acknowledge that the final construction represents, with whatever degree of completeness, yet not a mere fragment reduced to fill a void, however inevitable, to satisfy a longing, however natural, but the summary, the essence of a body of verifiable fact, having an existence independent of the wishes or ideals of mankind.²⁶

This passage seems to set forth the desire which men have felt for the theistic proofs—that is for objectively valid arguments for the existence of God. Dr. Mullins' comment is as follows:

From the point of view of the author this is a finely expressed and comprehensive statement of the aim in view. The objection to it is that for religious purposes it is inadequate. To search in "the external world," for a foundation of fact for the "belief drawn from the inner world of mind," is just the ancient process of theologians to find a new proof of the existence of God. The "modern mind" has long ago pronounced such "proofs" unconvincing. And it must be said that the outcome is merely a philosophy of the universe, not a religion. The further result that "the most skeptical shall acknowledge" the truth of the outcome, is to convert religious certainty into a form of logic which deals not with

²⁶ Pp. 78 f.

religious forces, but with external facts of nature. Even intellectual stability is not attained in that way. The proof is conclusive, of course. But the "most skeptical" are very stubborn.²⁷

Here our author says that the "modern mind" is hostile to the theistic proofs. But what is his own attitude? We cannot help feeling that at this point he regards the "modern mind" with considerable sympathy. To be sure, he does say that "the proof is conclusive, of course." But in the context this is apparently to be regarded as almost ironical; and on the whole very little importance is here attributed to those proofs of the existence of God which operate with the "external facts of nature."²⁸

How then, according to our author, is the existence and personality of God to be established? We are afraid that the answer is: "Through Christ." The evangelical Christian faith "gives rise," Dr. Mullins says, "to its own metaphysic":²⁹

Christianity is primarily not a philosophy of the universe. It is a religion. It is not founded upon metaphysics. Like all things known to us, there is an implied philosophy. There is a certain view of God and nature and man and the world in the background of our faith. But Christianity is a historical religion, and a religion of experience. It is grounded in facts. Its credentials are well-established facts and clearly defined experiences. God has revealed himself to man in and through Jesus Christ. The Christian world-view rests upon these facts.³⁰

So also, after his depreciation of philosophy, in the course of which he points out the fact that the moment the existence of a personal God is established by one system of philosophy it is questioned by another,³¹ he says that "God has revealed himself to man through Christ,"³² that as a result of our "experience of God in Christ" Christianity has fulfilled the ideal of religion and has forever set religion free," that

²⁷ P. 79.

²⁸ Compare also the passage quoted on p. 54 from p. 172 of Dr. Mullins' book.

²⁹ P. 162.

³⁰ P. 163.

³¹ See the quotation on pp. 54-55 from p. 172 of Dr. Mullins' book.

³² P. 173.

hence "it stands on its own foundations, brings its own credentials, performs its own function."³³

It is difficult to avoid the impression that our author is here making the establishment of theism dependent upon the revelation of God that has come through Christ:

The plea that the eternal and universal truths of reason and religion are not dependent upon history cannot be made good. Christianity completes religion as an ideal, as an experience and as a program. To go behind Christ and his gospel by referring them to speculative philosophy, is to go backward and not forward.³⁴

And in one place Albrecht Ritschl is commended (despite an accompanying recognition of his errors), because "he retained the New Testament truth that we know God only through Christ."³⁵

Now for our part we hold it to be not a "New Testament truth" but a very serious error to say that "we know God only through Christ." At least we hold it to be a very serious error in the sense in which it is apparently meant by Dr. Mullins. There is indeed a sense in which it is true: the eleventh chapter of Matthew does seem to teach either that all knowledge of God which men have comes through the second person of the Trinity, the eternal Logos, or else that a really full, intimate knowledge of God—a knowledge worthy of the name—comes only through Christ. But to say that there is no valid establishment of the existence of a personal God apart from the historic manifestation of Jesus is to do despite, for one thing, to what the Bible (especially Jesus Himself) says about the revelation of God in nature. The Bible holds that "the heavens declare the glory of God; and the firmament showeth his handywork." There is, as Paul says, a knowledge of God which ought to be obtained through the things that He has made.

It is true, this knowledge of God has been obscured. Of modern men as of the men of the first century it can be said that "their foolish heart was darkened." And that fact ex-

³³ Pp. 173 f.

³⁴ P. 174.

³⁵ P. 269.

plains those contradictions of philosophy with which Dr. Mullins is so much impressed. But the fault does not lie in philosophy but only in philosophers; the evidence for the existence of a personal God was spread out before us all the time, but we failed to discern it because of the intellectual effects of sin.

Now these effects of sin are removed by Christ. But that does not mean that He causes us to relinquish the theistic proofs which were open to us even in our unredeemed state, or that He causes us to despise that measure of understanding of those proofs which, through common grace, was attained even by unregenerate men. What it does mean is that we are enabled through the redemption offered by Christ to see clearly where formerly our eyes were darkened. The experience of regeneration does not absolve us from being philosophers, but it makes us better philosophers. And so far as the intellectual defence of Christianity is concerned, the fact should never be obscured that theism is the logical prius of faith in Christ. "Believe in God," said Jesus, "believe also in me." To reverse that order, is to throw the entire organism of apologetics out of joint. The old order of apologetics is correct: first, there is a God; second, it is likely that He should reveal Himself; third, He has actually revealed Himself in Christ. It is a very serious fault when the last of these points is put first.

Certainly we do not mean to deny that in actual experience it is through Christ that men are brought to believe in a personal God. It would be absurd to send men, in our effort to establish theism, to this teacher and that, and lead them to neglect the greatest teacher of all. And the greatest teacher of theism that has ever lived upon the earth is Jesus of Nazareth. In His teaching a theistic view of the world appears in its true reasonableness, and thus carries important credentials with it. But what we do affirm is that when the logical as distinguished from the temporal order is being established, theism does precede the acceptance of Jesus as Redeemer and Lord. The gospel sets forth the way in which God saved man; that gospel cannot be understood unless its presuppositions

are accepted; those presuppositions are the Christian view of God and the Christian view of man; and the Christian view of God is based upon theism.

Thus we disagree with our author in his low estimate of philosophy. "Is Christianity," he asks "dependent upon 'a sound metaphysic' in the ordinary popular meaning of that phrase?" "The reply," he answers, "is a decided negative"³⁶ Our reply, on the contrary, is a decided affirmative. We should hate to think that "the rational process in metaphysics is often in open antagonism to religion."³⁷ If we thought that, we should be in great danger of skepticism. On the contrary we hold for our part that wherever a process in metaphysics is in antagonism to Christianity it is not rational but irrational. Christianity does depend, we hold, upon a sound metaphysic. Only, that dependence fills us with no misgivings. For a sound metaphysic is not impossible of attainment; it may be attained wherever philosophers see clear. And philosophers come to see clear when their minds are illumined by the Holy Spirit of God.

We have spoken of Dr. Mullins' doctrine of the autonomy of science and of philosophy. It remains to speak of his doctrine of the autonomy of religion. But here we can perhaps speak more briefly; since most of what we should like to say is implied in what we have already set forth.

The autonomy of science and of philosophy is correlative, according to our author, to an autonomy of religion:

Religion also is autonomous. It has its own methods, its own criteria of truth, its own approach to the great Reality, and its own conditions for attaining certainty.³⁸

Fifth, religious certainty is religiously conditioned. . . . The Christian act of faith is a self-committal to God as revealed in Jesus Christ. Instantly it brings the soul into contact with spiritual Reality.³⁹

Sixth, we are led by the preceding to the next principle: religious rationality is religiously achieved.⁴⁰

³⁶ Pp. 163 f.

³⁷ P. 164.

³⁸ P. 33.

³⁹ Pp. 46 f.

⁴⁰ P. 49.

It is clear from the preceding that disputants are working at cross-purposes when this truth as to religious rationality is not recognized on both sides. Use reason in the narrow Aristotelian sense and your conclusion about God and religion is insecure. It can be attacked on other logical grounds. But bring reason over into the larger context of the religious life itself and it attains stability.⁴¹

I note, as an eighth principle, that religious life and experience must be religiously evaluated. All kinds of confusions and controversies have arisen in recent times by failure to keep this truth in mind. How shall a critic approach religion? With what principles of explanation, with what tests of truth, with what norms and criteria of thought shall the various religions of the world be judged? There can be but one answer to these questions. Religion must be judged as religion.⁴²

But the more accurate and thorough and self-consistent is the physicist, chemist, biologist, or psychologist, the less justification he finds for bringing religion to the test of the non-religious sciences. . . . We must conceive it, define it, analyze it, expound it and defend it, not as physics, chemistry, biology, psychology or anything else, but as religion.⁴³

It is a false issue when men deal with religion as if it were physics or chemistry or biology, or psychology, or sociology. There is no necessary conflict between any of these and religion. But when men crave religion and a solution of its problems, then religious criteria must be employed.⁴⁴

It follows from this that we are on a false trail when we strive to make the Christian religion conform to science or philosophy, or anything else.⁴⁵

But it [the Christian faith] does not depend upon scientific research for its justification or vindication.⁴⁶

If these passages stood alone, they might seem to place our author in the full current of present-day anti-intellectualism. What is this "religious rationality" which is so distinct from other rationality, and which seems to absolve the Christian from subjecting his religion to the criteria of science and of philosophy? At first sight it might seem to be another name for that ineffable experience which the mystics make to be the sum-total of religion.

But such is plainly not the case: Dr. Mullins is no mystic;

⁴¹ P. 51.

⁴² P. 53.

⁴³ P. 54.

⁴⁴ P. 62.

⁴⁵ P. 230.

⁴⁶ Pp. 257 f.

he grounds Christianity in a genuine theism and in historic facts. In one passage at least he is definitely polemic against a view which "simply sets aside the history and transfers the problem of Christianity to the inner realm of our moral and spiritual intuitions."⁴⁷ It is true that in that very passage the transferring of the problem of Christianity "to the inner realm of our moral and spiritual intuitions" is repudiated not in the interests of a general objectivity of religious knowledge (which is what we should like to see done) but in the interests of what we regard as a somewhat anti-philosophical polemic against the validity of moral intuitions when they are not supported by the New Testament history. Still, it remains true that Dr. Mullins is not a mystic but a theist, and not a pragmatist but a believer in the objective validity of Christian theology. So much is established by the whole tenor of his book.

Nevertheless we hold the whole notion of a special "religious rationality" to be open to the gravest objections. What these objections are need not be set forth here in detail; for the simple reason that Dr. Mullins himself has really provided the best possible presentation of the objections in the whole course of his interesting book. Sometimes he provides even formal contradictions to those elements in the book to which we are now objecting. "It [the Christian faith] does not depend primarily upon what men usually call a sound metaphysic, although it rests upon unassailable philosophical foundations."⁴⁸ The second part of this sentence, however contradictory it may be to the former part, does seem to restore philosophy to its rightful place. And what is more important than such individual passages is the whole tenor of the book. Is religion entirely autonomous? Must it be tested only by itself? Dr. Mullins' own defence of the New Testament facts, on the basis of scientific historical criticism, is the best refutation of any such view.

Nevertheless, the epistemological error (so we are con-

⁴⁷ P. 179.

⁴⁸ P. 257.

strained to regard it) in certain passages in the book is not altogether unimportant; for however the consequences may be avoided (through a salutary inconsistency) by Dr. Mullins himself, those consequences are likely not to be altogether avoided by others. It is dangerous to adopt the shibboleths of modern anti-intellectualism in the course of an intellectual defence of the Christian faith.

Is there, then, no element of truth in this notion that religion possesses its own credentials and should be judged as religion and not as something else? There is, we think, such an element of truth.

In the first place, it is of course true that religion is far more than science and philosophy. A man might conceivably hold a perfectly correct view of God and of Christ, he might attain a complete intellectual acceptance of the facts that are at the basis of our religion; and at the same time not be a religious, or a Christian, man. Religion is not merely intellectual.

But although religion is not merely intellectual it *is* intellectual. Dr. Mullins himself says that it "includes cognition or knowledge as well as emotion."⁴⁹

In the second place, we admit freely that in human nature as it is at present constituted a full intellectual conviction of the truth of Christianity is not attained without the experience of the new birth; no man was ever brought to Christian conviction merely by argument.

But because argument is insufficient it does not follow that it is unnecessary. It is often an instrument that the sovereign Spirit of God is pleased to use. What the new birth does is not to absolve men from being scientific in their defence of the Christian faith, but rather to enable them to be truly scientific because a veil has been taken from their eyes.

In the third place, in application of what has just been said, we admit that there are certain convictions, so closely connected with the heart of religion that they can be called

⁴⁹ P. 108.

specifically religious, without which a conviction of the truth of Christianity cannot be attained. Such, for example, is the conviction of sin. Convictions such as that cannot be attained by ordinary methods of research, but come more obviously (though not more really) than is the case with other convictions through the illumination of the Spirit of God.

But attainment even of these convictions is not really to be separated from philosophy or from science. A man cannot be truly scientific if he neglects relevant facts; he cannot be truly scientific if he neglects the fact of sin.

Thus we do hold that as defenders of Christianity we must meet non-Christian scientists and non-Christian philosophers on their own ground. But we meet them on their own ground armed with certain weapons which they do not possess—armed with certain facts to a knowledge of which they have not attained. That knowledge has been attained by us not by our own merit or by our own diligence in research but by the gracious illumination of the Holy Spirit.

Such knowledge of new facts which Christians alone have does not absolve us from a consideration of other facts which are known to non-Christian men. On the contrary the truth can be attained only by a consideration of *all* of the facts. We ought therefore not to despise either science or philosophy; we ought not to hold that the arguments even of non-Christian men are without importance for the defence of the Christian religion. We ought to try to lead scientists and philosophers to become Christians not by asking them to regard science and philosophy as without bearing upon religion, but on the contrary by asking them to become more scientific and more philosophic through attention to all, instead of to some, of the facts.

We are pleading, in other words, for a truly comprehensive apologetic—an apologetic which does not neglect the theistic proofs or the historical evidence of the New Testament account of Jesus, but which also does not neglect the facts of the inner life of man. The force of such an apologetic is, we think, cumulative; such an apologetic is strong in

its details; but it is even stronger because the details are embraced in a harmonious whole.

Dr. Mullins would hardly disagree with us here; there are indeed some specific utterances in his book which show that he does not disagree. But in the separation which in other places he sets up between science and philosophy and religion, he has introduced, we think, an inconsistent element that mars the symmetry and the stability of the apologetic edifice. That inconsistent element does not destroy our admiration for the many splendid features of this defence of the Christian faith. Most splendid of all, we think, is the fact that this author is ready to be polemic in defence of his faith. Dr. Mullins for his part detects the great issue of the day, and has decided it aright. We rejoice in the noble testimony of this Christian leader in our perplexing times.

But just because of our admiration for Dr. Mullins we have plucked up courage to set forth the points at which we feel constrained to differ from him. In the case of a writer less able and less truly Christian than he, the thing would have been hardly worth while. But in this book the good is so very good that we feel the more constrained to separate it from that which we are forced to regard as misleading if not bad. And we are not altogether without hope that consistency in Dr. Mullins' thinking may ultimately be attained—attained by an elimination of that to which we object in the interests of that which we sincerely and profoundly admire.

At any rate, we for our part cannot with safety go one step upon this anti-intellectual path. It may be safe for others; Dr. Mullins, for example, will never follow it to the end. But it would never be safe for us. We are not indeed without appreciation of its attractiveness. The apologetic battle in which Christianity is engaged is so sore that it is not surprising if men desire to avoid it. When scientists are attacking Christianity in the name of science and philosophers are attacking it in the name of philosophy, it seems to be such an easy escape from the battle to say that religion has its own credentials which it alone can judge; it seems so easy to

withdraw thus into a place that shall be free from all possible attack. Such is the epistemological By-path Meadow which is found in the separation of religion from science. It is pleasant to weary eyes and soothing to weary feet; and it seems to lie close along the way. But ultimately it leads to the castle of Giant Despair. We, therefore, are obliged to keep, by God's help, to the high, rough, intellectualistic road of a sound epistemology. That road leads past many a difficulty and through many a conflict. But there are some cooling arbors beside the way, for the refreshment of weary pilgrims. And at the end there is the City of God.

Princeton.

J. GRESHAM MACHEN.

IS JESUS GOD?

PART II

At the conclusion of Part One the first of two alternatives for further logical procedure was set forth. This first alternative was to regard the elimination of the "not good" horn of the dilemma as immediately and automatically establishing the opposite position that He is God. Prove His sanity and you prove His deity.

On the other hand as a second alternative line of development we may assume that the elimination of the alternative of Jesus' mental insufficiency does not automatically force acceptance of the opposite proposition of the dilemma, but that on the contrary it is merely one step toward the distant goal of logical proof. We may hold that it is only one link in the long chain of cumulative proof; and that it is of strength only as taken along with a series of many other arguments. If we assert that the first alternative line of development, suggested at the close of Part One, is sufficient and final in itself, then this seems to become subversive of the duty of further approving to natural reason, on grounds of rigorous and more extended discursive reasoning, the divinity of Jesus who makes the Scripture claims.

Again we are subject to a difficulty of a rather subtler nature, namely that it is inherently impossible to describe and explain the uniqueness of the human attributes of any supposable God-man, if He is really God, in unreal abstraction from the indwelling and all-pervading divine attributes. It is just this very supernaturalness which is to be proved that enters into and causes this uniqueness. Even when we reason in a most naturalistic fashion about the superior attributes of this man over every other figure in history, the influence of the conviction or feeling that He is divine enters subtly, but perceptibly into our argumentation and renders it a *petitio principii* in spirit. We know in ourselves that if we eliminate His deity, we eliminate the significance of His moral uniqueness.

Hence (1) because our reasoning in our descriptions of His character, is influenced unavoidably yet rightly by the anticipation of the truth of the conclusion of Jesus' deity, and (2) because the uniqueness of the natural morality of Jesus is in reality, inseparable from the supernatural cause of it, we prefer to conduct the next argument concerning the uniqueness of His character, from the point of view, the coign of vantage, of the temporary assumption of Jesus' deity. One can only be unsympathetic with those methods which study the nature of Jesus first, as is illusively believed, from the exclusively natural side of His life, career, and character, then finally with an "*Ecce Homo!*" soar to the conclusion "*Ecce Deus!*"⁴⁶ We must always carry in one hand a tentative working hypothesis, a tentatively assumed truth concerning the object of investigation, while with the other hand we are collecting the facts and phenomena toward the end of establishing that hypothesis. The divine and human attributes interpenetrated each other in an inseparable manner during the entire life-career of our Lord as we shall see. God-consciousness always and everywhere dominated and characterized His self-consciousness, as Schleiermacher has well brought out. We shall aim to be as *a posteriori* and unassumptive as possible but we reserve the right to occasionally shift our ground to the useful assumption that what we describe is true only in the case that Jesus is divine.

That this is correct logical procedure is witnessed by the scientists. They, in seeking to penetrate the unknown, be it

⁴⁶ It is most significant and striking to note that even the best works which attempt to portray an unusual human life and character for the purpose of ultimately inferring His deity, cannot and do not repress His divinity, which surcharges the account, inevitably shines through, and makes itself known throughout their treatment. Even the demurring author of *Ecce Homo* finally breaks out irresistibly from His previously pent up humanism into an indubitably clear admission, if not confession. Strauss and Renan are eloquent with His divine excellence, though they refuse to take the further step and call it what it is. See pages 345-355.

an unknown law or substance, project their hypothesis and tentatively assume its validity. And thus assuming its validity, they seek to interpret various isolated phenomena by it, and if the latter bear out the hypothesis, the hypothesis becomes fact. And again, psychologically speaking, no piece of art can be adjudged correct and perfect until the spirit and the feeling of the critic is projected unreservedly into it—an act and principle well termed by the Germans “Einfühlung” (feeling into). To attain the truth, we must feel into, and act upon the unknown as if it were true. This must be the present attitude.

A further statement, one concerning our limitations, is necessary. The stupendousness of our attempt to analyze and understand this character must be fully realized. If He should be divine, in the nature of the case, it will be discreet to leave more unsaid than said. Without going into the epistemological question of the validity and the limits of our anthropomorphizing tendencies in attaining to a knowledge of the divine, we would simply forewarn ourselves that our ability to understand and then to explain this unusual character is conditioned by our own terms of thinking and *quale* of character, in short by our finiteness and corruptness. Just as in the cognitive act of perception of an object, what we see and how we see it is not determined entirely by the objective sense presentations, but by that mass of representations, or all the previously experienced mental contents, or by what Herbart calls the “apperceptive mass” which from within the mind of the percipient is brought to bear on the presented datum; so in our effort to cognize the character of Christ we must reckon with this “personal equation.” We must leave a vast margin after all our interpretation is said and done for the probability that this character far transcends our best descriptions of it; that “as high as the Heavens are above the earth, so high are His (thy) thoughts above our thoughts, and His (thy) ways above our ways.” The inevitable tendency of the human interpretation of the superhuman is to assimilate the transcending elements of the

superhuman to the human, or to attenuate the supernatural to the natural. Our mental frame is "of the earth earthy." This is well exemplified in the "comprehensible" Jesus of the Liberal school. Renan virtually conceives the Lord, for example, as a Frenchman of the baser sort, surcharged with all the defects of the Gallic temperament, theatrical, insincere, intense, almost immoral. In recognizing this anthropomorphic tendency we may forestall the thrust of our opponents that the character of Jesus which we describe as portrayed in the Scriptures is not unique enough to warrant the conclusion that He is divine, for the very proof of His divinity will be precisely this, that His ultimate character will surpass our descriptive and rational powers, and can not be formulated in the inaccurate and changeable symbols of earthly language.

The importance of the argument from Jesus' character is seen from its relation first, to historical criticism. Though the understructure of historicity be knocked out completely, leaving this character suspended in the air as pure ideality and fiction, it would yet leave the mythical morality of this mythical person as something unsurpassed in history. No more striking illustration of this meets us than that of Strauss⁴⁷ turning back upon his impious wreckage of this figure and being converted by the indestructible influence of His character whose body he had killed. Further, he prophesies the historic success and great destiny of these living ideals which he could not destroy nor, by laying unhallowed hands upon, improve. It has characterized almost all historic rationalism from Strauss down to Harnack, to reverentially abstain from their fell work of criticism when it came to the sacred precincts of Christ's holy character, and they have

⁴⁷ "His worship will grow young without ceasing; His legend will call forth tears without end: all ages will proclaim that among the sons of men there is none born greater than Jesus," such is the *Magnificat* of this great legendist.

bowed in deference to the monitions of some categorical imperative, some *noli me tangere*.⁴⁸ Dr. Row, a reputable scholar in Christology, has built up his argument against Strauss and Renan on the sole consideration of the unity of Christ's character as found in the four Gospels.

Secondly, in relation to miracles, the argument from Jesus' character has determinative importance. Modern apologetes are saying that the argument from the miracles is more of a "hindrance" than a help to the issue. If then, purely for the sake of argument, it be conceded to the modern miracle-detesting mind that the miracles with which Jesus surrounded Himself were spurious or were the retrospective ascription of later deluded worshipers, it becomes then only a matter of carrying the difficulty one remove further back into Christ's moral nature. Is this not the "moral miracle of history"? Is there not here the same difficulty only shifted from the physical to the moral-spiritual plane? Nor can subterfuge be had by asserting that this character was the invention of either Himself as an impostor, or of the disciples, or the four evangelists. This is only to press the difficulty back further still, for it would still remain inexplicable how they invented a moral and spiritual hero great enough to fit the miracles, and how they succeeded in attributing to him so many and varied characteristics in all their perfection, characteristics harmonious with each other but out of keeping with the general ideals and tendencies of his age; and how the writers of the gospels succeeded in making this *tour de force* of literary fiction and idealism appear to the men of their own and succeeding times as the most attractive, commanding and dynamic piece of realism that the world has ever seen. If (with the modernists) it comes down to a matter of choice as to where we shall place the miraculous element, there will certainly be no hesitation in placing it simply where it is—in that *character* that rises immeasurably above the highest level of all other literary achievements. If it lies not in His healing the lame, the blind, the deaf and the sick, who will gainsay its reposing in those qualities more than

⁴⁸ Some few of the other countless and admiring writers are Goethe, Guizot, Lecky, Napoleon, Carlyle, the Jew Max Nordau, and Rousseau.

humanly sweet and strong, unapproached and unapproachable, great and gracious, sinless, timeless—the wonder, the worship, the aspiration of humanity?

The supernatural can be as easily and naturally and as certainly approached through the scrutiny of the character of this man, through what He is, as through what He works. The “modern mind,” so-called, is realistic and positivistic and convinced only by palpable and verifiable facts. Moral “values,” ethical reality and genuineness, force of character, personal qualities—these constitute the desideratum; these only, in contrast to metaphysical relationships, appear to suit pragmatic interests and to be capable of pragmatic relations. No line of proof could be more effectively followed then, than that which offers the supreme character of our Lord for this test of its experienceable qualities.

It may even take the primacy over the traditional argument from miracles. The argument from the gospel miracles involves the task of balancing the probabilities and possibilities of historic evidence, for there are no such miracles today from which to reason.⁴⁹ Christ Himself gave but secondary importance to the miracles as *σημεῖα* of His Messiahship. Only an evil and adulterous generation seeketh after a sign, was His rebuke. And when the Pharisees besought Him openly for a *σημεῖον* from heaven He “sighed deeply in his spirit” and categorically refused to put His miracles on this basis, exclaiming “Why doth this generation seek a sign? . . . There shall be no sign given unto this generation.” He, significantly, in contrast to the evangelists, always called His miracles *ἔργα*, never *σημεῖα*. The latter term is never used by Himself when expressing His own view of His supernatural deeds—only as expressing views of others.⁵⁰ He thought more of the self-evidencing nature of His own person and teachings, as they manifested the “glory of the

⁴⁹ The older method, e.g., of Paley, arranged the evidence from miracles with its necessary long chains of intricate historical reasoning in the van of apologetic proof.

⁵⁰ Cf. Row, in *Bampton Lectures* for 1877, pp. 76-80.

only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth." "I am one that beareth witness of myself," He says. When the multitude challenged Jesus "What then doest thou for a sign, that we may see and believe thee? what workest thou?" He ignored the giving of signs and gave Himself. "Every one that beholdeth the Son and believeth on Him" shall have eternal life, was the reply (Matt. vi. 30 and 40). He avoided all ostentation in working His miracles and even requested secrecy, that He might not create the impression of being a thaumaturgist.⁵¹

The argument from character appeals to another general class, those who decry all doctrine, whether in the interest of "life" or of "facts."

In relation to all other considerations, Jesus' self-assertion, His titles, His teachings, His good works, etc., the argument from the character manifested by Jesus is if anything the most compelling, if indeed it can be thus mechanically separated from these arguments. The very thing that substantiates these claims for the modern character-worshipping mind at least, is the consistency and quality of this character. Christ's subjective consciousness of deity would prove little to the modern temper of mind with which we are dealing throughout; it tests and judges by the visible and the empirical, or by the "fruits" rather than by the "roots" (i.e. the origins) as W. James puts it.

Our first observation regarding Jesus' character is that He was genuinely human, not a prodigy. His character is not unique on that account. This is seen (1) in His being temptible in all points "like as we are." He had no praeternatural immunity to temptation; He was not hermetically sealed from the world's trials. This is seen (2) in that He was not as Minerva who sprang full-grown from the head of Zeus. He developed according to natural laws from youth up. His character was attained by process, albeit not by that inner conflict and struggle and progressive self-correction which some allege.

⁵¹ Matt. viii. 4.

The first feature of this genuinely human character that we mention is His innocence—not His sinlessness. There is no question about His innocence, though His sinlessness is denied. He is a perfectly harmless being actuated by no destructive passions, without malevolence, doing ill or injury to no one. It is that rare quality that we associate with the lamb and find in the child. But it is also a quality that is never predicated of a real man without that underlying indissociable suggestion of weakness and lack of spirit or manly force. Human writers idealize the innocence of childhood, and often of pure women as the mild Madonna, but never has a writer pictured or desired to picture, any man as a perfectly innocent being—the incompatibility is almost self-evident. Harmlessness and frailty, guilelessness and softness, benevolence and lack of power, blamelessness and unforcefulness, ingenuousness and untutored artlessness, simplicity and simplemindedness, spotlessness and lack of cunning, innocuousness and characterless passivity, lack of offense and submissive timidity or pitiful incapability, gentleness and spiritlessness, innocence and weakness, seem forever to be combined. We are so trained in human nature as to look for the other where the one occurs. Only in Jesus do we find innocence and manliness combined, and see harmlessness become a positive virtue and grace; while purity and strength, as mercy and justice, in Him meet and kiss each other. Impossible in any other man, Jesus is able to unite the purest hearted innocence with the most virile manhood without the diminution of the uniqueness of either. It is none but the grand and majestic superhuman manhood that can sustain the pure celestial innocence of childhood amplified by natural growth and the lamb-like quality of temper unsullied before the world while in the world.⁵²

If such innocence or innocuousness be tinged with the superhuman, what shall we say of His apparent absolute sinlessness (not “Holiness”)?

If sin be defined as “selfishness” (Muller, Taylor, Em-

⁵² Vide Schaff, *The Person of Christ*.

mons), then we point to the peerless exemplar of Jesus, who, beginning His *κένωσις* by taking upon Himself the form of a servant, continued it with the same self-renunciation and obedience "unto death," the whole series of steps in His humiliation being entered upon with absolute prevision and spontaneity or love-prompted altruism if you will. Or if sin be lack of "God-consciousness" as Schleiermacher would say, what mortal can convict Jesus? or has ever tried? Or if sin be called lack of social consciousness (cf. Josiah Royce's "loyalty to the group" idea in *The Problem of Christianity*), or non-conformity to custom, maladjustment to the environment, or ill-balance of the natural faculties, or whatever conceivable construction,—if one dare to intelligently convict Jesus of these, let him speak. Or if sin be as it really is, innate corruption, who has had or ever will have, the temerity to venture accusation in reply to His challenge, "which of you convicteth me of sin?" We "find no fault in him"!

Jesus is never recorded as confessing sin, asking for pardon or repenting, though He authoritatively called on others to do so; He never experiences regeneration nor sanctification, though He urges their necessity for others. The very fact that He came, as He claimed, for the express purpose of saving sinners implies His own consciousness of personal freedom from guilt and corruption and from all need of salvation. He is never touched with the anxious dread of a penal future that others had, nor makes the most casual admission that the most venial fault or peccadillo is His. Never is there the slightest touch of self remorse. Never is conscience attributed to Him. Had His nature entertained one touch of sin, one momentary flickering of an evil impulse, though He may have concealed it at the time, He could never have thus carried the sham through life, for (1), conscience, though temporarily stifled is inevitably its own Nemesis; and (2), the slightest, most transient sin not only lingers ineffaceably in human nature, but redoubles its reproducing power by natural law; and progressively lowers the internal

resistance until a final breakdown and exposure is inevitable. Yet Jesus capped the climax of His career by His successful challenge to His acute and most critical enemies, "which of you convicteth me of sin?"⁵³

Passing by the great testimony of the Baptist, what more is needed when His most typical enemies humbly admit His guilelessness. The pagan Pilate and his wife after a most exacting trial shuddered with foreboding and presentiment, he washing his hands of innocent blood and exclaiming "I am innocent of the blood of this righteous man: see ye to it." Judas despairingly admitted, "I have sinned in betraying innocent blood." Never did the captious Pharisees or Sadducees catch or confute him, but they were so rebuked by the exposure of their own sin in their attempts that "no man durst ask Him anything more." Surely, His claim to sinlessness was not spiritual illusion or a sin-callousedness, else why this perspicacious insight into the sins of others? The heathen centurion, voicing the feeling and silent judgment of other spectators averred "certainly this was a righteous man."⁵⁴

To pile Pelion on Ossa, this is the *universal* judgment: "He is the purest among the mighty, and the mightiest among the pure—and still continues to rule and guide the ages," says J. P. Richter, the great German poet. His moral purity is not only without parallel, but without reproach, a lamb without spot and without blemish, says Rousseau. Subterfuge can not be had by saying that all men are sinless, for even the heathen Seneca laments "All is full of crime and vice, they are open and manifest: iniquity prevails in every heart." Even the unorthodox become more conservative here, "Christ differed from all other men by His essential sinlessness and His absolute perfection," says Schleiermacher. And similarly speaks Hase.

Finally, how shall we account for the apparent balance of faculties in Jesus' nature? Sin warps and distorts them in us,

⁵³ John viii. 46.

⁵⁴ Luke xxiii. 47.

the sensual (σάρκικος) obtruding itself ruinously into the higher (πνευμάτικος) nature. The intellect becomes a blind guide to volition; volition is inordinately swayed by sin-darkened feeling: and both volition and feeling override and annul the judicious counsel of the intellect. It is no cause for wonder that the heathen Plato adjudged balance and equipoise in the related faculties to be the moral good.

Objection has been made by referring to supposed moral faults, and inconsistencies in the gospel records. These are negligible.⁵⁵ Again, it is asserted that our perceptive faculties are too deeply affected by sin to recognize and judge a supernaturally sinless man. This objection overlooks the fact that it is just because of this moral obliquity and extremity of sin that we are able to appreciate *e contrario* the transcendency of sinless character, though we may not have the profounder comprehension of it that would come from a perfect character assimilating itself to another perfect character. Again, we can know for a surety regarding this character, *that* it was sinlessly superhuman and superhumanly sinless, without knowing *how it is*. Again, Martineau objects that the records of the entire life are too meagre to form the basis for an absolute judgment of sinlessness. But the sources for Jesus are as great in extent and quality as for any great man of antiquity. Even if this were not true, the burden of proof would rest upon Martineau in view of the claims and representations of the account we do possess. On this basis we have sufficient evidence for presuming agreement of all other discoverable records.

In the last analysis we must again reduce the issue to a dilemma. This man is either a moral miracle in His sinlessness, which at least suggests an intimate relation to the Perfect Moral Being, or He is grossly self-deceived or spiritually blinded and calloused by sin, or monstrously hypocritical in His challenge regarding the convicting Him of sin. Jesus in all cases is either the perfect God, or morally deficient.

⁵⁵ V. Schaff on these in *The Person of Christ*.

It were possible to proceed from Jesus' negative quality of sinlessness to His positive holiness, and prove not only its intrinsic grandeur and uniqueness but show how it pervades and transfuses all other attributes, harmonizing them and purifying them into inapproachable celestial glory and truth, so that the very demons cry out to Him as the "Holy One of Israel." Each of the kindred virtues may be dwelt on separately, and their vast number and variety noted. But one of the most commanding aspects of His person is that of the great and apparently contradictory contrasts within His character, impossible in any mere man, yet graciously and harmoniously united in Jesus—His energy and repose, His simplicity and His keenness, His resoluteness and His patience, His cheerfulness and sorrow, His innocence and His righteous wrath, His severity and His sympathy, His manliness and vigor, and yet His geniality and sociality, in fact all His passive virtues contrasted with the active virtues. Further we find combined in Him a strict obedience to law and utmost freedom; the fervor of an enthusiast, and calmness, sobriety, and self-possession; a complete and uniform elevation above the affairs of this world, yet a mingling with society, male and female, dining with publicans and sinners, blessing children, shedding tears at a sepulchre, admiring the lilies and God's nature. Purest and holiest of men, He provided wine for the wedding feast, and provoked the enemies' sneer that He "came eating and drinking" and was a "glutton" and a "winebibber": fearless in courage, He was wise in caution; of unyielding firmness yet He was of sweetest gentleness. But above all are those most striking and inexplicable antitheses which though contrary do not appear contradictory to each other, i.e. the more specifically divine-human contrasts; His sublime self-consciousness of being God and His ceaseless subjection to God, His pronounced self-assertion of deity and His utter humility and self-abnegation;⁵⁶ His infinite power yet withal a most complete self-restraint and helplessness; His above-described sinless-

⁵⁶ Philippians ii. 2-14.

ness, yet the scenes of the temptation, the garden-agony, the passion and death on the cross; finally the general infinity which we instinctively feel and intuitively recognize in Him, yet therewith the general limitations of earth and environment, e.g., He was once a growing God-infant, if such an oxymoron is permissible. Not only are there these blended contrasts in His nature, but *all* attributes both religious and moral—piety and virtue—stream radiantly from Him by way of eminence, and in a transfigured unity. His temperament is neither, in trite phraseology, sanguine, choleric, melancholic, nor phlegmatic exclusively, but each and all. No one virtue towers inordinately above the others, while all other great men, Napoleon and even Luther and others have dimmed their greatest virtues and strength in some counterbalancing trait of character, and this without exception. It might then be shown how, in all this versatility and completeness and harmony of attributes, there was a person whose principles, character, and teachings were neither provincial, racial nor national. Though a Jew He is universal, spaceless and timeless in significance. When we put this portentous character back of a stupendous plan, universal in extent and perpetual in time, a plan promulgated in a manner of intense earnestness, yet without creating partisan feeling and without any perceptible anxiety for it within, we can no longer simply say "*Ecce Homo*," but we assuredly know that some one has burst into this world who is not of it, and one to whose claims to be very God of very God we must solemnly acquiesce.⁵⁷

This Jesus grows more great and wise, sacred and sublime, adorable and transcendent the more He is known and the more He needs to be known. The most simple and the only final argument is to point our unbeliever to the gospel portrait with its inexhaustible reserve of truth and beauty

⁵⁷ The defense of his character from the viewpoint of the nature of His *teachings* is a most important one, e.g., He employs no human method, has no inordinate desire to gain assent, He teaches with perfect simplicity, it is adequate and final, and He never appears unduly anxious for success. But space does not permit its extended consideration.

that it may lay hold and grow upon him, as all who "search the Scriptures" rejoicingly find. All human attempt to portray this character has miserably failed; we have not added one cubit to His moral stature by taking thought thereunto. But in so far it has been a successful failure, for the more we attempt to understand and portray this character in our own art and speech, the more clearly does it impress us as above our range—a miracle and a mystery. In our failure we rejoice all the more and rest assured to hear Him say, "I am one that bearest witness of myself," and in full view of the sacred radiance streaming from His self-evidencing nature, we stand back only asking of our adversary "What think ye of the Christ?" We "find no fault in him!"

In view of modern demands again, we must show that this ideal character is not unreal to us, but is correlated with, and corresponds to, our deepest moral and religious desires, which desires, and ideals He must satisfy. He must "find us," as Coleridge would say.

Taking only one line of thought, we observe that this character and the principles it represented and fulfilled in actual life both comprise and transcend all historic conceptions ever held by man as to the ethical ideal of life—or the *summum bonum*.

The highly refined Greek culture had only succeeded in offering to the world as the chief end of man τὸ κάλον (the beautiful), or τὸ πρέπον (the fit or becoming), with perhaps the daemonic συνείδησις of Socrates for a monitor. Thus Greek ethics all revolved around the idea of self and self-culture, (e.g., "man is the measure of all things") as ethics virtually has ever since in all civilization. In addition, the τὸ κάλον and the τὸ πρέπον were subtilized, impalpable abstractions that could not be comprehended by the inerudite. It is as true of these as Schiller says of the abstract "categorical imperative" (thou must) that they will fail to command even the obedience of slaves, but thousands will be won to filial obedience and self-renunciation by the simplicity of

"Be ye holy even as I am holy," "Learn of me, for I am meek and lowly of heart."

Conversely, Judaism exemplified the opposite idea of the extreme objectivity of the ideal. The majestic infinity of the Torah was apotheosized. Its awful transcendence was terrifying to contemplate. Jesus peculiarly harmonized this emphasis upon the objectivity of the Jewish law and the Greek subjectivity in His Christian teachings. He taught and wrought in Galilee, as Professor Harnack would say, a "transvaluation of all values," on the one hand by making clearer the "reality and infinite value of the human soul," and on the other hand by filling in the hollow Greek ideals with a new and transsubjective content, namely, the will and glory of the Father.

Further history of ethics found the moral good in idealism or "self-realization,"⁵⁸ in "happiness" in either its eudaemonistic, Epicurean, social,⁵⁹ or quantitative (Bentham) or qualitative (Mill), or theological (Paley) aspects. Though retaining all these elements, Jesus anticipated these partial truths by a more ultimate and comprehensive one—a revelation that cleared them up with a more transcending and more perfect idea of "oughtness" founded on the concepts of God, the reality, worth, and dignity of the human soul, and immortality. If the moral norm be conceived socially as the "greatest good of the greatest number" Jesus goes one better and because we are all "members one of another" teaches the principle "no man for himself, every man for all," as Herder phrases it. This ideal will not incite that lurking prudentiality or quasi-altruism attached to the utilitarian motto, (i.e. the "greatest good of the greatest number") for each will be motivated by the fundamental principle of loving "thy neighbor as thyself," grounded in turn in the deeper love to God. This is quite opposed to love for a "happiness" which certifies its legitimacy to conscience by a falsely projected social altruism or philanthropy. Stated in other words, Jesus' sys-

⁵⁸ Hegel, T. H. Green and the Cairds.

⁵⁹ Bentham and Mill.

tem was a three-relation ethic, i.e., a two-relation ethic enriched by the introduction of a third and transcending personality. The world's is a meagre duality of "*me et te*," I and my neighbor, "ego" and "alter ego," "self" and its "socius"—an effete two-relation ethic.

In short what man's ethico-religious idealism has ceaselessly groped for unaided, Jesus has revealed through His person, word and work in all its comprehensiveness, transcendence and satisfying profundity.⁶⁰ We may call this worthy Galilean only an exceptionally virtuous man, yet somehow we seem to see life and its ethical relations transfigured for us in Him. In His person we seem to gaze into the eternal realms of Spirit and Deity where wise and unwise, foolish and ignorant alike may handle everlasting realities and realize in their deepest experience the duties and powers of the world to come.

The argument from the miracles and especially the final and most portentous one, the resurrection, is now in place with its corroborative function. In the miracles we find but the objective counterpart and complement of what we have already discovered in Jesus' character and person. The Ritschlian school along with much other modern thought is egregiously inconsistent at this point in denying the super-

⁶⁰ It were possible to show how Jesus revealed the other moral implicates, e.g. free will. Opposed to the fateful Greek *Erynis*, and *τὸ ἀνάγκη*, the Roman *Fortuna*, the philosophic theory of materialism, the determinism of environment or of "evolution," Jesus explained the true meaning of environment, evil, the "flesh," the world, and necessity to us. He put the issues of life within us (e.g. the kingdom is *ἐν τῷ ὑμῶν*) not in environment. Further the springs of conduct were in spiritual *ἐνέργεια* manifesting itself in *ἀγαπή* and not in stoic *ἀπάθεια* which the intense Occident detests; and more deeply in *γεννηθῆναι ἀνῶθεν*. Especially in the individual virtues do we find the contrast—*Ἀγαπή*, *Ἔρως*, *Amor* and *Caritas* were all rescued from the mire in which they lay and given new footing. The weak-willed "humilitas," or the world-tainted refinement of "humanitas," or the esoteric *γνώσις*, the intellectual *σοφία* and the socialized idea of *δικαιοσύνη* have all been the pride of the non-Christian ethicists. But they were all taken up, given new content, and quite transfigured by being brought into organic relation to the central motivating and "energizing" virtue of *Ἀγαπή*.

naturalism in Christ's miracles yet accepting the unique character of Jesus which is just as inseparable from its inner supernaturalism.

The equally corroborative argument from the fulfilment of prophecy is subject to a different objection, i.e., the critical rejection of the records of the Old Testament. The Wellhausen evolutionary hypothesis and other theories consider Old Testament prophecy as *post eventum*. However, the prophecies of Christ Himself are not *post eventum*, whether the prophecies of the exile are or are not. They fulfil all of the canons of true prophecy; i.e., does the prophecy precede its fulfilment? does it lie beyond human sagacity or conjecture? has a real fulfilment taken place? Though some prophecies should be explained away a goodly number of others can not be rejected so easily. And as critics differ *inter se*, some admitting most, some admitting all of the Messianic prophecies, we may still argue with validity before most of the critical world from the unity and organic relation of the system of prophecies, symbols, and types obtaining from at least 2000 years back. Jesus' own consciousness witnessed that He was fulfiller of the covenant and of the law and of prophecy. Surely no mere man would claim to consider himself as the fulfilment and goal of all God's dispensations. And surely it is an impossible task to explain away these phenomena when taken cumulatively. For if the whole Old Testament were written within the period of 1000 or even 500 years by various authors, with their succeeding redactors, it is even then inexplicable how they so uniformly happened to ring all the changes on this *continuum* of Messianic prophecy, each from his own standpoint. Collusion, or interpolations by accommodating redactors can not begin to account for it. We must find the weak link in the chain of Christological evidence at some other point.

Present-day stressing of the question of Comparative Religion and the History of Religions solicits serious attention. They require us to look in two directions, (1) in backward or temporal perspective, and answer the question, are Christ and

Christianity simply "more evolved"? and (2) in the outward perspective of the present, i.e., does Christianity surpass the contemporaneous religions encircling and rivalling it?

Does Christ's superiority lie in His being the acme of a process of development having its genesis in a primordial priest-magic, or in fetichism continued through totemism, polytheism, henotheism, to monotheism? Is Jesus' person but a reappearance of a number of sporadically appearing pre-Christian Christs? a temporary efflorescence in the restless movement of the human spirit as it unfolds itself in religious history, which, in its diversification into pantheisms, polytheisms, mythologies, and monotheisms, found only another and parallel expression in the Christian Trinity and the Incarnation of Jesus? Such at least is the teaching of the late Professor Ernest Troeltsch of Berlin, leader of the "Religionsgeschichtliche" school. Is Jesus' preeminence only, as Professor Troeltsch affirms, "a preeminence in a divine anticipation, comprehension, validation, and strengthening of natural religion"; or is the superiority of His religion only in its being a "psychologically deducible and definable religion," according to the "laws of the soul life"? Or, with A. Sabatier, is it only a preeminence soon to be transcended again? Is Christianity only the latest symbolic religious conception thrown off from the changing heats of the imagination of this evolving "life"? When the facts are all faced it will be clearly seen that these constructions are a total inversion of the process of becoming. The curve of the course of the history of natural religion has been downward from a given point. That initial point is Genesis i. 1, "In the beginning God," that is, monotheism, not polytheism or henotheism, or fetichism lie at the source of natural history and religion. And the course has been one of devolution from this primordial conception rather than evolution to it. Jesus' appearance was so sudden, so transcending the age then lying in darkness "without hope and without God in the world," that it could not be a mere epiphenomenon of the gradual evolution of the human spirit. According to Troeltsch's

principle of relativism there must be some sufficient historical nexus for each new moment in the process. But the nature of this figure defies all attempts to relate it immediately to anything antecedent or subsequent to it in history. Couchoud well says on this point, "un Jésus historique devient impossible à placer. . . . Nous sommes ici hors des routes frayées de l'histoire. Les analogies font défaut." Or, to recognize the idea of a noted German theologian, Professor Otto, the author of that widely devoured work *Das Heilige*, we must accede to the "numinous" element in Jesus. It is only so that he has any religious value at all. For the "numinous" is that element in God and Christ that transcends the power of the human reason to grip and hold fast. The "Ganz Andere" (Totally Other), the "mysterium," the non-rational and supra-rational in a divine being is precisely that and only that which makes it eligible for human worship. That historical figure called Jesus of Nazareth possessed this inconceivable and mysterious element expressed by the term "numinous" and "holy" and therefore can not be merely rationally conceived and related to the processes of nature and history, to the laws of heredity and environment, and to the limitations of space and time. It came *per saltum*, to borrow a concept from the great biologist De Vries. It is *sui generis* and cannot be placed in the continuum of any type of evolutionism be it physical, mental or religious. If Jesus was not part of any causal series in nature or history, a "root out of the dry ground," there is no other alternative, we must acclaim Him as a being of the supranatural order if we hope to be scientific in our aetiology.

As to the *outward* perspective, is Jesus only *parus inter pares*; or even a *primus inter pares*, as Schleiermacher construed? Present-day savants make much capital and considerable caricature out of the fact that devotees of every religion enthusiastically universalize their faith and founders. Of this species of religious subjectivism or delusion Christianity with its idolized Christ deemed the "Light of the World," is just another typical example. So we are reduced

to the plane to which the author of Hebrews condescended—of comparison. By this method we compare Jesus with all other religious masters to discover whether Jesus was more wise, more consistent, and more perfect, and better attested than they; and whether in all essential respects His religion is superior to theirs, and therefore, on the principle of the “survival of the fittest,” ought to supersede theirs. If it should be shown that Christ is superior in degree, who can call it subjectivism or arrogation if we press on to the irresistible conclusion that Christ is superior in kind, i.e., that He is differentiated generically or by an intrinsic principle from all rival masters, in short, that He is the absolute, universal, final religious master? It is this conclusion which the trend and force of all the previously adduced arguments presume. From this coign of vantage, i.e., Christ as absolute and universal in nature and history, the Christian believer can then confidently turn and throw off the charge of blind exclusivism or of provincialism by duly recognizing the virtues in Mohammed, Confucius, and Buddha and at the same time favorably evaluate all that is edifying in their respective religions. Some religions seem to give us glimpses of truth that do seem divine and above the mere natural understanding. But these, if Jesus should be established as truly God, may be interpreted as but unconscious hints and prophecies presaging Him who is the “desire of all nations,” the “Way” and “Truth” par excellence. While they may not be regarded as special revelations, they do however represent the desires and noble efforts of the unenlightened to grasp that of which their highest intuitions could only give them the vaguest intimations. For example, the countless Avatars or incarnations of Vishnu, indicate the partial truth that it is through a man that the revelation of God is to be looked for.

The comparative argument involves, of course, the circuitous and unambitious method of pitting claim against claim, fact against fact, and detail against detail—its force lies in the preponderance of data that may be inductively assembled in favor of one religion over the other. To this end

the following facts contribute their weight. Confucius though a sage, called himself a "transmitter, not a maker." He professed to be "ever learning, but never able to come to a knowledge of the truth" as Paul puts it. He was agnostic in respect to metaphysical and ultra-phenomenal reality, God, the soul, and immortality. He gave no impulse to progress, reduced religion to a ceremony of empty proprieties; and despite the virtues of his ethics, was in general opinion, the cause of the falsity, the religious senility, the atrophy, moral and intellectual, of that great race of his idealizers.

Mohammed stands self-condemned before authentic tradition and before his own Koran, as one of immoderate passions and wavering will; domestic unchastity, and frequent seizures of what appeared as epilepsy, are recorded. His Paradise was that of an intensified sensuality. He had no attesting miracles; it was only later tradition that ascribed miracles to him. His religion is most transparently an eclectic patchwork pieced from Judaism and environing sects and cults. Buddha, so far as we can disentangle his real life from the mass of the monstrous, almost unintelligible traditions, was indeed a noble and pure individual; yet there was a needless, indeed a morbid abjectness of spirit reflected in most of the precepts of his "Eight-fold Path." His religion was a blank and dreary atheism; his morality a narrow selfishness; his heaven a total extinction of sentient existence according to which suicide would be the quickest route to Redemption, provided the resulting Redemption was not "desired"; his loftiest social action was that of a perverted bodily service; and his most sanguine hope for the future was that of a fatalistic retributive scheme of transmigration of souls, or "Karma." Christ taught not extinction of the "will to live," but the fullness and pregnancy of life, and that must certainly be because He brought life and immortality to light for the first time in history, which, in turn, only God could do. The more these oriental religious masters are compared with the Nazarene, the more does the thought lay hold upon us that He came from above down, while these are

struggling from below up, seeking if haply they may find Him who is their common Father. That which they so nobly struggled and groped for, Christ, it appears, came down and authoritatively revealed.

Four final considerations will help to fix what is already apparent. (1) All religious masters wrought out systems, but not one dared to put himself in the centre of his own mental creation as the exemplar and perfect embodiment of its principles except Jesus. None but the learned Harnack questioned that Jesus was the very center of His own gospel. (2) None of the founders of the great rival systems of Christianity identified themselves with God, though not infrequently lesser lights have appeared with the presumptuous claim. (3) None but Jesus has been supported by a vanguard and rearguard of miracles and prophecy such as His. Even if so these personages could never be supported by so unique a character as that of Jesus. (4) Setting up the highest criterion, i.e., the claim and aspiration to be *universal*, we can more directly narrow the issue down to two religions, which right now seem to be the most serious rivals in the world forum, i.e., Buddhism and Christianity. All religions may be divided into three classes, 1, the religions of past and present barbarian tribes, 2, the national or racial religions, and 3, the universal religions. The first two classes of religions have remained within their designated boundaries, not claiming or striving for universal conquest. Here even Mohammedanism in a certain sense belongs, for it is very questionable whether the founder originally intended it to be universal; and further, it did not actually strive to widen its national limits until much later when it suddenly surprised itself by discovering the power it had for making political conquests. Only Christianity has had a strong conviction of universal destiny, and only Christianity and Buddhism have striven for, and very eminently succeeded in actually conquering the world's ethnic religions.⁶¹ Though we in civilized nations

⁶¹ Certainly the conviction of universality, and the actual universality of conquest are the best *a posteriori* tests of whether universality is the

are more keenly feeling right now the acuteness of this issue with the fascinating Oriental religion, we may have no ground for apprehension for the future outcome when we survey the credentials of the two respective founders.

Against Troeltsch on the one hand, and religious eclectics, or devotees of Buddha on the other hand, we may confidently conclude, that "the one God has his correlative and counterpart in the one religion, and in its character the religion could not but be as was the God," as Fairburn states it.

The crowning witness for Christ, undenied and undeniable, is Christianity, and Christianity in relation to history. We must first account for it that Christianity began to be, and persisted. Jesus died while young, lived a public life only three years, in which short period He matured no series of concerted plans, constituted no society with name, design and laws all definitely fixed; had no correspondence with any local or foreign parties for a wide extension of His belief. He did no organizing. In fact all that He did was to speak. He left no written word or written truth—only a spirit breathed into a few principles. He was the object of scorn and died a malefactor's death. In the ordinary course of events the name of such a mere youth would then have perished from among men. How strikingly unpromising also was that upper-room band in that remote province of the mighty Roman Empire. The most of Jesus' timid followers had broken and fled, and even the most bold of them had denied Him. They were poor, they were ignorant, they were helpless. Even when they opened their mouths and spake, they were betrayed by their mongrel Galilean dialect. Yet the resurrection belief and the unusual impression created by this personality, somehow took root, and we must assure ourselves that it was on the ground of sufficient evidence, if we trust generic human nature. If not true, why has humanity believed in them after the elapse of nineteen centuries? why

destiny of a religion. Absence of this consciousness and this conviction in any religious community already furnishes strong presumption that it is not universal in destiny.

has it never become decadent? Human opinion in the "long run" is history's most infallible test. If this test is favorable, then the original impression produced must have been correspondent with reality.

Not only did Christianity persist, but it persisted through every conceivable difficulty. The most difficult barriers for any religion, new or old, to cross are not geographical, but ethnographical and religious. Yet Christianity passed from an obscure and hunted *religio illicita* through the Neronian persecution to equality and then supremacy in the puissant Roman empire, with none for her and all against her during the time. Thence she passed through a pornocracy, internal schisms, and purifications, through an Inquisition and St. Bartholomews Massacre, a Renaissance, a skeptical period of deism: through the Copernican revolution in science, through modern doubt, and the fiery test of a world-war. Today she holds the minds and hearts of humanity as never before.

Not only did Christianity persist and that through humanly insuperable difficulties, but in doing this she turned the channel of world-history by her social, political, ethical, cultural, and religious transformations, each a distinct chapter in the annals of universal history.

Such is the pragmatic test. If Voltaire pointed an accusative finger with sceptical scorn at the 10,000 lives (he computed to be) lost because of Christianity, ejaculating "religion, behold thy consequences!", and if modern Voltaires point to the 10,000,000 dead on the fields of Europe, exclaiming, "religion, behold thy consequences!", can not we too, point to an *untried*, and *untested* Christianity?

Do men gather figs of thorns and grapes of thistles? What is to be made of these solid facts, if we do not infer, as even Keim does, that "the religion of Christ (in history) refers mysteriously back to His person"? Even the redoubtable Harnack becomes superlative here, "not only in the beginning was the Word, the Word that was once Deed and Life: but the living, resolute, indomitable Word, namely the *person*,

has always been a power in history, along with, and above the power of circumstance. No torch lights itself; one prophet rouses another; but this mysterious development we can *never fathom*.⁶²

If we believe in the principle that every effect has its sufficient cause, we can not postulate anything less in explaining these phenomena of history than a divine-human personality.

Thus far the weight of the reasoning has lain within each individual argument per se. It has been "line upon line and precept upon precept, here a little and there a little." But the true force of each of the arguments can not be appreciated until we take them cumulatively. So in the whole series of arguments thus far adduced, we must rise above detail and precise logic, and with one synthetic grasp ask "*quo tendunt?*" whither do they tend as a whole. Though certain considerations may be conceded for sake of argument as lacking in finality in themselves, what must be said of the general effect and tendency, of the totality of probability? We must not lose the forest in its trees.

The cumulative argument requires us to envisage the vastness of the system of which Jesus is the keystone supporting the arch, an extended series of supernatural acts and manifestations reaching over a history of more than 6000 years. Its force is seen by assuming for the time being the opposite alternative. If the supporting keystone of Jesus' divinity is removed, then the whole scriptural system falls apart, prophecy and all. In fact the whole system becomes *no* system; only a congeries of facts, events, speculations, and we might as well join the ranks of Strauss and Baur and call this *continuum* of literary composition, "myth" or "legend." Unless there is one great fact that can harmonize these details and otherwise isolated events covering over 6000 years of history, Bible history loses its *motif*, its *nouement* and *denouement*, in short, all of its significance. On the other hand, that fact that can harmonize these events, and

⁶² *Christianity and History*, p. 33.

unite these threads and details otherwise confusing, can be counted on beyond all uncertainty to be a reality—a reality constituted by its fitting the demands of the circumstances, and therefore a key-reality. It is a postulate required by our rational nature, which can not be stultified, that truth can only be perceived in wholes and particulars be synthesized as unities, and details must be organically related to organizing principles.

Speaking yet more specifically, regarding the small segment of history subtended by Christ's life we may apply Mill's "method of difference"; when the many and diverse effects of Jesus' person and life (the claims, character, miracles, belief of apostles and later Church) are reviewed, they appear to be connected with supernatural causes as their only explanation. When not explained by this kind of a cause, we have a bewildering cumulus of effects not ascribable either to blind fortuity or to natural law. And it impugns the intelligence of the Final Cause to make Him the author of such bewildering, deceptive, and meaningless second causes. The failure of all naturalistic theories to present uniformly sufficient causes, gratuitously conceding that naturalism may explain a few doubtful miracles, precludes the validity of these as genuine causes at all.

He who would free his mind from the stigma of narrowness and inability to generalize from facts and details (power of generalization being the mark of the order *homo sapiens*) must bow in recognition of the God-man as the explanation of that which is otherwise enigmatic and insoluble in ancient Jewish, Christian, and modern history.

We have, thus far, pushed reason and knowledge to their utmost effect. We have reasoned and learned that we may believe. We now turn to the indispensable correlate of this, *credo ut intelligam* as Anselm put it. There are times to believe in order that we may learn. There still remain such questions as how the infinite and the finite can coalesce in one person. Such questions specifically evoke our faculty of faith. We may adduce the analogy of our own two-fold natures

and their interpenetration. But this suffers the limitation of of all analogical reasoning. It is too remote in its bearing upon the tremendous problem of the coexistence of the finite and infinite natures, and even like Tertullian, we may finally have to say *credo quia absurdum*; but this is not to say or to believe that this faith will not be justified by its results.

In pleading a place for faith, we are not asking for a new and essentially different exercise of the mind than that of general faith. Most modernists confuse science with purely objective, demonstrable knowledge, and theology disparagingly, with a purely subjective attitude, faith. The most rigorous of scientists, however, makes as momentous ventures of faith as are required in the Chalcedonian creed, when he assumes the existence of the "self," the trustworthiness of his senses and intellect, the existence of other "selves," the existence of the objective world and its essential rationality and the uniformity of natural law. None of these verities rest upon demonstrable evidence. Now it is the same faith or trust, differentiated only by its object, which is evoked in the proposition "God exists," or "Jesus is God." Both rest upon probable, but not demonstrable evidence; and both require ultimately, pure faith, over and above any kind of evidence.

Further, every man, being the "incurably religious" creature that he is by nature can not escape the *duty* to believe, a duty impressed upon him by his inner consciousness or by what Calvin calls the *sensus divinitatis*. If it is his natural duty to believe in God, he must believe in God's only Son, to whom God so clearly witnessed, according to reliable testimony, on the banks of the Jordan at the baptism.

But finally if our unbeliever should not believe, on the ground that it requires too great a degree of credulity, he has not therein escaped an equal "credulity" which trusts the power of human nature to create such a wonderful fiction, a credulity which also naively assumes that humanity, these 1900 years since, has been as persistently and universally credulous and gullible as himself. His charge of credulity is retroactive.

Along with the exercise of faith, place must be left for the contribution of experience to what reason is in itself inadequate to furnish.

That there must be something deeper and more final, however, than this (general) faith and experience, is witnessed by the fact we have so often observed, that men who had never believed in Jesus did believe when they saw the quiet conviction of the genuine Christian. They have realized that the Christian possesses something which they do not and can not possess. Hence it is that I as a Christian, cannot reduce to cold syllogistic framework, nor put into feelingless intellectual symbol, that which I possess as a vital inalienable state of the heart, in the last analysis. This cordial conviction that came profoundly into my being when the marvelous light of God shone into the darkness of my heart, came not by dialectic demonstration, nor through long trains of discursive proof; much less can I ever hope to communicate the smallest element of insight into this cherished hope and experience within me by these intellectual media. When all argumentative weapons are laid aside, and we recoil from the heat of the fray, we can simply point to the precious eternal verity within the breast and bid our unbeliever, "Go thy way!" and in the silence of eternity, we will go ours. For "He that believeth on the Son of God hath the witness in himself" (1 Jno. v. 10). But we can trustingly intercede for him that he may have that enabling, quickening influence of the Spirit by which he can say "Lord, I believe, help thou mine unbelief," for it is "with the heart man believeth unto righteousness." And here it is that we must be content to let the issue forever repose; for, like Christ's kingdom, the issue is "within you," and "cometh not by observation." Until mere general faith and experience are born into a full-orbed saving faith and experience, we cannot regard the momentous conclusion of our argument as settled and sealed for all time to the heart of the seeker.

Then will the entire series of arguments appropriately come to their close in that spirited and triumphant Te Deum:

THE GLORIOUS COMPANY OF THE APOSTLES PRAISE THEE.

THE GOODLY FELLOWSHIP OF THE PROPHETS PRAISE THEE.

THE NOBLE ARMY OF MARTYRS PRAISE THEE.

THE HOLY CHURCH THROUGHOUT ALL THE WORLD DOTH
ACKNOWLEDGE THEE.

THOU ART THE KING OF GLORY, O CHRIST: THOU ART THE
EVERLASTING SON OF THE FATHER.

Princeton.

F. D. JENKINS.

THE RATIONAL ARGUMENT FOR IMMORTALITY

Probably there is no question of deeper concern to mankind than the age-old question: "If a man die, shall he live again?" The answers that have been given to this question have been many and varied, but on the whole there has been a startling unanimity about them, in regard to the belief in the certainty of *some* kind of survival after death. The belief in survival may have taken the crude forms of some of the ethnic religions, or it may have risen to the heights of Plato's conception of the immortality of the soul, but everywhere we find the human heart *longing* for another life, and usually resting in faith in some kind of survival. Where is the thinking man who has not at some time of doubt and uncertainty cried out in despair: "Oh that I might know that I will live again!"

It is not the purpose of the present discussion to approach this question from the Christian point of view. To the person who believes that the Bible is the Word of God, the certainty as to the future life which cannot be obtained from external arguments is realized in the promises of Scripture. If we believe that Jesus Christ is the Son of God in the deepest meaning of the words, that He died on the cross and actually rose again from the dead, leaving an empty tomb, then we agree with Paul that Christ brought life and immortality to light, and can trust the promise of the Master that where He is there we shall be also. To the Christian who believes that Jesus Christ was God in the highest sense there is no doubt about immortality. Doubt has been removed by the express teaching of the Lord of Glory, and the truth of His words sealed by resurrection from the dead which placed the stamp of truth upon His teachings. In Christianity, therefore, we have the certainty which no amount of rational argument could give. But the fact remains that many people will not accept the Christian beliefs. They have not the same confidence and hope that we have in the words of Christ, and

demand to know if there is not some other method of approach, and some other way of attaining certainty as to the future life than the Christian one. In this discussion, therefore, we shall ignore the Christian view-point, not because we do not believe in it, but because, though we do believe in it, it offers no common ground of approach to the subject. Our whole purpose, then, will be to attempt to discover what arguments for the immortality of the soul can be advanced apart from the Bible and Christianity.

Of course the starting point must be with the soul itself. If there is no immortality of the soul, there can of course be no immortality in any real sense of the term. To some the immortality of influence suggested by George Elliot in *The Choir Invisible* may offer some specious consolation, but to most of us such an immortality consisting simply in the memories of us in the hearts of our friends, is just no immortality at all. To live for such a hope would be like spending one's life in the search for the bag of gold at the foot of the rainbow, and would be just as useless. To hold out such a hope on the brink of eternity would be merely to tie the bandage of deception around the eyes of reason before the bullet of grim Death sends the quivering soul into the abyss of annihilation. If memories in the hearts of others are all that remain after death, then let us face the fact with no false hopes or deceptive words. Such an immortality is no immortality.

Nor is the persistence of the germ-plasm in the race any real immortality. To be told that we will live on in our descendants and in the future of the race is no consolation to the broken heart of the mother whose babe is lying dead in her arms, for neither the babe nor the mother will have even that poor consolation. Even were it true, such glittering tinsel hope is denied to vast numbers, perhaps even to the majority of the race, for not only do individuals die childless, but whole races have been obliterated in the past history of the human race. But even to those individuals who might be so fortunate as to have perpetual descendants, such a hope

would be a mere travesty. Modern physiology has taught us that the body of a man has no direct relation to or effect on the germ-plasm, other than to act as a channel to transmit life to the following generations. If I cannot therefore pass on to my descendants anything except life and influence, in what way can I be said to have immortality in them? Let us not deceive ourselves. We are merely juggling with words when we say that we can live forever in our off-spring.

Equally vain and empty is any hope of immortality based on pantheistic notions of survival in the Infinite, sinking back into oblivion in the boundless ocean of impersonal Spirit from which we emerged for our short course on earth. Though pantheism were true, absorption into the Infinite would be far from immortality in any real sense of the term. Any Nirvana of extinction of individual personality is for all practical purposes the extinction of the hope of immortality, for to say that we can live on in the limitless ocean of Infinite Spirit is to rob words of their content and to deceive us with illusive unrealities. Either there must be conscious persistence in the future life, or there will be no immortality. Either the soul continues to exist, not as an unconscious atom of Infinite Spirit, but as a conscious, personal being, objective to God, or there is no immortality of the soul.

Having thus cleared the atmosphere of false notions of immortality, we are ready to come to grips with the subject itself. Has man a soul, distinct from his body? If the material atoms which compose the human frame, whatever may be their ultimate nature, are *all* of the man, then of course we must rule out the possibility of immortality. If the brain alone can explain the rational activities of man, and what we call mind or soul is only like the odor of the rose or the "music of the lyre," then of course when the brain dies, all that was the man dies also, and there can be no immortality. If the mind is only the epiphenomenon of matter in the brain cells, then of course it will, like sparks which fly from the revolving emory wheel, disappear into nothingness when the brain stops. If the brain secretes thought as the liver secretes

bile, if the chemical activity of a group of cells produces consciousness as the dynamo generates electricity, then we might as well face the fact that the "soul" is only a mental abstraction, and immortality a chimera.

The theory of William James must be placed in this same class. The phrases which James popularized, "the passing thought is the thinker," and "the stream of consciousness," have lent plausibility to his theory that there is no abiding soul back of the stream of consciousness, and that each passing thought gathers into itself every memory of previous thoughts, and then in turn hands them over to the following thought, so that all that really exists is a constant succession of thoughts, with nothing permanent and abiding back of the succession. This of course is only another way of saying that the psychical series has no reality apart from the brain to which it adheres, and brings us back to the view that mind is only the epiphenomenon of matter. We can amuse ourselves with the intellectual leger-de-main of trying to give reality to a constant succession of evanescent thinkers, but if the thought of a second ago has ceased to exist except as a memory clinging to the present passing thought, and the present passing thought will cease to exist as soon as it turns over its heritage of memories to the thought born the following instant, then when the brain-cells cease to work and the material particles disintegrate, the passing thought will vanish as the glow of the glow-worm, when the glow-worm dies. If all that exists is the passing thought, then since it is only passing it will cease to exist when there is no brain to produce its successor, and we are shut up to the theory that when the brain dies all that is man dies with it.

Pringle-Pattison, in his book *The Idea of Immortality*,¹ criticises sharply the "traditional doctrine of the simple identical self" and caricatures this view as that which locates successive "thoughts or feelings in the empty focus of an immaterial substance or unchanging ego."² This interpreta-

¹ Cf. pp. 96-104.

² P. 102.

tion of the soul which he is criticizing, is of course the old view of Locke, Berkeley, *et al*, that the ego is a blank tablet which receives "impressions" as a wax tablet receives the imprint of the stylus. Far different is the modern view that the soul or ego is the thinking subject who actively appropriates all sensations which enter the mind, and by the use of the space and time forms transmutes them into perceptions, and then by the application of the categories of the understanding such as the ideas of cause, being, relation, identity, etc., which are the innate ideas *originated* by the mind *upon the occasion* of experience, transforms these perceptions into knowledge, then into memories, and back into mental perceptions, thus making possible the higher processes of conceptual reasoning. This view of the soul is not that of an "immaterial substance or unchanging ego" which Pringle-Pattison attacks, but that of an active agent, a *person*, who *does* something, and not merely receives and binds together the states of consciousness. The modern view is that the self is the active agent of thought, growing and developing through life as it appropriates knowledge and experience, yet at the same time remaining the *same* subject amid all its growth and development. It is a *spiritual entity* existing apart from its experiences, and "in, with, and under" the stream of consciousness, yet not comprehended in that stream. In reading the pages of Pringle-Pattison one cannot but feel that he subconsciously has such a view in mind, for after ardently defending the view of James stated above, that "the passing thought is the thinker," Pringle-Pattison goes on in the following pages to assume the permanent reality of this thinker!

Instead of being an intermittent and evanescent accompaniment of organic processes, the spiritual self, created through the bodily medium, is seen to achieve a unity and identity more complete and more permanent than can belong to any non-self-conscious being. It is, indeed, only the self-conscious spirit—a being who can make himself his own object and contemplate himself as a self—that attains individuality and independence in an ultimate sense.³

³ P. 105.

In reading these words one cannot help feeling that Pringle-Pattison has subconsciously in mind the same kind of a self that we have in mind, yet he strenuously denies that he believes in an "identical subject present in his body all along." Pringle-Pattison thinks he agrees with James that the passing thought is the only thinker, and yet after getting rid of any permanent, abiding self, he goes on to assume that it is possible for this passing thought to be a *real* self, and attain independence "in an ultimate sense"! He has tried to build up a kind of *tertium quid* between matter and spirit, and give it objective and permanent reality! One is reminded very much of the smile on the face of the Cheshire cat in *Alice in Wonderland*, that remained after the cat disappeared! Pringle-Pattison gets rid of the cat (a permanent, abiding self) and leaves us the smile (the passing thought that has attained "independence in the ultimate sense")!

But in real life there are no Cheshire cats, and there is no such *tertium quid* as a passing thought that can attain independence in the ultimate sense. If there is no abiding spiritual self or soul, then we are shut up to the view that mind is only the epiphenomenon of matter, and will disappear when the body dies. We cannot have the smile without the cat! If there is no permanent abiding self or soul, then there can be no immortality.

The question, then, of the existence of a permanent abiding soul not constituted either in the brain or in the mental processes accompanying thought, but transcending both, is one of vital importance for our subject. Is it possible to explain all thought without an ego to act as thinker? The passing thought that is the thinker of James and Pringle-Pattison in no way answers the purpose, for though they have tried to give it all the attributes of the real ego without any of the substance and permanence of the real self, it is after all only an *ignis fatuus* or a mere puppet. Not by any stretch of the imagination can we be made to believe a fluent stream of consciousness exists without a channel in which to flow, or

that non-material thought can originate from a material brain and still be independent of an active and abiding thinker who is the subject of the thought.

The method of approach to the subject is introspection. Let us look into this stream of consciousness and examine these passing thoughts to see what are the characteristics and real qualities of our self-consciousness. *Cogito ergo sum*, still remains the corner-stone of introspective psychology. It is impossible to think without assuming the real existence of a self not comprehended in our brain, though acting in it and using it as a mechanic uses his tools. If we examine the stream of consciousness at any moment we notice several things. First, we notice that it is not a mere stream flowing constantly on and on with no direction or control; it has a director who hastens or slows it, changes its direction at will, shuts off one current and turns on another, who selects various elements in the stream and brings them to the focus of consciousness and then dismisses them and selects others. Were we to suppose that there is no active agent controlling and guiding the whole process, it is impossible to see how a train of ideas which once started in our brains could ever stop unless stopped from without by an external stimulus of a different character breaking into the previous train of thought and leading the consciousness off in another direction. And when the new train of thought got started, how could *it* ever stop as long as the brain-cells continued to function properly and throw off sparks of thoughts, unless it too were interfered with by another external stimulus? Under such conditions the brain would be simply a mechanism at the mercy of every passing stimulus with no power of its own to interfere with the stream of consciousness continually flowing through the brain-cells to the accompaniment of chemical activity in the cells. Unless the brain-cells became diseased or the life processes ceased to operate, thought would continue in an unbroken stream unguided and uncontrolled from within, and con-

tinually at the beck and call of the strongest external stimulus entering the brain.

Now anyone who thinks about his mental processes for a moment knows that this is not the case. It is true that we are more or less under the control of external stimuli, especially when these stimuli are unusually strong, as for example when an explosion occurs near the room where we are working, or the fire department truck goes by the window, but under ordinary circumstances we clearly possess the power of selecting from the stream of sensations constantly entering our brain the ones which we will permit to occupy the focus of consciousness. We resist others and repel them from our minds and from the focus of consciousness. We call it the *power of concentration*, and a person has a strong or a weak personality according as he is able to guide and control the stream of consciousness, with greater or less decision.

Not only does the mind possess the power of selecting from the entering stream of sensations the one to which it will choose to attend, and to refuse admittance to all others, or after attending to one entering stream of sensations for some time, to drop that stream and allow another to occupy the focus of consciousness, but the mind in the second place possesses the power of *originating* a train of thought deliberately, even when that train of thought has no relation to the entering stream of sensations, and is unconnected with the previous train of thought by any chain of association of ideas. We might compare it to a searchlight playing over the surrounding landscape and picking up at will new objects upon which it chooses to focus its rays. If there is method and planning in the manipulation of the searchlight we judge that it is not automatic in its operation but that it is under the control of a *person*. In the same way, when we see the mind deliberately breaking off a chain of thought, and from among the various memories of the mind choosing a certain one upon which to concentrate, when that one had absolutely no relation to what went before, or reviewing in

the mind scores of unrelated memories, thinking first of one and then of another, dropping the second and deliberately going back to the first or to some other line of thought, is it not necessary to postulate an active ego back of the passing thought, not controlled by it, but controlling it, to explain this phenomenon?

Then in the third place the mind has the power of conceptual reasoning and also the power of imagination. How could we account for the fact that the mind can take various memories, relate and coordinate them, notice their similarities and differences, recognize the inner meaning of the facts which they denote, and then draw conclusions from them which are new, simple ideas, manufactured by the mind, and which were not in any way contained in either the sense perceptions or the memories about which the mind thought, unless we postulate an active thinking ego back of the passing thought and the stream of consciousness? Then the mind has the power of imagination which consists of combining various memories into new concepts which are not mere picture puzzles pieced together by the mind, but new simple ideas manufactured by the mind. Only an active agent back of and under the train of thought can account for these things.

The only conclusion possible from such a process of introspection is that there is a real soul, ego, self, mind or whatever we wish to call it, dwelling in each of our bodies, acting within the brain, and yet not comprehended by the brain. Of course we are not to think of some independent, unchangeable substance which we call a soul, dwelling in an isolated part of our brain, unchanged from birth to death. Nor must we think of it as impressionable soul stuff like spiritual wax, that takes and retains impressions and acts as the carrying medium for memory. The real soul, as has been said before, is an active spirit that is a real person, with the powers of growth and development with the acquisition of knowledge and experience, and yet with such growth and change, maintaining identity throughout life. A non-material

soul must certainly be posited to account for the rational activity of man.

Nor is it an objection against such a view that we cannot explain how material matter and non-material spirit can interact. Those who take the view that the ultimate nature of matter is energy, and trace the ultimate source of the energy to the activity of God, have no problem of interaction to contend with. But even were we shut up to the view that matter and spirit are disparate substances, the proof that the soul exists is so strong that even though we cannot explain *how* they can interact, the fact that they do interact cannot be doubted. We have reality, at least, in the soul, so that we have at least the *possibility* that when the body dies, since there is a non-material soul, it may persist as a real independent existence apart from the body. This of course is not *proven* by proving the present existence of the soul, but the possibility of such persistence after death cannot be denied and is open to further investigation.

Is there any evidence that such persistence after death is probable? There are certain lines of evidence that point to such a conclusion. When we are asleep the ego apparently becomes either inactive or has its connection severed with the body. All the mental processes either cease or if they continue in dreams, apparently are uncontrolled by the conscious ego. We know that we have no control over our dreams, and in fact the brain acts in dreams much as we would expect it to act if there were no controlling ego. It is led around through the labyrinth of associated ideas entirely under the control of external stimuli or of stimuli arising in the brain itself, with no purpose or reason to its wanderings. It gives every appearance of a ship without a rudder. The pilot may be in the ship but when the rudder goes there is nothing to control the course of the ship. In the same way the brain apparently has lost temporary connection with the piloting ego, in dreams. The very fact that the brain thus acts differently in dreams and in waking life, is one of the strong-

est evidences of the existence of a real ego as well as of the possibility of the ego persisting apart from the brain.

Then too when the body is under the influence of an opiate a similar effect occurs. It is a well known fact that when a patient is under an anaesthetic he may make remarks of which he is totally unconscious and which he does not remember when awake. In such a condition the connection between the brain and the ego seems to be interrupted even more than in case of ordinary sleep.

A third fact seems to make this conclusion even more probable. In many well authenticated cases large portions of the brain have been diseased without affecting the self-consciousness of the individual. In such cases many times the patient retained full consciousness and apparently had all the characteristics of an ordinary ego. Then in many instances great portions of the brain itself have been removed, and upon recovery the patient maintained the consciousness of personal identity, with full control of his mental faculties. It cannot be said that the seat of consciousness was in the portions not removed, for in other cases other portions of the brain have been removed without affecting the self-consciousness of the patient upon recovery. If the brain can be thus removed in sections, and the ego still remain intact, it certainly points to the possibility of the ego continuing after death itself, since in life it is relatively independent of any particular portion of the brain.

This conclusion is strengthened by another fact. In many cases of serious illness, while the patient is lying at the point of death and is unconscious, though afterward recovering from the illness, such patients have been known to pass through strange experiences in which they seem to be able to stand off at a distance and view their own bodies with the surrounding physicians and relatives, yet during the whole time the body lies unconscious with closed eyes. They have been known to get glimpses of glories unspeakable, so that upon recovery they have had hard work convincing their relatives of the reality of such experiences. Such cases

certainly point to the possibility of persistence after death of the human soul.

Then the cases of insanity and feeble-mindedness certainly resemble a broken machine which cannot be used by the worker until it has been repaired. If a telephone does not work we are not to conclude that there is no person at the other end of the line simply because we cannot communicate with him. The brain may not function, and yet the ego be in existence behind it, though unable to express itself in the imperfect instrument. Certainly we are not justified in concluding that there is no ego behind it. In such cases the ego will be prohibited from growth through experience and education, and will probably remain immature throughout this life, but who can deny the possibility of its growth and development beyond the grave?

Cases of dual personality are of course difficult to explain on any hypothesis, and yet though we may not be able to account satisfactorily for them, the evidence for the existence of the ego and for its persistence after death is strong enough to overcome even such difficulties. There are several possibilities in this case. It may be that the brain is diseased in such a way that the ego is unable to express itself at all times, so that what appears to be two personalities is in reality only one, appearing part of the time through the diseased section of the brain. Or another explanation which might be given is that the individual is under the control of an evil spirit at a certain period. Of course this explanation would be unaccepted by those who deny the existence of such spirits, but if the possibility of such spirits existing be admitted, then this explanation could be given. It is even possible to say that through some freak of nature two souls are actually struggling for the control of one human body. However we may explain it, such things cannot be used as an argument against the reality of the soul or the possibility of its persisting after death.

It is impossible to ignore psychical phenomena in this connection. For many years a great number of scientists

and pseudo-scientists have been collecting vast amounts of evidence and publishing a large number of books on the subject of Spiritism. The ranks of believers in Spiritism have been augmented since the Great War by such men as Sir Oliver Lodge the physicist, and Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, the writer of fiction. The Spiritists believe that they have experimental proof of the survival of the human soul after death, in the psychical phenomena of numerous kinds. Large numbers of messages from alleged spirits of departed friends have been received by numerous investigators, through mediums in a state of trance. Many of such messages have been published in volumes such as *Raymond*, by Sir Oliver Lodge, and in the *Proceedings* of the American Psychical Society. Recently the investigation of a noted medium in Boston by a number of scientists has brought the subject to the forefront in the press of the country. The volume of these messages, and the character of the people who vouch for them is such that they can no longer be ignored, whatever explanation we may be able to give for them.

Unquestionably there is a vast amount of deceit connected with the whole matter. Over and over again famous mediums have been detected in deceit, and exposed. Almost all of the so-called spiritistic phenomena have been duplicated by noted magicians who made no claim to supernaturalism. Then too the trivial character of the messages from the alleged spirits does not lend plausibility to the view that educated, talented men could after death give messages of such an insipid and colorless nature as the alleged messages which come through the mediums. According to the public press an interesting instance of the failure of mediums all over the world to discover the countersign and message agreed upon by a man and his wife who has since died, has just occurred. Before the death of the wife, a message and a certain countersign which the one who died first would try to convey through mediums to the other, were agreed upon, placed in a triply sealed envelope and deposited in a safety deposit vault to obviate the possibility of someone tampering with the

message. Hundreds of attempts by mediums to guess the countersign have been made, and not one was successful as proved by the opening of the envelope recently. Things of such a nature have happened so frequently that one is not inclined to place much dependence on the authenticity of the messages. Even granted that there is no conscious fraud on the part of the mediums, other explanations of the phenomena than that of actual spirits of departed mortals can be given. According to one hypothesis, the whole affair is caused by telepathy between living persons. Whether there is an actual force which will enable persons at a distance from each other to communicate with each other, is still a questionable matter. Still more doubtful is the possibility that a person may unthinkingly communicate his thoughts to another at a distance and be entirely ignorant of the fact. Perhaps too the name telepathy is merely a term which covers up our ignorance of the actual forces at work. Then there is the possibility which no naturalistic investigator would admit, that these various phenomena are caused by the agency of evil spirits, with the idea of leading mankind astray from the true way of salvation. Even were we to admit that the phenomena are caused by the actual spirits of those who have passed over, that would not prove that these souls were immortal, but only that they have survived for at least a certain period. Whether they will survive through all eternity would still be an open question. We must deny, then, that the immortality of the soul is proved by spiritistic phenomena, however genuine they may be.

This concludes the evidence on the subject from a scientific point of view. The most that can be claimed so far is that science cannot *disprove* the possibility of immortality. It seems fairly certain that there is a real soul in our bodies, of a different character from that of the physical matter of the brain, and if such a soul exists there is the possibility that it may continue to exist after death. The relative independence of the soul during this life, as shown in sleep, under the influence of anaesthetics, and in cases of recovery from most

severe illnesses, indicates the probability of persistence of the soul after death, but this of course in no way proves that the soul is immortal; it only proves that there is the possibility of immortality, even from a scientific point of view. We must now proceed to examine the philosophical and ethical arguments for immortality.

Much has been made at various times of the argument from the universality of the belief in the future life. The fact that all races of men have, from the earliest dawn of history, believed in some kind of a future existence, certainly makes it difficult to believe that their belief is entirely without foundation. If there is a Creator back of this world and life, it is difficult to believe that He would have planted such an unconquerable desire in the human heart were it to remain unsatisfied. We must admit, however, that this argument proves nothing. It rests on too insecure a foundation to build upon it any structure of faith. In the first place it is by no means certain that all races have believed in the same kind of immortality that we have in mind in the present discussion. Many of them have believed only in some kind of bodily survival which is entirely different from immortality of the soul. Other great sections of humanity have believed that the soul becomes reincarnated in animals or absorbed into the Infinite. Thus when we come to examine the belief in detail we find far from the unanimity we might expect. Then in the second place, even were there a greater unanimity than actually exists, it is entirely possible that mankind is deceived in its hopes for a future life. The argument is thus seen to be far from conclusive.

The argument from analogy is likewise unsatisfactory. The transformation of the caterpillar into the butterfly, is a beautiful picture of nature's methods, but it is after all in the realm of physical life, and what may be true in physical life may or may not be true in the spiritual realm. Furthermore the analogy at best is imperfect in two respects. It proves neither the necessity of a future life, nor its permanence, for the caterpillar sometimes dies without becoming a

butterfly, and even if it becomes a butterfly it has no immortality.

To be sure, the snake sheds its old skin, the tadpole changes into the frog, the grain of wheat dies in the earth only to burst forth again with renewed vigor in a new life, and the trees shed their leaves in the autumn only to bloom forth in renewed glory in the spring, and if we can prove on independent grounds that the soul of man is immortal, then we can look at these things in nature and see an imperfect analogy, but as for proving that the soul must live forever, these arguments from analogy are entirely insufficient, for they are not dealing with the spiritual realm. Perhaps the strongest argument of an analogical kind arises from the physical laws of the conservation of energy and the indestructibility of matter. If particles of physical matter can persist through the ages, and if energy can be changed but not destroyed, certainly it seems improbable that human personality, which is of such infinitely greater value, could perish. The human soul shows every evidence of being a bit of real energy of a personal kind. If this is true, it would apparently come under the law of the conservation of energy, or at least the analogy would be so strong that it would seem to offer great probability of being true. William Chester expresses this line of thought very strongly in *Immortality a Rational Faith*, as follows:

Is not the life more than the raiment? Can we conceive of a father saving his child's clothing and deliberately allowing his child to perish in the flames? Does God preserve the elementary constituents through their countless changes and yet snuff out the precious spirit of His own offspring? Would He give millions of years to the duration of the solar system and annihilate His own child after this little gasp? . . . Shall the choicest, most precious product of the universe—intelligence, spirit, character—be absolutely thrown away?⁴

Even though we must notice that this argument assumes the existence and fatherhood of God, its strength cannot but be felt on any basis. Even if we deny the existence of God, the existence of soul energy must be admitted, and if it exists,

⁴ P. 100.

according to the law of the conservation of energy, it could hardly pass out of existence. Of course we must recognize that this argument has its limitations, and is open to the objection that though the soul exists as a person now, the law of conservation of energy would be satisfied if the soul were to persist as impersonal spirit. So that, after all, the argument is far from conclusive as proving that a human soul can persist forever as a person. It has a certain weight, however, that cannot be ignored, especially to one who believes in a personal God.

A strong argument for immortality is based on the incompleteness of human life. During the few short years of our life here on earth, we can only brush the surface of the fathomless knowledge of the universe. The more a person learns, the greater the vistas of possible knowledge that lie open before him. No matter how great achievements we may make in life, still greater ones lie before us if we were only given time in which to carry on. There is a hunger in the human heart for time in which to realize these intellectual cravings. Then when we think of the lives that are snuffed out before their time, in the prime of youth, or in the bloom of manhood, with their task on earth only begun or half-completed, we cannot but feel that there must be another opportunity for growth, development and service beyond the grave.

Every one possesses this singular power of continually conceiving higher visions than he can possibly realize. Strive as he will, each attainment only enables him to see greater possibilities. Every result achieved simply enlarges his ability for greater attainment, this growing capacity therefore prophesying eternal utility.⁵

All this uncompleted immaturity certainly points forward to an opportunity for fulfillment, yet here again we must admit the insufficiency of the argument for proving immortality. It indeed makes immortality seem a fitting culmina-

⁵ Chester; *Immortality a Rational Faith*, p. 111.

tion of an incomplete existence on earth, but that does not prove that such immortality is *actual*.

Then we must mention the Kantian argument for immortality from the ethical constitution of our natures. We have deeply imbedded in our consciousness the moral sense of obligation to do right when we know what the right is. We call it conscience. Now by the word conscience we do not mean that there is an eternal blood-hound in our minds that always points unerringly to the course of action which is always right, and to another course of action which is always and irrevocably wrong. All history would disprove the existence of any such power in mankind. Were there such a power, the disagreements in moral judgments between races and between individuals would be inexplicable. Nor is it possible to say that the race in its sinless state had such a power but that that power has been weakened and corrupted by sin. Undoubtedly our moral natures are corrupted by sin, but even though these natures were restored to their full moral purity, there would be the possibility of their making a wrong moral decision without knowledge of a true standard by which to estimate all acts. The conscience is simply the moral judging faculty of the mind, or the mind judging on questions of right and wrong, plus the necessity which the mind feels of doing right when it makes the decision as to what is right. Whether we decide correctly or not depends on whether we have a true standard of right and wrong by which to measure the act, and also upon whether we make no error in estimating the facts and in our mental processes while judging the act. The conscience is simply the sense of moral obligation which the mind feels to do right. Now it is the universal experience of mankind that such a conscience is present in our souls. Why is it there? If this life ends all, why should we feel any obligation to do right when once we have decided what is right? We have this characteristic in our natures, and the fact that this characteristic is there, indicates that there is a moral government in the universe. If there is moral government in the universe,

then certainly there must exist a hereafter in which to realize justice for mankind. As we look about us in this world, we see no such reign of universal justice as our natures point to. The good are oftentimes shamefully treated and the evil are oftentimes triumphant. If this world ends all, the sense of moral obligation in our natures is a lie. This fact that we have moral natures offers a strong argument for a future life, for it is difficult to see how such a moral nature could arise if there is no God, and if there is a God, the fact that we have moral natures is the strongest kind of a pledge that justice will be done in the future life. Of course we must realize that this argument tells us nothing about a Saviour who took upon Himself the punishment due sinners, but the fact of the moral government of the world as evidenced by our moral natures, makes the Atonement a necessity if sinners are to escape the wrath of God.

Many philosophers have argued that eternal life is a necessity from the very simplicity and indivisibility of the soul. Since the soul exists as a simple unit of spirit, it is impossible to conceive of its passing out of existence with death, for an indivisible unit cannot be separated into smaller divisions and therefore must continue to exist through eternity. The trouble with this argument is that it proves too much. If its indestructibility is *necessarily* involved in its simplicity and indivisibility, its preexistence would also necessarily be likewise involved. Such a view would limit God, for it would posit other existences from all eternity besides the living God, which is irrational. On the other hand, if we say that these souls were created by God, as the Christian believes, certainly we cannot deny that the same God who created them could blot them out of existence if He so desired. There might be other considerations that would lead God to bestow eternal life, but the theoretical possibility of annihilation could not be denied. This argument, therefore, would be valid only if there were no God, or if souls existed from all eternity.

Some writers with pantheistic tendencies have argued that the individual soul does indeed persist after death, but that the immortality of which it partakes is absorption into the Infinite from which it came. Pringle-Pattison calls attention to the fact that the idea upon which this view is based is that individual soul-substances are merely portions of the Infinite soul-mass from which they have been for a time separated, and to which they will be reunited at death. He then goes on to say,

If we reflect that the reality of any finite spirit is the formed mind and will which is the result of the long moulding process, and that this result is something absolutely new and unique in the universe, a creation in the most literal sense, then it is plain that the so-called reabsorption of the individual into his divine source does not mean that anything is actually refunded into the Divine Being, to enrich it or to be used afresh for further creations. It means simply the disappearance of the personality in question, and to represent this as, in each case, the goal and consummation of the creative process, seems little less than contradictory.⁶

The pantheist might reply to this that if the soul is only what Pringle-Pattison makes it, an evanescent *tertium quid* between material substance and spiritual substance, there won't be anything to be absorbed, after the death of the body! There are only two possibilities, and if we say that mind is not the mere effluvia of matter, we must say that it is a spiritual reality, which for want of a better term we may as well call substance, provided we do not think of it as unchangeable stuff, incapable of growth or development. The soul is a self-conscious personality, and as such it has a substantive existence, created by God with the possibility of growth and change, though always retaining personal identity. But Pringle-Pattison is quite right in saying that this created soul is something new in the universe, and that for it to be absorbed into the Infinite would mean simply the disappearance of the personality in question. To talk of immortality in such a case is indeed a contradiction in terms. We have in the universe an indefinite number of created spirits. Suppose we say for the sake of argument that these

⁶ P. 162.

spirits are all absorbed into the Infinite at death, and the sum total of their individual consciousnesses becomes part and parcel of the consciousness of the Infinite. What would be the result? Why it would mean that there would be an infinite number of contradictions, oppositions, disagreements, hatreds and antagonisms in the one self-same Infinite consciousness, and the result would be simply chaos! To posit reality to such a figment of the imagination and to say that such a process represents what actually takes place when we die, is to reduce reason to an absurdity.

The only alternative from the pantheistic point of view is to say that when the individual dies all that has been distinctive of his personality fades away, and all that remains is spirit of the characterless sort which Pringle-Pattison fulminates against under the impression that it is the ordinary view of substance as applied to the soul. But were this the true view of the soul (i.e., as unchangeable soul-stuff), upon reabsorption into the Infinite, it would lose all that constitutes it a soul as we know it in personal existence, and would be simply to turn immortality into a mere delusion and a travesty of true eternal life. For the pantheist there can be no immortality in any true sense of the term. If the pantheist is right, death ends all just as truly as it does for the materialist.

But is the pantheist right? The one conclusive argument against pantheism is that it contradicts the testimony of individual consciousness. I *know*, and the knowledge is immediate, that I am not identical with my sensations, or with other finite existences! To say that I am part and parcel of the rest of the universe is to talk nonsense. We are not parts of the same great whole, but are each distinct from every other person or thing in the universe. This knowledge is of a kind about which it is impossible for my consciousness to lie, and it constitutes the greatest single refutation of pantheism.

There is an argument for immortality advanced by many thinkers of the present day, which we will mention only to dismiss. This is the argument for immortality from evolution. It is argued that since man is at the apex of the whole

process of evolution, and is evolution's highest and best fruit, it is inconceivable that nature would through countless ages produce such a wonderful creature as man only to blot him out of existence after a few short years of life. It is said therefore that the whole process of evolution points to continued existence after death and continued development. It is said that the fact of the soul's being brought into existence through evolution is the most conclusive proof that it will not be extinguished like a candle but will continue to burn brighter and brighter through all eternity. Now of course the argument rests entirely on the validity of the theory of evolution. If evolution is true then the argument would have some weight, but to those of us who do not believe in evolution, there is no foundation for the argument. But even though we were to admit that evolution is true, that would not prove immortality, for if other forms of life die without passing into eternity as living organisms then it might quite probably be that the soul of man is only another stage in the whole process, and that as time goes on in the far distant future, man might quite conceivably evolve into a higher creature here on this earth, with no life after death. According to evolutionary principles nature cares only for the race and cares nothing for the individual as such, so that individual immortality would in no sense be necessary though evolution were true. If evolution is not a fact, then the argument of course falls.

At the beginning of this argument we stated that the question of immortality would not be approached from the Christian point of view, or from the point of view of a person who believes that the Bible is the Word of God. There is one argument that can be considered apart from the Bible and Christianity, though it is a distinctly religious argument. This argument arises from the nature of God. Though we may not be Christians or believe that the Bible is the Word of God, there are independent grounds for believing in the existence of God, as an all-powerful, personal Being who created the universe and man, either directly or indirectly through the use of

means such as a process of evolution. It is not necessary to go into the question of proving the existence of God at this time, but this could easily be done if it were necessary or desirable, and of course logically it should be done at this point. We shall, however, assume the existence of such a personal God as creator of the universe. If such a God exists as the rational cause of our existence, and if, as has been shown, the created man is not merely a creature with a material brain, but also with a non-material soul, then there must be some purpose for which man has been created. It is inconceivable that man should have been created with all these wonderful powers for no purpose. Does life on earth for the short period of man's existence justify his creation if we were to assume that death ends the life of his soul as well as the life of his body? In a rational universe governed by a rational God, the enormous waste, for example, of those who die in childhood and youth, with their uncompleted existences even on earth, certainly would be hard to explain if there were no future life to justify their creation. And when we consider the life even of the most mature men, or of the greatest geniuses, it is inconceivable that such powers should have been developed and brought to fruition under the control of a rational God, and then snuffed out of existence when at the very zenith of their powers, unless there be another life in which to utilize their powers. The enormous waste of spiritual powers and resources on any other hypothesis, renders it incredible that God would go to all the trouble of creating such minds only to destroy them. This life certainly does not offer sufficient reason for His creation if death ends all. It would be like the mountain travailing and bringing forth a mouse! In a rational universe a great effect necessitates not only a great cause, but it also necessitates a great purpose in the mind of the Cause. This life alone does not offer such a great purpose for our creation. Such a purpose would be found if we were created for time and eternity to have communion with and to worship our Maker. We feel that such a magnificent end would be worthy of God, and it

is difficult to see how any other end not as great would justify our creation. A personal God after creating persons with natures like His own, certainly would prolong their existence into eternity in order to have communion and fellowship with them and to have worship and adoration from them forever. This of course does not take into account sin and the necessity for redemption, though incidently we may say that this very argument renders redemption most probable in order to fulfil the purpose for which man was created. Of course we must admit that this argument is not decisive. It simply adds its cumulative force to the whole trend of truth which we are considering, though it falls short of positive proof.

We cannot ignore, even in a discussion of immortality from a purely rational standpoint, the fact of the resurrection of Christ. Though we may not accept the Bible as the Word of God, or believe in the doctrines of Christianity, we are forced to consider events which are asserted to be facts of history, bearing on our subject. The resurrection of Christ is such an event. We can trace the history of the Christian Church back to the first century, to the time of men living in the lifetime of the apostles and other witnesses of the resurrection of Christ. We know that the early Christian Church believed and was founded on the belief in the resurrection of Christ. Whether we say that that event was an actual occurrence in history or not, we must admit that the Church believed it to be an actual occurrence. We must account for the origin of this belief. Of course the very simplest method of accounting for the belief is to say that the resurrection was an actual occurrence. If we deny that such an event could have happened, we have the origin and persistence of the belief in its truth to account for in some other way. One way of explaining the origin of this belief is to say that the apostles and the early witnesses were deceivers. But who can examine the accounts of the lives of those apostles and early Christians and assert that they were base deceivers? To make such an assertion would necessitate the

moral miracle of hundreds of men and women banded together to propagate a fact which they knew to be a lie, and at the same time living lives of purity and preaching the necessity of truth and righteousness in their churches and to the world! Moreover, remember that there was no opportunity to deceive, for those things were not done in a corner, but in the busiest city of Palestine, before the eyes of their bitterest enemies, who would move heaven and earth to get evidence disproving their claims. Remember that those enemies had only to produce the body of Jesus to overthrow the whole movement. The tomb was empty, and though the Jews charged the disciples with theft to account for the empty tomb, they very well knew that such a thing was impossible in view of the guard whom they themselves had placed to prevent that very thing. Moreover the greatest miracle of all would have been the spectacle of men and women dying for a claim which they knew to be a lie! Men and women have died for false principles before in the history of the world, but they died believing that the thing for which they died was *true*! But in this case we are asked to believe that men and women in their right minds died for a cause which they knew to be false! Such a thing is utterly inconceivable. The hypothesis of intentional deceit is one that is utterly untenable.

But if we do not believe the resurrection happened, and cannot say that the disciples were deceivers, we must say that they were unconsciously deceived by something that didn't happen but which they thought happened. There are two hypotheses in this connection. One is that the disciples saw a vision in the external world, and the other is that they were victims of hallucinations. According to the first of these hypotheses the various disciples actually saw a supernatural vision in the external world, though it was not the actual resurrected body of the Lord that appeared to them. Passing over the fact that the resurrected Lord ate with them and they were able to place their hands in his wounds, as well as the numerous incidental points in the accounts which

make the hypothesis of a supernatural vision incredible, there are two insuperable difficulties to the theory. The first is that it necessitates a miracle to get rid of another miracle! It necessitates the miracle of an actual supernatural appearance of a vision in the form of our Lord, in order to get rid of the necessity of saying that He actually rose from the dead! Now if the supernatural must be brought in to get rid of the supernatural we are certainly in a strange situation! The chief reason for doubting the resurrection accounts is that they are accounts of an event which does not happen in the world today, and are therefore unbelievable. But if we interpose another supernatural event in its place, we have made matters worse, for if one event is possible so is the other, and all reasons for doubting the accounts are removed. The other difficulty is that this theory cannot account for the empty tomb. The enemies had only to produce the dead body of Jesus to overthrow the whole movement. This they could not do and never claimed to be able to do. Something had happened to the body. As we saw above, we cannot under the circumstances accuse the disciples of theft of this body both because we cannot charge them with dishonesty, and because there was no opportunity to get by guards who knew that it might mean death to them if they slept on duty. There was no motive for Jesus's enemies to steal his body, and if they had they would have produced it when the disciples claimed that He had risen from the dead. The vision hypothesis thus also completely breaks down in face of the facts.

The remaining hypothesis is that the disciples all were victims of hallucinations. They thought they saw the resurrected body of the Lord, when all they actually saw was an imaginary form which arose from a disordered brain. This is the favorite explanation of naturalistic theologians. Of course it too faces impossible difficulties. To begin with, the details of the conversations which the disciples had with the Lord in the upper room and on the way to Emmaus as well as at the grave itself, and the fact that this figment of their imaginations was said to eat with them, while one of them

in a doubting frame of mind was invited to put his hand in the side of Jesus and his fingers in the nail-prints, and actually did so, renders it impossible to regard such events as mere hallucinations. Remember also that these alleged hallucinations occurred not at night when such things are possible to an imaginative person, but in broad daylight, over a period of many days, and most miraculous of all, instead of increasing as the years went on as such things have a habit of doing when they are merely imaginary, these appearances of Jesus *ceased* after a short time! But the conclusive reason why these resurrection appearances of Jesus cannot be regarded as hallucinations, is that they occurred to great numbers of people at the *same time*! Where in all medical history is there another instance of five hundred people having the same hallucination at the same time when there was nothing in the external world to cause it? The very characteristic of an hallucination is that people around the one who has the hallucination see nothing of the things the one who is undergoing the experience claims to be seeing. If they all see the same thing, that is the proof that it is not an hallucination. Then lastly all that was said in the case of the vision hypothesis about the empty tomb, applies with equal force to this attempted explanation. When the disciples claimed that they had seen the Lord, all the Jews had to do was to go to the tomb and produce the body! This hypothesis like the others, breaks down completely when confronted by the facts.

But if these hypotheses will not hold water, what remains? Either the disciples deceived or were deceived, or else they saw the actual body of our Lord risen from the tomb. If the first two suppositions are upset by a close examination of the evidence, the only possibility that remains is that the Lord actually rose from the dead! If this fact is admitted, then we have before us the most stupendous fact in human history! Of course we have not mentioned in the above discussion the swoon theory, for it hardly deserves even cursory attention. People who have their sides pierced with spears over the heart, so that the fluid, which proves that Christ's heart was

actually broken, rushes out, are scarcely in a condition to push away large stones from the mouths of tombs! Neither do such men appear and disappear at will, or pass through closed doors. Such a theory is almost beneath consideration. Yet if Christ actually rose from the dead, we have proof that the dead can live with spiritual bodies, and yet with bodies that are the same as our bodies!

It may be justly said in reply that Christ's resurrection in itself does not prove that we who are not God live after death while our bodies remain in the grave, though it raises a strong presumption that that can occur. But what it does do is to establish Christ as a supernatural person, and set the seal of truth on the previous utterance of Christ! The resurrection proves that Christ was the Son of God, and if the Son of God, then the One who promised us eternal life can be trusted! Here at last we have certainty! Here we can rest our case for the immortality of the soul! It is impossible to deny from a scientific point of view that there is a soul, or to deny the possibility of immortality, but there is no positive proof of immortality from science, philosophy, or religion. Our positive proof of immortality rests on Jesus Christ alone. We can believe in immortality because He promised it to us. We know His promise is true because He was proved to be the Son of God by the resurrection from the dead, and the Son of God could not lie. Here and here only can we rest our case. Here and here only can we have certainty. Through faith in Him alone do we know that our Redeemer liveth and that we too shall live, in the realm from which no traveller returns.

Princeton.

FLOYD E. HAMILTON.

NOTES AND NOTICES

HOEN'S LETTER ON THE EUCHARIST AND ITS INFLUENCE UPON CARLSTADT, BUCER AND ZWINGLI

Cornelius Hoen, or Honius, the author of the widely discussed *Epistola Christiana tractans Coenam Dominicam*, was a lawyer at the Court of Holland in The Hague till the year 1523. Erasmus called him "vir optimus."¹ He studied the works of a Dutch humanist, named Wessel Gansfort,² who had written a treatise on the Holy Supper.³ He was so much impressed by this treatise that he arrived at an entirely new view on the sacrament. It seemed to him that Gansfort had deviated considerably from the generally accepted view of transubstantiation. For Gansfort had written such statements as this:

Necessarily it must be admitted that when he says, "Except ye eat the flesh of the Son of man and drink his blood," we are to understand that it is an inward eating and drinking, that is, of the inner man. He who thus eats already has the benefit of the outward sacramental eating. To eat, therefore, is to remember, to esteem, to love.⁴

Hoen also appears to have been greatly influenced by Luther. It was probably in the year 1520 that he composed a short treatise on the Sacrament of Communion, in which he seems to betray an acquaintance with some of Luther's works.⁵ His admiration for Luther undoubtedly impelled him to seek the great Reformer's advice on the sacrament in question. He finally decided to send his treatise or letter to Wittenberg, where Luther was residing in 1520 and in the months of January to April,

¹ P. S. Allen, *Opus epistolarum Des. Erasmi Roterodami*, vol. V, Oxford, 1924, pp. 276-277: "Cornelius Hoen, vir optimus, ut audio, fuerat repositus per aulam." Allen indicates that Hoen was a good friend of Erasmus.

² The best work on this humanist is M. Van Rhijn, *Wessel Gansfort*, The Hague, 1917. An excellent translation of Gansfort's most important works is found in: E. W. Miller and J. W. Scudder, *Wessel Gansfort*, New York, 1917. His name originally was Goesevoyrd, but it never was John Wessel, nor was he a doctor.

³ The title of this treatise is: *De Sacramento eucharistiae*.

⁴ From E. W. Miller and J. W. Scudder, *Wessel Gansfort*, vol. II, pp. 28-30.

⁵ E. L. Enders, *Dr. Martin Luther's Briefwechsel*, vol. III, Coln and Stuttgart, 1889, p. 424.

1521. We have two sources which seem to prove that the letter was sent in 1521. One of the two is the *Life of Wessel Gansfort* by Albert Hardenberg, which is in itself, however, by no means a reliable source.⁶ Here we read that Hinne Rode, rector of the school conducted by the Brethren of the Common Life at Utrecht,—the school where Hoen himself had been taught—visited Luther in person and presented the letter to him, together with some of Gansfort's writings. Luther was greatly pleased with the latter, but condemned Hoen's treatise.

This part of Hardenberg's account is very probably correct, for although the whole of it has been rejected by several authorities in Germany, we have a second source which clearly corroborates the first part. This source is the title-page of the first printed edition of Hoen's letter, written by Zwingli, who edited the letter in 1525, and had it published at Zurich in the same year. It reads as follows:

EPISTOLA CHRISTI-

ANA ADMODUM AB ANNIS QUATU-
OR AD QUENDA(M), APUD QUEM OMNE
IUDICIUM SACRAE SCRIPTURAE FUIT,
EX BATHAVIS MISSA, SED SPRETA, LO(N)-
GE ALITER TRACTANS COENAM DOMI-
NICAM Q(UAM) HACTENUS TRACTATA EST,
AD CALCE(M) QUIBUSDAM ADIECTIS
CHRISTIANO HOMINI PERNE-
CESSARIIS PRESERTIM HIIS
PERICULOSIS TEMPO-
RIBUS.

I. CORINTHI(UM) XI:

NON POTESTIS COENAM DOMINI-
CAM MA(N)DUCARE QUOD UNUSQUISQ(UE)
PROPRIA(M) COENAM OCCUPAT IN
EDENDO.

.M.D. XXV.

This first edition of Hoen's letter is so rare that neither H. Barge nor O. Clemen, nor any of the Dutch authorities make mention of it till 1917. Professor A. Eekhof of Leyden discovered what appears to be the only extant copy, in the Royal Library⁷ at Berlin, and published it in facsimile.⁸ He shows

⁶ M. Van Rhijn, *Wessel Gansfort*, pp., xii-xiii.

⁷ This library is now called Preussische Staatsbibliothek.

⁸ A. Eekhof, *De Avondmaalsbrief van Cornelius Hoen (1525)*, The Hague (Martinus Nijhoff), 1917.

that the "eminent theologian" to whom Hoen's letter was sent, and who contemptuously rejected it (the word "spreta" means "spurned"), was Luther.⁹

Moreover, Luther undoubtedly read those works of Gansfort which according to Hardenberg were brought to Wittenberg by Rode. When in 1522 they appeared in print at Basel, they were provided with a letter of recommendation by Luther, where we find this astonishing and much debated statement: "If I had read his works earlier, my enemies might think that Luther had absorbed everything from Wessel: his spirit is so in accord with mine."¹⁰ Luther's own words, therefore, corroborate part of Hardenberg's account.

It is not surprising, however, that scholars have hesitated to accept any part of Hardenberg's biography. Clemen wrote in 1907: "I cannot consider it any more as a historical source."¹¹ Hence the skeptical attitude adopted in Germany and also in this country by writers who mention Gansfort and Hoen. H. Eells wrote as late as the year 1925 that Bucer derived his view on the eucharist from Carlstadt, and not from Hoen and Rode.¹²

Now it is true that Bucer himself said: "When the writings of Carlstadt appeared, I was forced to make an investigation. . . . What appears evident to me is, that as in baptism plain water, so also in the supper, plain bread, was used."¹³ Bucer went even farther than that when in 1530 he wrote to Zwingli: "Carlstadt was the first to attack the erroneous view of Christ's physical presence in the eucharist."¹⁴

Nevertheless we know that Hoen's letter was sent to Luther

⁹ A. Eekhof, *l. c.*, p. xv.

¹⁰ From E. W. Miller and J. W. Scudder, *Wessel Gansfort*, vol. I, p. 232.

¹¹ O. Clemen, *Vorwort zu Wesseli epistolae 1522*, in: *D. Martin Luthers Werke*, Weimar edition, vol. X, Weimar, 1907, p. 315, note 1: "Jetzt aber möchte ich sie überhaupt nicht mehr als Geschichtsquelle gelten lassen."

¹² See: *The Methodist Review*, March-April, 1925, p. 325.

¹³ Quoted in: H. Eells, *The Attitude of Martin Bucer toward the Bigamy of Philip of Hesse*, New Haven, Conn., 1924, p. 13.

¹⁴ "[Carlstadt] primus . . . errorem illum circa eucharistiam expugnare adortus est." Quoted from: *Corpus Reformatorum*, vol. XC, Leipzig, 1914, p. 323.

in the year 1521, that is, one year before Carlstadt began to teach the new view on the Sacrament of Communion. It was not Carlstadt, therefore, who "was the first to attack the doctrine of Christ's physical presence in the eucharist." Zwingli knew better than that, for not only did he publish Hoen's letter in 1525, but in 1527 he wrote to Luther: "God sent us Hoen's letter, with which you are of course familiar."¹⁵ In the same year he made the following statement in his *Expositio eucharistiae negotii ad Martinum Lutherum*: "This conclusion that *est* stands for *significat*"¹⁶ I adopted from the Dutchman Hoen, whose letter John Rode and George Saganus carried with them."¹⁷

It would indeed be futile to doubt the veracity of Hardenberg's report where he speaks of Rode's trip to Wittenberg. We do not know whether Rode talked to Carlstadt as early as the year 1521. Luther left for Worms in April, 1521, and did not return to Wittenberg from the Wartburg till March, 1522. During his absence from Wittenberg, his friends Melancthon and Carlstadt instituted a number of radical reforms, most of which were discredited by Luther upon his return to the city. Early in the year 1522 several treatises by Gansfort were published at Wittenberg, though not edited by Luther in person, due to his absence. On July 30 of the same year he wrote the letter of recommendation mentioned above. The letter was dated "III. Calendas Augusti," and may have been composed in the year 1521, inasmuch as it was published at Zwolle in 1522, in an edition of Gansfort's celebrated *Farrago Rerum Theologicarum*.¹⁸

We know that in 1522 Carlstadt for the first time disagreed with Luther on the question of Christ's physical presence in the sacrament of communion.¹⁹ The relations between the two re-

¹⁵ "Und nach dem allem hat uns gott die epistel Honii zugesendt, von der du wol weist." Quoted from A. Eekhof, *l. c.*, p. xiv.

¹⁶ Matthew xxvi. 26; and Luke xxii. 19: "Hoc est corpus meum."

¹⁷ "Ipse ex Honio Batavo (cuius epistolam Joannes Rhodius et Georgius Saganus, viri tum pietate, tum eruditione insignes altulerunt), per 'est' pro 'significat' expedivi." Quoted from A. Eekhof, *l. c.*, p. xvii.

¹⁸ M. Van Rhijn, *Wessel Gansfort*, p. 260. Van Rhijn believes that Luther wrote the letter in 1522; so does Clemen.

¹⁹ Enders pointed this out as early as the year 1889 in vol. III of his edition of Luther's letters, pp. 424-425.

formers were not very cordial after Luther's return from Wartburg. This is perhaps the reason why Carlstadt now rejected both transubstantiation and consubstantiation. His explanation of Christ's institution of the sacrament, however, is far from ingenious. He asserted that when Christ said to his disciples: "This is my body," he was not looking at the bread which he broke for them, but pointed to his own body. Hence Professor W. Walker's remark, which the present writer supports: "The explanation was valueless enough."²⁰

If Bucer was influenced by Carlstadt in adopting the new view, one might say that he was influenced by Hoen through Carlstadt. The latter's place in the history of the Reformation is but one of the many instances where both journalism and history have overemphasized the importance of men who through their spectacular words and deeds attracted considerable attention in their lifetime. Carlstadt's contribution to the development of the new Protestant doctrine on the eucharist was but slight. He himself, as Preserved Smith remarks, adopted the symbolic interpretation from Hoen.²¹

The source of the Zwinglian and Calvinistic doctrine is not Wittenberg, but the Netherlands; it is not Lutheranism, but the *Devotio Moderna*. Even Luther and Melanchthon would finally have yielded, as many of their followers did later, had not Luther been quite so certain of being specially inspired with the only true understanding of the Holy Scriptures.²²

²⁰ W. Walker, *The Reformation*, New York, 1922, p. 170.

²¹ P. Smith, *The Age of the Reformation*, New York, 1920, p. 108. Although H. Barge has devoted three good-sized volumes to the life and works of Carlstadt, he has not proved that Carlstadt was a great theologian. His *Frühprotestantisches Gemeindechristentum in Wittenberg und Orlamünde*, published at Leipzig in 1909, fails to show a vital connection between the labors of Carlstadt in Wittenberg and the principles and influence of Calvinism (pp. 189-191), but merely establishes a frail hypothesis.

²² The present writer has often wondered why so many Protestants know absolutely nothing about Luther's amazing audacity and conceit. Whereas Luther asked his opponents at the Diet of Worms in 1521 whether they could prove from the Holy Scriptures that he had erred, and whereas he placed the Bible above all human knowledge and inspiration, he nevertheless considered himself even better inspired than several of the men who composed the Bible. He acted as if he had a monopoly of the truth. Revelation he thought neither apostolic nor

It is interesting to observe how Zwingli responded to the stimulus of the new teachings. In January, 1523, Rode and Saganus arrived in Basel, where they had a conference with Oecolampadius in the house of Andrew Cratander, the printer. They explained Hoen's letter to him, and not without effect, whereupon Oecolampadius suggested that they visit Zwingli.²³ It was in the summer of 1523 that they met the Swiss reformer. Zwingli readily admitted that Hoen's letter at last revealed to him the meaning of Christ's momentous words: "This is my body." On October 23, 1525, Zwingli wrote to Bugenhagen regarding the visit:

I had noted that the words "This is my body" had been said to be a figure of speech, but I did not understand how to interpret it. Then it happened that two pious and learned men, whose names I withhold, came to Leo and me to discuss this question. When they heard our opinion, they rendered thanks to God, but did not yet reveal their own, as it was not safe to do. And they brought a letter of a certain learned and pious Dutchman, which has now been published anonymously. Here I found the word *is* to mean *signifies*. The figure of speech, therefore, was hidden in the word *is*.²⁴

Erasmus confirmed Zwingli's report in the same year, saying: "A certain Dutchman wrote this letter four years ago, but anonymously. It has now appeared in print."²⁵

If Zwingli could be so easily persuaded, one might expect Bucer to have offered still less resistance. He had a talk with

prophetic. The Book of Esther should never have been written. Ecclesiastes rides in neither boots nor spurs but stumbles along in socks, "as I did when I was in the cloister." As late as the year 1545 he said that the Epistle of James was a letter of straw, while in his *Table Talk* he criticized it even more severely. See: Preserved Smith, "The Methods of Reformation Interpreters of the Bible," in *The Biblical World*, October, 1911, pp. 241-242.

²³ M. Van Rhijn, *Wessel Gansfort*, p. 260.

²⁴ This letter first appeared without the date and place of publication and was published in: M. Schuler and J. Schulthess, *Huldrici Zwinglii Opera*, vol. III, Zurich, 1832, pp. 605-606. It is not clear why this letter does not appear in the *Corpus Reformatorum*, vol. XCV.

²⁵ D. Erasmus, *Opera omnia*, Leyden edition, vol. III, part I (1703), col. 894: "Carolstadius quum hic clanculum latitaret, sparsit libellos Germanice scriptos, quibus contendit in Eucharistia nihil esse praeter panem et vinum. Persuasit illico plerisque. Hujus sententiam Zwinglius jam editis aliquot libellis confirmavit. Batavus quidam ante annos quatuor egit idem epistola, sed sine nomine, quae nunc excusa est."

Rode and Saganus at Strasbourg in November, 1524, and was greatly impressed by the arguments of the two Dutch scholars. He wrote not long thereafter that he knew no man more pious than Rode, not excepting Luther. Although Rode was a follower of Luther, yet he often owed more to Gansfort. Bucer, when Rode was his guest, tried to defend Luther's view, but could not meet Rode's arguments. Hence he forthwith dropped his view on Christ's physical presence in the eucharist.²⁶

Strange to say, the letter in which Bucer so clearly expressed his indebtedness to Hoen and Rode, was used by Eells to prove that Bucer derived his view from Carlstadt. This letter reads in part as follows:

When the writings of Carlstadt appeared, I was forced to make an investigation. . . . I consulted Luther, who answered me in a friendly manner. . . . In the meantime there came to me a pious man, named John Rhodius, a heart so pious and enlightened, both in deeds and in words that I, in matters of faith and ethics, know of no one whom I can place above him, not excepting Luther. . . . He comes from The Netherlands, where he carries on about the same sort of work as Paul did among the Greeks. Although he regards Luther as his teacher, he nevertheless owes at times more to Gansfort. I am amazed that we make so little of Gansfort.

This man Rhodius was my guest. He, with the Bible in his hands, discussed consubstantiation with me at great length. I defended Luther's view with all the force at my command, but soon noticed that I could not meet his arguments, and that one cannot maintain the view I sought to uphold, if one adheres to the Bible as the final authority. So I had to relinquish my own view on Christ's physical presence, although I was still in doubt as to the meaning of the words ["This is my body."]. *Carlstadt, for more than one reason, could not satisfy me.*

Carlstadt himself was compelled by Luther in 1525 to modify his view considerably.²⁷ While he did not completely recant, he

²⁶ J. W. Baum, *Capito und Butzer*, Elberfeld, 1860, p. 305.

²⁷ W. Capito, *Letter to Zwingli*, October 28, 1525: "Recantavit Carolstadius specie declarationis sententiam suam super materia eucharistias . . . Lutherus huic agenti supparasitatur, qui agnoscit inscriptiones opinantis citra assertionem esse. O viros vere evangelicos! . . . Bene cecidit. . . . Nos edimus ridiculum libellum." This letter is published in *Corpus Reformatorum*, vol. XCV, pp. 404-405. In 1525 Carlstadt wrote a new work on the Supper. Here he expressed his modified views. The title is: *Erklärung wie Carlstadt seine Lehre von dem hochwürdigen Sakrament und andere achtet und geachtet haben will*. Luther wrote an Introduction for it, which is published in the Weimar edition, vol. XVIII,

nevertheless ceased for several years to preach the doctrine first upheld by Hoen and Rode, and after 1522 defended and widely disseminated by Bucer, Oecolampadius, Zwingli and Calvin. Hoen's letter remains a document of great historical importance. Its influence on Bucer and Zwingli can no longer be doubted. The new doctrine here so clearly enunciated became a hotly debated issue both before and after the famous Marburg Colloquy. It probably was the chief cause of the rift in the harmony among Protestants east and west of the Rhine. But though Luther and Melanchthon refused to yield to its ever increasing sway, many Lutheran churches of today and practically all other Protestants have come to consider it the most satisfactory explanation of the words recorded in the Gospels of Matthew and Luke: "This is my body."

Ann Arbor, Mich.

A. HYMA.

pp. 453-466. It must have greatly humiliated Carlstadt to issue such a work, for he was neither willing nor able wholly to renounce his former beliefs. Many reformers ridiculed him and Luther as a result.

Capito had lost a good deal of respect for Carlstadt as early as the year 1521, when Carlstadt had been introducing radical reforms in Wittenberg. After Luther warned Capito against Carlstadt in March, 1522, Capito had even less respect for the latter. (See: H. Barge, *Andreas Bodenstein von Karlstadt*, vol. II, Leipzig, 1905, pp. 208-209). It is not surprising that Luther banished his former colleague from Saxony. In October, 1524, Carlstadt appeared in Strasburg, but stayed here only four days, as neither Capito nor Bucer gave him any encouragement. They regarded him as too erratic and too fanatical (H. Barge, *l. c.*, vol. II, pp. 210-213). Shortly after his visit Capito wrote about him as follows: "Carlstadt has through his poisonous books thrown our church into confusion. . . . He dares to call Luther a messenger and relative of the Antichrist." (See: E. L. Enders, *Luther's Briefwechsel*, vol. V, p. 59: "Carolostadius nobis Ecclesiam turbatam reddidit suis virulentis libellis. . . . Audet Lutherum nuntium et proximum affinem Antichristi nominare.) In October, 1525, Capito still speaks of him as a bad man. Very interesting is the letter written by Bucer, and sent by the seven chief reformers of Strasbourg to Luther on November 23, 1524, (Enders, *l. c.*, pp. 59-68). Here the Alsatian reformers show a tolerant attitude toward Luther and Carlstadt, but even Barge does not deduce from their letter that Bucer was influenced by Carlstadt (*l. c.*, vol. II, p. 231). Bucer was a follower of Luther and later of Zwingli, but never a disciple of Carlstadt. (See: G. Anrich, *Martin Bucer*, Strasbourg, 1914, pp. 47-50; Anrich also maintains that Bucer adopted his new view from Rode and Hoen.)

REVIEWS OF RECENT LITERATURE

EXEGETICAL THEOLOGY

Christian Beginnings. Three Lectures. By F. C. BURKITT, D.D., Norrisian Professor of Divinity in the University of Cambridge. London: University of London Press, Ltd., 1924. Pp. 152. Price 4 sh. 6 d. net.

This little book presents Dr. Burkitt's views about Christian origins in very brief form and with special reference to the work of Lake and Jackson on *The Beginnings of Christianity*. In the case of most authors the brevity of the book might prevent it from being seriously regarded, but such is not the case with Professor Burkitt. It is always interesting to hear what so able a scholar has to say upon any mooted question of New Testament study, even though the brevity of the treatment prevents a full grounding of the author's views.

Certainly in the present case the views that are expressed are not wanting in originality. That does not mean that these views are always, or even in most cases, unique; but it does mean that the reader always has the feeling that the author has come to his opinions through independent thinking, based upon a fresh examination of the sources. It may be worth while, therefore, to set forth the salient features of the book.

The starting point of the reconstruction is that which was favored by the older "Liberal" historians—namely the reduced Jesus of modern naturalism. What was primary in Jesus' consciousness was "a sense of vocation," a sense that God "had called Him Son in a special sense not shared by others" (p. 29). This sense of sonship took shape in His acceptance of Peter's confession at Caesarea Philippi, in His own designation of Himself as Son of Man or "the Man," and in the conviction that God had marked Him out "as the instrument of bringing in (or at least hastening) the End of the present state of things by His becoming in some way a sacrifice or ransom for the elect" (p. 29). But the really primary thing, according to our author, was the filial consciousness, not the Messianic consciousness, of Jesus.

With regard to the origin of the Church, Dr. Burkitt is a strong opponent of the dominant Galilean hypothesis as to the "appearances" of the risen Christ; the appearances took place, he holds, not in Galilee but in Jerusalem. No doubt Peter was on his way to Galilee when the Lord appeared to him, but he had not gone very far. And the appearance to five hundred brethren which is mentioned by Paul is to be identified, Dr. Burkitt thinks, not with any Galilean happening but with the coming of the Spirit on the day of Pentecost. Only by this Jerusalem hypothesis, it is urged, can the fact be explained that the disciples were so soon found in Jerusalem after the appearances had taken place. If the Lord

had appeared to Peter in Galilee, what could have led Peter to return to Jerusalem? Would he not have remained on the hallowed Galilean ground?

This hypothesis, we think, is correct for the most part in what it affirms but incorrect in what it denies. It is correct in giving credence to Luke-Acts with regard to the Jerusalem appearances, but incorrect in refusing credence to Matthew and to John xxi. in their account of appearances in Galilee. Especially is it incorrect in its identification of the appearance to five hundred brethren (1 Cor. xv. 6) with the event on the day of Pentecost. The return to Jerusalem from Galilee may of course be explained if the disciples were acting under actual instructions from the risen Christ.

With regard to the nature of the appearances, Dr. Burkitt preserves the customary attitude of modern naturalism. The records, he thinks, justify the historian "in postulating something surprising, some event following the Crucifixion of Jesus which is not quite explicable." But he continues: "Whether Peter and Paul were mistaken in their belief that they had seen the Lord Jesus is at this time of day, strictly speaking, unprovable; what I do think we are bound to recognize is that they were fully convinced that they had seen Him" (pp. 78 f.).

The early Church in Jerusalem, our author maintains, did regard Jesus as "Lord"; the *Κύριος* title was not, as Bousset supposes, applied to Jesus for the first time in Damascus or Antioch. Dr. Burkitt has a peculiar view of the Epistle of James; it was originally written, he thinks, in Aramaic by James the brother of the Lord, and what we now have is a free Greek translation. Somewhat related to this hypothesis is the suggestion that Silas drafted the Thessalonian Epistles, and that Sosthenes may have had a considerable part in the arrangement of material in 1 Corinthians.

One of the most distinctive features of the book is the defence of the relative trustworthiness of Luke-Acts. That defence cannot of course be more than relative, since Dr. Burkitt rejects the supernatural content of the book. But at least the Tübingen objections are here overcome. The Apostolic Decree, in particular, is regarded as historical.

This defence of Acts is accomplished by the dating of Galatians before the Apostolic Council; Paul could not have mentioned the Apostolic Council in Galatians, it is held, for the simple reason that the Council had not yet taken place when the Epistle was written. In order then to explain the similarity between Galatians and Romans, the hypothesis advanced by Kirsopp Lake is adopted, to the effect that the bulk of Romans is a theological treatise, written as a circular letter at an early time and then, on the third missionary journey, fitted with certain personal matters and sent to Rome. The simplicity (Dr. Burkitt would say rather "weakness") of the Thessalonian Epistles as over against Galatians and Romans is then explained by the hypothesis that Silas was really the writer, though the content of the Epistles was approved by Paul.

The early dating of Galatians can no longer be regarded as a mere

curiosity of criticism. We do not indeed think that it constitutes the only means of defending the trustworthiness of Acts, or that it has as yet established itself. But it is at least interesting; and the weighty support of Dr. Burkitt will increase the consideration that it will receive from students of the New Testament.

The comparatively conservative views of our author in the sphere of literary criticism are harmonized with the rejection of the supernatural by a curious return, here and there at least, to a rationalizing treatment of the New Testament somewhat similar to that which prevailed before the days of Strauss. Thus the extraordinarily strong attestation of the feeding of the five thousand leads Dr. Burkitt to suggest that we are "justified in 'rationalizing' the narratives, in seeking a more or less rationalistic account of them, in explaining the miraculous details away" (p. 78). And the story of Peter's escape from prison in Acts xii. gives our author "the impression that some human sympathizer was at work, who had drugged the guards and bribed the turnkey" (p. 103). If this rationalizing process goes on much further—beginnings of it appear in C. C. Torrey and in Harnack, as well as in Dr. Burkitt—we shall really need some twentieth century Strauss to put a stop to it. Bousset, unfortunately, is dead, but there will probably be others to take his place.

In general Dr. Burkitt's own book is itself the best refutation of his suggestion that there may "come a time in the not very distant future when the direct investigation of these early days of Christianity will have come to a standstill, when the task of re-writing the beginnings of the Christian Society will have been carried as far as the materials at our disposal will carry us" (p. 140). The way in which this interesting little book rejects what have long been regarded as established results of criticism joins forces with the work of radicals like President McGiffert to show that there is as yet not the slightest indication that any one naturalistic reconstruction of early Christianity will win universal acceptance. On the contrary, the whole question is ever anew being thrown into a state of flux. And the reason, we think, is that the naturalistic historians are engaged in an impossible task. One hypothesis must necessarily give place to another for the simple reason that the starting point of all the hypotheses is wrong. Real consistency and real agreement can be attained only when men abandon the hopeless task and decide to ground Christian history where the New Testament grounds it—in a supernatural act of God.

Princeton.

J. GRESHAM MACHEN.

The Credibility of the Virgin Birth. By ORVILLE E. CRAIN. New York, Cincinnati: The Abingdon Press, 1925. Pp. 105. Price 50 cents.

Mr. Crain defends the historicity of the virgin birth, but is inclined to deny its doctrinal importance.

The defence of the historicity is not characterized by any great knowledge of New Testament criticism or by any great command of historical method. Thus the reader may be somewhat surprised to hear

that "no literary criticism has ever been directed against the Lukan origin of the third Gospel" (p. 30); and the way in which the author apparently treats the traditional authorship of the First and Third Gospels as though it were a thing that the opponents would for the most part accept shows that he has not really acquainted himself very extensively with the modern critical debate. Very confusing also is the treatment of "manuscripts" and "versions" on pp. 37-40. Indeed, in almost everything that concerns textual and literary criticism the book is either erroneous or vague.

Nevertheless, the argument for the historicity of the virgin birth is not altogether without value. A layman's sturdy common sense sometimes discerns things that technical scholarship has missed, while specialists are sometimes not able to see the wood for the trees. Mr. Crain's conclusion, at any rate, is to be greeted with satisfaction, and his argument may have a salutary effect upon the lay mind.

In the sphere of doctrine, however, and consequently in the sphere of the Christian heart, the little book can hardly be anything but confusing. At times the author does seem to be aware that the question of the virgin birth is intimately connected with the great question of the supernatural. But the trouble is that he has rather a confused notion of what the supernatural is. "The supernaturalism," he says (pp. 18 f.), "really consists in the power of the Divine *to control* the laws of his natural world to secure *his aims*." And then he proceeds to cite instances of "parthenogenesis" as illustrations of his point! In contrast with all this, a consistent theism will simply distinguish a miracle as a work of creation from natural events as works of providence. Both are accomplished by God, but in the latter case He uses means, while in the former case He puts forth His creative power.

On the whole, Mr. Crain is inclined to believe that insistence upon the doctrinal importance of the virgin birth is an indication of undue "dogmatism." In opposition to such dogmatism he himself finds the importance of the miracle in its effect as a witness to Joseph and Mary and in its consequent effect upon the child. "Both Matthew and Luke," he says, "make the miracle amount to no more than a witness, that an extraordinary child should be born who should be called the Son of the Most High" (p. 99). "The high and holy confidence which was caused by the miracle upon Mary and reflected in 'The Magnificat' (Luke i. 46, 55) could not do otherwise than exercise a profound reaction upon the child during the pre-natal days" (p. 98).

This last sentence is somewhat connected with the author's suggestion that "the incarnation of Jesus was a progressive experience that culminated in the resurrection, and continued to reveal itself in the further manifestations of his Spirit" (p. 101). Just at this point Mr. Crain has unconsciously established that doctrinal importance of the virgin birth against which he himself is arguing. It is just exactly because it *prevents* the Church from holding Mr. Crain's tentative view that "the incarnation of Jesus was a progressive experience" that the virgin birth is so supremely important. That notion is quite inimical to Christian faith;

and the virgin birth always has been one great barrier (along with the entire content of New Testament teaching) against its baleful inroads.

Our author has two quite inconsistent elements in his thinking; (1) the historicity of the virgin birth, (2) the progressive incarnation of Jesus. We hope that he will hold fast to the former and (as he then must logically do) will give the latter up. The saneness of much that he says in the historical sphere leads us to believe that our hope is not altogether unlikely to be realized.

Princeton.

J. GRESHAM MACHEN.

The Teaching of the Prophets. By CHARLES ARTHUR HAWLEY, S.T.M., Ph.D., Professor of Biblical Literature in the Springfield Young Men's Christian Association College, and Associate Professor in Mount Holyoke College. New York: Association Press, 1924. 16 mo. Pp. xv, 242.

The aim of this book is stated to be "to introduce to the Christian community the prophets of Israel." The author feels that "The small number of sermons one hears from the heart of the Old Testament is lamentable. Abraham, Moses, Joshua, and the Kings, are either praised or blamed by pastors and Sunday School 'Quarterlies,' but the great forerunners of Jesus remain silent. This condition must be remedied if we are to remain a people who rank high in the moral life." Clearly the writer of these words attaches great importance to "the Hebrew prophets" and deeply deplores the fact, as he considers it, that they "have remained almost unknown men." This is a serious charge. But before the reader decides whether or to what extent he agrees with Dr. Hawley, it will be well for him to ascertain what is meant by this statement and why such prime importance is attached to "the prophets" as distinguished from other parts of the Bible.

"Human nature," we read, "manifests itself in various ways of life. The three ways that confronted the prophets and yet abide with us are simply the three brands of religion today" (p. xi.). These three "brands" are folk-religion, priestly religion, and prophetic religion. "Folk-religion interests itself in what we call superstitions. . . ." Priestly religion "is characterized by performing a certain set of ritual with meticulous exactitude under the leadership of one especially set apart for this function." Both of these conceptions are affirmed to be false. "In opposition to these two ways, stood the *prophetic religion*, clear, simple, straight-forward, and it may be summed up thus: There can be no fellowship with God except that based on a strictly moral life. All folk religion is swept away along with the priestly cult." Micah's familiar "definition" of religion is quoted and then we read "Jesus' way of life completed the prophetic religion."

The quotations we have given from the preface of this little volume indicate clearly the general character of the discussion. A few remarks by way of criticism will now be in order.

It is to be noted in the first place that while folk-religion as defined by Dr. Hawley includes what all intelligent people should regard as

superstition, i.e., beliefs and customs which are a crude and grotesque caricature of the real supernaturalism of true religion, it also includes this true and essential supernaturalism itself. This is suggested by the words "The earmarks of folk religion are also belief in witches, fortune tellers, omens, talismans, evil eye, dreams, reincarnations, second comings, necromancy, various signs, control of weather, belief in spirits' causing disease; and 'the day of Yahweh,' that is, a violent cataclysmic end to the present world order." Here we find very definite features of Biblical supernaturalism classed with the crassest of superstitions; and it soon becomes evident that in our author's opinion the opposition of the prophets to the superstitions of folk religion involved the rejection of the supernatural as such, or at least in its two great manifestations of miracle and prophecy. A sharp line of cleavage is drawn between the earlier and the later prophets. "The old non-literary nabis worked miracles. From the literary prophet on, no more miracles appear" (p. 89). The treatment accorded Elijah shows that for the miracle-working prophets our author has scant respect. He likens their "emotionalism" to the excesses of the howling dervish. And in commenting on the "taking up" of the prophet he asks the reader: "How do you account for early stories of ascensions? How might one describe Elijah's death in present-day terms?" Obviously, described in what our author would regard as present-day terms there would be nothing of the truly supernatural in the great victory at Carmel or in the translation of the prophet. Miracles are to him magic, trickery or legend: they are not manifestations of the presence and power of the Almighty. Similarly in the predictions the supernatural is ruled out. We are told that "people often think of the prophet as telling events thousands of years before they happened. This is not according to the Old Testament. The nabis, just like any intelligent statesman, foretold certain events by reading the signs of the times" (pp. 25f). Clearly then it is not merely *superstition* but the *supernatural* which Dr. Hawley rejects; and he rejects it not merely in *folk religion* but in true religion. He regards it as characteristic of an inferior type of religion.

In the second place we find that the rejection of priestly religion involves not merely the discarding of external rites and ceremonies but the rejection of expiatory sacrifice, of the necessity of atonement. Thus our author tells us that "The stern Tekoan denounces the cult of the priests in no uncertain terms." Then after quoting Amos v. 21-24 he adds "A harsher rebuke to the whole priestly system is unthinkable" (p. 54f.). And we are assured that Hosea, Micah, Isaiah, and Jeremiah shared the same attitude. Yet the inadequacy of our author's conception of priestly religion is shown by the following statement, "The priestly idea of religion may be summed up as the requirement to follow ritualistic, complicated forms in unthinking obedience." Furthermore he fails to consider whether the ritual against which the prophets fulminated may have been a perversion of priestly religion. Thus we are told that "Bethel, the old sanctuary, was held especially sacred and dear to the heart of God" (p. 43), despite the clear declarations of the Old Testa-

ment that Bethel was a centre of the new calf worship. "The teaching of the prophets" as understood by Dr. Hawley was not merely opposed to ritualism with its emphasis upon rites and ceremonies, but also to "priestly religion" as such with its insistence upon the necessity of atonement, of mediation and expiation.

Two further points are to be noted. The first is that having eliminated from Old Testament prophecy, at least in what he holds to be its best and highest form, those distinctive features of miracle and prophecy which constitute its divine authentication and give the "Thus saith the Lord" of the prophets its unique authority, and having made the prophets the avowed enemies of priestly religion, our author finds prophecy to be a universal phenomenon. "Prophets were not peculiar to Israel," he assures us, "Barring a few local peculiarities of thinking, had Hosea, Socrates and Buddha met, they would have agreed one with the other. Herein lies the charm of prophets, they are universal in sympathy, love and charm" (p. 70).

The second point to be noted is that Jesus, according to our author, is to be classed with the prophets. "Jesus never considered that He was anything else than a prophet who dared to fulfil the Law and the Prophets, both of which demanded in spirit moral perfection" (p. 233). He was the last and greatest of them. For we have been told already that "Jesus' way of life completed the prophetic religion" (p. xiii). But there was no essential difference between Him and them. And if the prophets rejected priestly religion, with its doctrine of sacrifice, of course Jesus' death is to be regarded as only a martyrdom. "If Servant [cf. Isa. liii.], Socrates, Jesus and Paul had been faithless to their trust, if they had died as old men peacefully in their beds, the world would yet be wallowing in savagery" (p. 201). "Micah, Jeremiah, Servant, Jesus, Savonarola, Woodrow Wilson, all suffered for the truth which they felt must conquer" (p. 10).

Clearly then, in the opinion of Dr. Hawley, the great prophets of the Old Testament were great ethical teachers, and Jesus' claim to pre-eminence among them is due solely to the sublimity of His teachings and the perfection of His life. But what is the logical and inevitable conclusion from the attempt to eliminate the supernatural and the redemptive from our conception of the ideal prophet and still to find that ideal fulfilled in Jesus? The answer to this question is given in the concluding paragraph of the book, a paragraph entitled, "The Challenge of Jesus to the Modern World." There our author in speaking of the beginnings of Christianity tells us, "Soon the teachings of the dead prophet took shape in books called 'The Good News' or in the Greek Language *Evangel* and in Anglo-Saxon *Gospel*." This is the conclusion of the whole matter. The critic may begin with the Old Testament prophets, he may question Elisha and the axe-head, he may reject Jonah and the whale, but he will come eventually to the greatest of all questions, What think ye of Christ? Professor Hawley does so. And here we have his answer bluntly stated: the challenge of Jesus to the modern world is, according to this liberal theologian, the challenge of

the teachings of a dead prophet. Christianity is reduced to "Jesus' way of life"; we are to follow the teachings and example of a *dead prophet*. He whom generations of believers have worshipped as Risen Saviour, the Eternal Son of God, lies with the generations of the dead, far away under a Syrian sky. The Lord of life is a dead prophet. And yet there are those who tell us that Christianity has nothing to fear from the "higher critical" study of the Bible!

This book is issued by the Association Press, the publication department of the Y.M.C.A., and on the wrapper, which bears this significant slogan "books with a purpose" we read, "Every earnest student of the Bible as a literary and historic document will be grateful to Dr. Hawley for the striking new picture of the Hebrew prophets which these studies give." Nothing is said about the "striking new picture" of our Saviour Jesus Christ, the Lord of glory, as a *dead prophet*. Are we to be grateful for that also? Ask us to be grateful to Giant Despair if after shutting us out from the life-giving sunshine he gives us a tallow dip that we may the more plainly discern the bolts and bars of the prison into which he has cast us. That were easy as compared with this, to be grateful to those who would fain persuade us to exchange the glad tidings of our Great Salvation for *the teachings of a dead prophet*.

Princeton.

OSWALD T. ALLIS.

The Program of Jesus. By EDWIN DUBOSE MOUZON, D.D., New York: George H. Doran Company.

The Program of Jesus is the publication title of the 1925 Cole Lectures, delivered by Bishop Mouzon (Southern Methodist Episcopal) at Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tennessee. In them, the author offers a discussion of the social aspects of the Gospel, though advising the reader in the Preface that this social emphasis is not the whole of the Evangel, and referring him to a companion series. In spite of this disclaimer, there seems little reason to doubt that while Bishop Mouzon may not be prepared to renounce the official standards of his Church, the trend of his sympathies is in the direction of what is commonly called constructive liberalism. Jesus, we are told, proposed to establish the Kingdom of God in human society—not a kingdom in the heavens, nor an invisible realm to be entered at death, but a kingdom to be built here and now, in this present world. The difficulties presented by Synoptical apocalypticism are given short shrift; what Jesus had in mind in His employment of apocalyptic was merely the ultimate triumph of God over all foes (p. 66); the inner reality promised in such prophecies was granted in the outpouring of the Holy Spirit (p. 74).

Jesus, according to Bishop Mouzon, was the greatest of the Teachers of mankind, His instructions centering in Divine Fatherhood, Human Brotherhood, Love to God and Man, and Immortality (involving rewards for the good, and penalties for the wicked). He is not to be regarded as a lawgiver with a set of rules; He inculcated great principles, and then breathed into His followers His own realizing spirit. It is true, we meet with the affirmation, "The cross is indeed central to

Christianity"; but the meaning evidently intended is, central as a well-spring of spiritual inspiration. "Christianity is above all else a method of living" (p. 171). Jesus' life, obedience and self-dedication are indeed linked with salvation (p. 16), but the stress of this salvation appears to spend itself upon the saving of men as members of society (p. 17). In the main following Harnack, Bishop Mouzon summarizes the teachings of Jesus as follows: The Kingdom of God and its Coming; God the Father, and the infinite value of the human soul; The Higher Righteousness, and the commandment to love; and Christ Himself, in relation to the Kingdom and all who seek its higher righteousness.

Lecture V is entitled, Dare We Be Christians? "Our civilization is still to a large degree Pagan. . . . We must heal the open sores of human society, destroy the secret breeding-places of vice and crime. . . . We must do more than abolish slavery, close gambling-dens, destroy the open saloon, outlaw white slavery. What health-giving institutions can be created? . . . Even here in America the large majority earn their bread under conditions that dwarf the mind and stunt the soul. . . . The acid test of our Christianity is whether it can solve the race question in America and all the world. . . . Above all, what shall be said of war? We must declare it a criminal and outlaw; we must recognize that the League of Nations is a going concern. Will we stand for peace, even if other nations prepare to force war on us?" In the last chapter, the thought is emphasized that the works of Jesus are His best credentials.

Apart from their setting, the Lectures as a whole possess, by virtue of their ethical emphasis, a content which may be studied with interest and profit. As is most likely already apparent, the main weakness of the book consists in its wholly inadequate conception of the Atonement. The author repudiates the view that the total work of redemption was accomplished on Calvary (p. 138). Does he not, then, regard the authority of the Great Teacher Himself when He says (Matt. 26:28): "This is My Blood, poured out in behalf of many for the forgiveness of sins"? Is it a mere symbol of self-sacrifice, of sacrificial love (pp. 114, 115), that is set forth in these solemn words? Thus, too, may be explained his referring to the book *Christianity and Liberalism* as an obscurantist volume (p. 15), and his rejection of the statement: "It is doubtful whether anything that preceded the death of Jesus can be called Christianity"—though it certainly can not properly be so called.

And this inadequate conception of the Cross will in turn be found to ground itself in an inadequate conception of the Redeemer's Person. This emerges very clearly in the discussion of the attitude of our Lord toward the apocalypticism of His time. After observing that the intellectual prepossessions of the early disciples probably colored the original sayings of Jesus, he adds (p. 65): "Jesus, it will be remembered, confessed to ignorance touching this very matter. The day and the hour of His coming were known . . . not even to the Son, but to the Father alone. It is surely not taking anything away from His dignity to say that it is certain that His earthly ministry was conducted under human

limitations. . . . In recent years, the ancient heresy of Docetism has reasserted itself. . . . Such knowledge was His as was necessary to His redemptive mission—that and no more. What could be more natural and inevitable than that Jesus should use the thought-forms of His own age?"

That Jesus did confess ignorance, however, is doubted by weighty authorities. To begin with, in the verb *οἶδα* as used in the New Testament, there appears at times a latent Hiphil force, as may be seen in such passages as 1 Cor. 2:2: "I determined to know nothing amongst you save Christ and Him crucified"; or—if we may judge from Christ's reply—Mark 11:33: "We know not whence the baptism of John is." Applying this principle to the passage in question, it may be paraphrased as follows: "The exact time of the Consummation is an absolute secret. In reference to that day or hour, no man has impartible knowledge—no angel of heaven—not even the Son—only the Father." We next note that Christ does not say, "No man knoweth the day or the hour," etc. That, it is admitted, would validate the modernistic view. But what He actually says is, "Of (*περί*) that day and hour knoweth no man." What is the force of *περί*? That "as to" is a just rendering, covering the generality of passages, will be admitted on all hands—an indefinite term. If, now, we adhere to the more usual rendering of *οἶδα*, we find ourselves in trouble. Is it *true*, that neither Christ nor His disciples had in any sense knowledge as to the day and the hour? Our Lord had furnished two separate notes of time: (1), Certain cosmical portents would manifest themselves, and then (*τότε*) should men see the Son of Man coming in the clouds: i.e., the day and the hour would have come (Mark 13:26). (2), The imminence of the impending epiphany might be learned from the first occurrence of the portents (Mark 13:29). That much, then, *was known*. Yet Christ tells us that no one has knowledge as to (*περί*) the day or the hour. We would seem to be shut up to one of two alternatives—either Christ contradicted Himself in almost the next breath, or else relief must be had from the shading accorded the verb. The idea of the lack of *impartible* knowledge of the precise date on the part of all except the Father, Who in His own time should reveal it (1 Tim. 6:15), does away with the prepositional *impasse*, and dispels the miasma of kenoticism.

Lincoln University, Pa.

EDWIN J. REINKE.

Cardinal Ideas of Isaiah. By CHARLES E. JEFFERSON, Pastor Broadway Tabernacle, New York City: The Macmillan Company. Pp. 199; \$1.75.

The ten chapters of this volume represent as many sermons delivered in the Broadway Tabernacle early in 1925, and bear the following titles: The Value of the Study of the Hebrew Prophets, Why It Is Difficult to Read the Prophets, The Social Vision of Isaiah, A Holy and Reasoning God, Religion and Morality, Sin and Retribution, The Remnant, The Messiah, A Warless World, The Day of the Lord. These sermons reveal Dr. Jefferson at his best as a teaching preacher. As clear as light

and with all the force of dogmatic assurance his sentences follow one another from beginning to end. Nor does he ever write a dull or uninteresting sentence. No present-day writer excels him in the art of simplification. Perhaps this characteristic leads to weakness through its extreme exercise at times. Indeed these studies in Isaiah suffer just in this way. Everything in the prophecy is made so perfectly natural that there is little or no room left anywhere for anything supernatural. That is simplification by elimination rather than by illumination. But simplification by elimination involves at last a practical substitution, a substitution of the simplifier's message for the original. For instance, Isaiah appears in these sermons as a "genius," and the ideas of religion which filled the hearts of the Hebrew race came to them in just such natural, every-day ways as our ideas of things come to us, that is through the changing experiences through which they passed politically or otherwise. The author also has this to say about revelation: "It would be absurd to suppose that God spoke in the eighth century and is dumb in the twentieth century. If he ever spoke at all, he is surely speaking today. Tell me that he is not speaking today and then I will refuse to believe that he ever spoke. It would be incredible to suppose that he ever spoke to men in Jerusalem, and that he will not speak to men in New York City. God is speaking and acting every day and every night. He is saying things to us hour by hour." Now all that is true and it is false. God is speaking to the twentieth century and to men in New York City, but He is doing it through the messages He gave supernaturally to men specially chosen and prepared, and most of all through His own Son, who definitely set up His own words as the standard by which men will be judged at the Last Day. And it is just this sort of loose talk about continuous and present-day messages from God and "the Spirit of Christ," in apparent neglect of the Sacred Word, that is doing infinite harm. It is deplorable that so charming and helpful a man in many respects as Dr. Jefferson should allow the ointment to be spoiled by the unsightly and stenchful fly of deistical minimization of the Scriptures with their declared and abundantly certified divine authority and finality. One might ask the gifted author to specify some of the men of New York City who are receiving these twentieth century messages from God, which contravene or transcend those of the prophets and apostles and the Son of God Himself, for most of the messages that come out from that city smack strongly of the flavor of Hume and Voltaire and Thomas Paine, with their rejection of a supernatural Bible and a supernatural Christ and their exaltation of nature and the reason as the authoritative source and agency of all truth for man. We would not press this matter, of course, but some such practical test for these careless declarations serves to show up their fatuity and falseness.

It goes without saying that the author accepts the results of the so-called Higher Criticism concerning Isaiah. Accordingly, only the first thirty-nine chapters of the prophecy are included in the purview. The most distressing result of this acceptance appears, however, in his hand-

ling of the passage in chapter vii. 14, "Behold a virgin shall conceive, and bear a son, and shall call his name Immanuel." Several pages are devoted to the exploding of the idea that this prediction refers in any way to Messiah, and it is all done with a cocksureness, depending on the "experts," that produces something akin to irritation in one's mind. Matthew is made to bear the brunt of blame for the whole blunder in interpretation, because he, in his zeal for finding parallels between the Hebrew Scriptures and the happenings of his own day, filled his Gospel with careless and misleading quotations from those Scriptures to explain or enforce such happenings, and this application of Isaiah vii. 14 to the Son of Mary is one instance. But Matthew studied the Hebrew Scriptures for three years under a Teacher, Whose authority many of us prefer to that of any modern "experts," and follows the selfsame method in searching out and applying their Messianic predictions which the record in Luke xxiv. tells us that unapproachable Teacher did with such telling effect on His disciples in those days after His Resurrection. So that we must be a bit careful how we set the pupil at nought lest we be found to be setting his Teacher at nought also. Whether or not Jesus Christ ever elucidated Isaiah vii. 14 to Matthew and the other disciples, we have no sure means of knowing; but the weight of supposition would certainly incline to the belief that He did, seeing that He began with Moses and all the prophets and interpreted to them in all the scriptures the things concerning Himself. For how could He pass over so outstanding and so startling a prediction as He set out to His followers the saving work He had come to do, a saving work wondrously set forth in Isaiah vii? Let others do as they will, the reviewer for one believes it is the most reasonable, the most scientifically correct, and infinitely the most satisfying conclusion that Matthew had it from the lips of his Divine Teacher that He was the holy child, conceived by the virgin and called Immanuel. At any rate we will not lay vandal hands on the New Testament records in their explicit utterances in order to clear the way for those whose contentions serve only to take the crown of His peculiar glory from the brow of our Blessed Lord.

Orange, N.J.

H. H. McQUILKIN.

HISTORICAL THEOLOGY

Kirchengeschichte. Von KARL MÜLLER, Professor der evangelischen Theologie in Tübingen. Erster Band. Zweite, völlig neubearbeitete Auflage, 8.-10. Tausend. Erste Lieferung. Tübingen, 1924. Pp. xii., 316. Mk. 7.

The first volume of Prof. Müller's *Kirchengeschichte* made its first appearance in 1892; the second volume, in two half-volumes, came out in installments from 1897 to 1919. Four new printings of the first volume were made during the period from 1905 to 1920; but when these were exhausted, the author determined to carry out his long-cherished purpose of completely revising and considerably expanding the entire work,

especially the part covering the history of the Early Church. The book before us—the first installment of the enlarged treatise—brings the narrative down to about the end of the third century. If one may judge from these chapters, the work in its new form will be almost twice as large as it was in the first edition.

The revision has affected the entire text. Scarcely a paragraph remains intact. But the main structural features of the treatise are left unaltered. This is quite what one might have expected in view of the high commendations given them when the work first appeared. The fact is that the popularity of this manual has been due largely to the ability and the courage with which the author, breaking with the traditional arrangement of the materials of church history, substituted a scheme of his own, by which he could more sharply bring out the causal connections in the historic process and more accurately determine the significance of events, conditions and personalities, by viewing them in their relation to the main development in a given period. By abandoning the rather mechanical and artificial method that uniformly imposed the same rubrics upon all epochs, regardless of the distinctive features that might call for special treatment; by greatly multiplying the number of cross-sections in each epoch; and by bringing well to the front the outstanding characteristics of each epoch, the author developed a mode of presentation which because of its manifest excellencies has been quite generally followed by teachers and writers of church history during the last quarter of a century. In the field covered by the volume before us, it was, no doubt, the influence of Prof. Harnack that proved the decisive factor in the reconstruction of the narrative; but in the later history it was Professors Müller and Moeller—whose manuals began to appear within a few months of each other—who deserved most credit for carrying through a methodology which, whatever drawbacks it may have, at least gives the reader a vivid idea of the interplay of the historic forces of a period and their relation to its main developments.

No doubt, the broader and simpler mode of treatment common in the more elementary sort of treatise will always have its justification, especially for the reader who is making his first acquaintance with the facts of church history and who often prefers to get the facts with a minimum of interpretation by any specialist. And it must be admitted, too, that many of the more recent "scientific" histories of the Church are hardly as interesting as one might wish them to be—hardly more interesting than some of the older manuals, which paid scant attention, indeed, to the organic relations of the data set forth, but which gave much useful information in a form highly convenient for quick reference. Prof. Müller's new edition, like the old, is meant for serious study. There is nothing prepossessing about the style, and the extreme condensation in some paragraphs makes the reading somewhat laborious.

But for the student whom the author has had in his mind's eye—the treatise, it ought to be remembered, belongs to the series known as the "Grundriss der Theologischen Wissenschaften"—this history will prove an extremely valuable publication. The bibliographical aids given in

each section are models of their kind. Of course, as is usual even in the most scholarly German productions of this sort, the references to British and American writers are not as numerous as they ought to be, though this defect is less marked in the volume before us than in some similar works.

We do not feel called upon to go into any detail concerning this new edition of Prof. Müller's history of the Church, but we cannot refrain from expressing our obligation to the author for this revision of his justly celebrated treatise. We have been particularly pleased with the fuller and more adequate treatment now accorded to such topics as the political and religious conditions of the Roman Empire at the beginning of the Christian era; the missionary expansion of the Church (here—naturally enough—the author's indebtedness to Harnack is much in evidence); and the difficult problem of the development of the government and polity of the Church. The philosophical and theological sections, too, partake of the benefits of the enlarged mode of treatment, and will now serve as an admirable introduction to the history of early Christian doctrine. On a number of questions of biblical criticism the author seems to have become more convinced of the necessity of taking a negative or at least an agnostic position. But in general, his account of primitive Christianity quite faithfully reflects the statements of the sacred sources.

Princeton.

FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

The Story of the Church. By CHARLES M. JACOBS, Professor of Church History in the Lutheran Theological Seminary at Philadelphia. Philadelphia: The United Lutheran Publication House, 1925. Pp. 418. \$2 postpaid.

By the use of the word "Story" in the title of this book, the author would intimate to his readers that the purpose he had in view in this publication was somewhat different from that which characterizes most outlines of ecclesiastical history. He felt there was room, he informs us, for "a volume of small compass that will lay especial stress upon the continuity of that stream of life which has flowed down through the centuries from Jesus Christ." It is not easy, however, to find in the execution of his plan any marked difference between this and the customary type of compendium, unless it be in the greater simplicity and readableness of the work before us. In these respects, indeed, the treatise is a model introduction to the history of the Church. The method of dividing the material is well adapted to give the requisite prominence to the outstanding movements and personalities, and the style is always clear, straightforward, and effective. The author knows his "story" and he knows right well how to tell it. He never loses himself in unnecessary details; he has a good sense of proportion; he tries to be just and fair in his treatment of the varied elements that must find a place in his narrative; and he invests every one of his brief chapters with a vital, human interest and with the qualities of an engaging style.

As in most similar sketches of church history, one misses, here and

there, the completeness of statement that is necessary for perfect accuracy. This is particularly true, of course, with respect to doctrinal controversies: it is hardly possible to do justice to them in a line or two. The popular or partisan catchword is not always a safe symbol of the view it purports to sum up. Moreover, the author is sometimes at fault, not merely by reason of an unduly limited presentation of the theological data in question, but rather because of an imperfect apprehension of them. This may be seen in his account of the early Christological controversies. Aside from the unaccountable omission of the first heresy in this notable series—that of Apollinarianism—one finds a number of inadequate statements. Eutychianism, for example, is represented as teaching “that Jesus was so completely divine that he had not a real human body, but only the outward appearance of a man.” Nor do the references to Monophysitism and Monotheletism (p.57) hit the nail on the head: the former is defined as “the doctrine that Christ, though both human and divine, had but one nature, that of God”; and the latter as the doctrine “that though Christ had a human nature, He had not a human, but only a divine will.” Nor is it quite correct to say that in the Christological controversies the real question was, “Is He [Christ] fully man?”

We find similar infelicities and errors in what the author says about the teachings of some of the Reformers. It is a gross exaggeration that Calvin “declared the Roman church entirely wrong” (p. 254). Calvin’s teachings in regard to the normative authority of Holy Scripture is not accurately reproduced in the assertion that he “insisted that there is an infallible source of religious truth outside of experience” (p. 255); for the work of the Holy Spirit by which alone the Bible authenticates itself to the regenerate man as the word of God is not to be conceived as something “outside of experience.” We must take exception, too, to the author’s account of the Genevan theocracy under Calvin. No doubt, there is a sense in which we may justly say that Calvin put “the State under church-control.” But the remark is apt to mislead. What Calvin accomplished by the sheer force of his ability as an interpreter of the Bible—that revelation of the divine will which has its applications for the civil no less than for the spiritual authorities—is one thing; his doctrine of the absolute autonomy of the State in its own sphere is quite another. What Calvin was most concerned about was the freedom of the Church in her own realm; ecclesiastical discipline without dictation on the part of the State was his main contention. In the outworking of his ideal, it was not the Church as such, but rather her teachers who sought to bring the revealed will of God to bear on the whole domain of human life, civil as well as religious, that gave a certain superiority to the ecclesiastical leaders. To say without qualification that the State was put under church-control is hardly in accordance with the facts. That Calvin in his doctrine of the Lord’s Supper did not teach the “Real Presence of Christ’s body and blood, either in the sense in which the Catholics understood it or in the wholly different sense in which Luther believed it” (p. 252). is quite true; but it would have been well

to indicate just what Calvin's own doctrine of the Real Presence is. Again, it is quite a misrepresentation of Calvin's doctrine of the Church, when our author says (p. 252) that the Church—to which the elect belong—is "necessarily invisible." The representation of Zwingli's view of the Lord's Supper is the common but quite erroneous one; for he no less than Calvin taught that Christ is spiritually present in the sacrament, and that by faith "his body is spiritually eaten."

The concluding chapter on American Christianity is a sort of appendix to the volume. It does not undertake to narrate the history of the Church in our country but only to enumerate its salient characteristics. The treatment is suggestive and instructive. Many readers, however, will be inclined to question the statement that "the liberal party has not extended very far among the rank and file of the members of the churches."

Princeton.

FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

De Kant à Ritschl: Un Siècle d'Histoire de la Pensée Chrétienne. Par H. DUBOIS, Docteur en Théologie, Professeur de Théologie Systématique. Neuchâtel: 1925. 8 vo., pp. 115.

In this brochure Professor Dubois of the University of Neuchâtel offers the public an important section of a course of lectures in historical theology which he delivered some time ago in this institution. The field covered—the century from about 1750 to about 1850—is not one that looms large in the ordinary histories of dogma, for neither the Roman Catholic nor the Protestant Churches during this period did much in the way of constructing and giving official approval to new forms of doctrine. And yet in the broader domain of religious thought in general, this century must rank as one of the most important of the whole Christian era. So profound and varied are the philosophical and theological transformations of this period that it is only through acquaintance with them that one can understand the characteristic developments and tendencies in the religious life of our own day.

It is from this point of view that we commend this brief treatise as an admirable presentation of the subject with which it deals—the Christian, or perhaps we had better say the religious, thought of Europe, and more especially of Germany, in that notable century that lies between Kant and the flourishing days of the Ritschlian School. The discussions, of course, are quite brief—Kant and Schleiermacher naturally receive most attention; and much of the material may be studied to better advantage in the standard histories of modern philosophy and in the special monographs on the leading theologians of Germany during the nineteenth century. But our author gives an instructive survey, with able criticisms, of these varied movements and schools of thought, and his generous quotations from the sources enable the reader to form his own estimate of the contributions of the philosophers and theologians whose works are passed in review. The most valuable parts of the treatise are the discussion of Kant's epistemology and his postulates of the practical reason; the critical reflections on Schleiermacher's essentially

psychological conception of religion and his failure to do justice to the empirical data of Christianity as an historical fact, and on the one-sided intellectualism of the Hegelians; the admirable characterization of the three main groups of theologians between Schleiermacher and Ritschl—the center, the right and the left wings—and the discriminating account of the merits and the defects of Ritschlianism.

Princeton.

FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

SYSTEMATICAL THEOLOGY

Shall We Have a Creed? By E. HERSHEY SNEATH, Ph.D., LL.D. Professor Emeritus of the Philosophy of Religion and Religious Education, Yale University. New York and London: The Century Co. 1925. Pp. 69.

This little volume embodies the substance of an address which the author delivered as President of the Theological Society at its last annual meeting in New York. It was repeated before the Convocation of the Divinity School of Yale University last Spring.

Dr. Sneath reviews the common objections to a creed and the arguments in favor of a creed. After weighing both sides of the question, he concludes that a creed is desirable, but it must be so constructed that really valid objections to it will disappear. These objections are mainly in the line of the prevailing doctrinal indifferentism and anti-intellectualism of the present time, as well as the desire for Church unity and an "inclusive Church." Hence the author thinks that the objections can be avoided by so framing the Creed that acceptance of it will prove "helpful to salvation," meaning by salvation "the realization of the supreme values of life." More specifically it should contain "three fundamental articles of Christian belief, each one of which is most helpful to the life of righteousness." The following is the proposed Creed:

1. "I believe in Jesus' conception of God as the righteous Father who desires and labors for the righteousness of his children."

2. "I believe in Jesus' conception of the law of love, 'Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind; and thy neighbor as thyself,' as the supreme and all-comprehensive law of righteousness."

3. "I believe in Jesus' conception of the immortality of the righteous soul."

This creed, Dr. Sneath thinks, should unite Roman Catholics and Protestants, Fundamentalists and Modernists.

This creed does not contain the "fundamental articles of Christian belief" if they are to be determined historically, as they must be, for Christianity is a historical religion. All Christians will agree on the second article as giving Jesus' teaching and command as to man's supreme duty. But Christianity is a redemptive religion, and its idea of salvation is salvation from the guilt of sin through Jesus' atoning death, and salvation from the power and pollution of sin through the super-

natural power of the Holy Spirit in regeneration and sanctification. There is not a word in this creed about sin and salvation from its guilt and power. There is not a word about Jesus as Saviour from sin and as the object of faith. All this is "fundamental" to Christianity, not only as the Apostles conceived it and as the entire Christian Church has conceived it, but as Jesus Himself taught. He held Himself up as the object of faith. He said that He came to seek and to save that which was lost, and to give His life as a ransom-price in place of the many. He spoke of the necessity of the new birth as a necessary condition of entrance into the Kingdom of God. The absolute command in the second article of this creed, therefore, instead of being "helpful," strikes man with a sense of helplessness and hopelessness apart from the supernatural power of God in salvation which Jesus and His Apostles taught, and in which lies man's only hope of approximating the command and ideal in article second. This creed, therefore, omits the very essence of the Gospel.

As for the first article, if it is intended to teach the universal Fatherhood of God, then it is contrary to the teaching of Jesus which conspicuously limits the Fatherhood of God to His own disciples.

As for the third article, if it is intended to imply that Jesus taught that only the "righteous soul" is immortal—and its wording seems to imply this—then it can find no support in the teaching of Jesus. Certainly Jesus said much about future punishment and clearly taught the resurrection of both the righteous and the wicked.

Certainly this creed will not satisfy the orthodox Roman Catholic or the evangelical Protestant. We doubt if it will satisfy many "modernists." It will not even satisfy the believer in bare natural religion unless he accepts the doctrine of "conditional immortality" and rejects the doctrine of future reward and punishment.

On the other hand, if article one be interpreted to mean that in a sense God is the Father of all as the author of their being and that His goodness is over all, if the implication of "conditional immortality" be eliminated from article three, then this creed is so broad as to include all theists who accept Jesus' "law of love," and we suppose most of them do so. This creed then will in that case include many who would not call themselves Christians, but who admire the ethical teaching of Jesus. Dr. Sneath says (p. 38) that a man is saved if he fulfills the commandment in article two. His whole philosophy presupposes that all men naturally have plenary ability to do this. But this supposition is entirely contrary to Scripture and to universal human experience. If this creed is all of Christianity, it is not "helpful," it leaves us in despair.

Princeton.

C. W. HODGE.

Dogmatik. Von WILHELM HERRMAN. Mit einer Gedächtnisrede auf Wilhelm Herrman von Martin Rade. Gotha-Stuttgart: Verlag F. A. Perthes. 1925. Ss. 103.

Wilhelm Herrman died in January 1922. The "dictates" of his lectures on Dogmatics were published in the *Christliche Welt* in 1923, 1924. Martin Rade has now published them in this volume, the first part being

taken from the text of Herrman's lectures in 1913, and the second part from those of 1915-16.

Herrman's *Dogmatics* contains two main divisions—the first being on Religion and the Christian Religion. In this part he shows how a man attains religion or faith in God, how Christian faith arises and what is its nature. The second part sets forth the "thoughts of faith" or the knowledge faith has concerning God, man, sin, and redemption.

This second part contains three main divisions—(1) The overcoming of the world through God-given faith: (2) the overcoming of sin through God-given faith: (3) the presence of God in the historical "factors" of salvation. In the last section Herrman gives his views on Christ, the Holy Spirit, and the Trinity. This section, however, simply states Herrman's views on the above subjects as they are implied in his ideas of revelation, faith and salvation as stated in the earlier sections.

The main interest lies in the first main part in which he states his fundamental and underlying ideas. It is here too that his greatest influence was exerted. Rade says that perhaps more than any other of the Ritschlian theologians Herrman made a "Ritschlian School." He never attended Ritschl's lectures, but was greatly influenced by reading Ritschl's books when dissatisfied with the mediating theology of Halle as well as with Lutheran orthodoxy and the old liberalism of Biedermann, Lipsius and Pfeiderer.

Herrman's theological thinking is directed, as is well known to all, through his many former writings, chiefly against what he calls the "intellectualism" of orthodoxy and rationalism, and the vague subjectivity of feeling in mysticism. It is, however, chiefly against what he calls "intellectualism" that his polemic zeal was always aroused. The "evangelical" idea of faith is not assent to doctrines, and revelation, therefore, cannot consist in the communication of truth by God to man. Faith is a personal experience of trust in God, and revelation must be found in history, i.e., in any historical events in which we are made to feel the presence of God as absolute love and goodness. These are the thoughts which underlie all Herrman's theological thought.

The task of *Dogmatics* is, accordingly, threefold, according to Herrman. It must point out the universally valid element in religion or religious faith; it must then show the specific ground and nature of Christian faith in particular; and finally set forth the thoughts contained in Christian faith. It is, as we said, in the first two of these three tasks that Herrman's chief interest and influence lies. We shall, therefore, confine ourselves to the first part of Herrman's book.

What, then, is religion according to Herrman? It is the capability of seeing the presence and action of God in any given events. How does a man attain such a capacity or such a religious faith? Not, Herrman thinks, in any intellectual way, not by any scientific knowledge of the world or by any theistic proofs. The idea which underlies all such supposed knowledge and arguments is that God is the great first cause, the Lord over all. But this idea is a thought of religion itself; it is not a way

to religious faith or faith in God, rather does it spring from an already experienced faith in God.

A second impossible way to religion is the attempt to exhibit its origin from the deepest energy and motive of human life. It is seen in Kaftan and Eucken. The former will ground religion in the fact that it fulfils man's needs for a perfect life and a highest good. This attempt is open to the objection that religious faith is the product of human desires, and religious thoughts may be noble but not necessarily true. Eucken sought to avoid the criticism that religious faith is the product of our wishes by claiming that religious life points to the working of a cause above nature and so the truth of religion is assured. But Eucken's attempt suffers from the fallacy that ideas which are the result of religious faith are made to ground that conviction. Neither can religious faith be grounded in, nor arise from, man's moral will (Kant), nor in the unity of man's self-consciousness (Schleiermacher in his *Glaubenslehre* pp. 3-5). Kant tends to reduce religion to ethics, and Schleiermacher to a dependence on fate rather than on God. In a word, there is no way from man's reason or feelings up to God. Religion must be grounded in a personal experience of God's love and power in historical events, and since it is a personal trust in God, it can be attained only by a revelation of God's love and goodness and power in persons. This is the way to religion. We experience God's love in persons whose love leads to deeds of self-sacrifice for men.

The final point in Herrman's argument is to show the peculiarity of Christian faith and how it arises. When a man seeks God in the Christian community of believers he finds that the examples of self-sacrificing love amongst his fellows, in which he finds a revelation of God, owe all the power with which they affect us to the Person of Jesus. If, then, we wish to know how Jesus can become such a power, i.e., revelation of God, for us, we must turn to the Christian tradition in the Gospels and see first, how the Person of Jesus influenced His first followers, secondly, how He came to be for them the revelation of God, and thirdly, how Jesus can be a revelation of God in the present to ourselves.

Jesus impressed Himself on His first disciples by preaching the kingdom of God as the reign of God in human hearts, a reign which is *the* "miracle" or work of God through the influence of Jesus Himself. This blessing Jesus gave His first disciples by His own influence, making them feel conscious of sin and announcing the forgiveness of sin, so that through Him they experienced the reign of God in their hearts. If the person of Jesus is to become such a revelation of God to us, then He must become for us just such an experienced power in our life as He was for the first Christians. Since faith is just this experience of the power of Jesus by which He becomes a revelation of God to us, it cannot be an assent to any doctrines about Jesus, no matter whether they be found in the teaching of the Apostles or even in Jesus' own teaching. To conceive of revelation as consisting in the teaching of Jesus Himself is as "rationalistic" and "intellectualistic" in principle as if we accepted the whole Bible as an authoritative statement

of doctrine. Faith, Herrman is never tired of repeating, is neither the acceptance of doctrine nor the belief in historical facts, but simply a voluntary yet compelled surrender to the power of the "inner life of Jesus." If it be objected, as it often was by Herrman's critics, that the "inner life of Jesus" is a historical datum which can be rendered uncertain by the results of historical criticism, Herrman would reply, and does so reply in this book, that the inner life of Jesus shines with the light of self-evidencing truth, and that to question its historical reality is impossible to a faith which surrenders itself to its power. Herrman would not take the position of the pragmatist that such faith works; he simply asserts it as an inescapable fact for the Christian. The Christian simply knows that he finds God in Jesus. The revelation Herrman would assert to be historical—that is his precise point, but it is nevertheless absolute and unshakable for the Christian.

This life of faith expresses itself in thoughts about God, man, and salvation. It is the task of Christian and "evangelical" Dogmatics to give expression to these thoughts of faith. It is at this point that we meet with two different points of view in Herrman's thought. On page 41 of this volume he says that faith grows and produces ever new thoughts, so that Christian doctrines are individually conditioned and there can be no fixed or authoritative evangelical Dogmatics. This is the point of view which Herrman emphasized formerly against Kaftan in his article "Christlich-protestantische Dogmatik" (*Kultur der Gegenwart I Aufl.*, p. 642). On the other hand, on page 38 of this volume he states that the faith of the Christian theologian is not the source of Christian doctrine, but the Scripture regarded as the classical expression of the Christian life of faith. The norm, however, for determining that in the Scripture which is "evangelical" and Christian, is the faith of the theologian aided by the results of historical criticism. This antinomy between freedom and a relative authority of the Scripture remains unresolved to the end in Herrman's theological writings, and Karl Barth has called attention to this in his article "Die dogmatische Prinzipienlehre bei Wilhelm Herrman" (*Zwischen den Zeiten*, 1925, *Heft* 3, pp. 246-280).

Herrman's views of the individual Christian doctrines have changed little, if at all. They are known to most theological readers in America. They are set forth in Part Two of this volume and their exhibition is the second part of Dogmatics. They are, generally speaking, the views of the older Ritschlianism. His "economical" view of the Trinity, his idea of the "deity" of Christ as consisting in the revelation-value of the man Jesus which he unfolds in several propositions, his conception of sin and of forgiveness, are the views he has often expounded. His portrait of Jesus is that of the older liberals which more recent writers, more radically inclined, especially those of the eschatological school represented by A. Schweitzer, have declared to be entirely unhistorical. Even modern Ritschlian theologians, such as Stephan (*Glaubenslehre*) have said that it is better not to apply the term "deity" to Jesus if it is not meant in any ontological sense as in orthodoxy. In a word it is the reduced and unhistorical Christianity of that type of German theology which delights

to call itself "evangelical" over against rationalism and Scriptural orthodoxy, which Herrman sets forth.

We shall not stop to expound this theology in detail, but will close our review with some critical remarks on the underlying principles.

In the first place Herrman's conception of the historical Jesus is not determined historically and so is unhistorical. It seems hardly necessary at this late date to call attention to this. The whole trend of modern discussion is an evidence of it. One need only read A. Schweitzer's *Von Reimarus to Wrede* to be convinced that, however exaggerated the "consistent eschatological view" may be, certainly the "modern liberal Jesus" is unhistorical. Certainly the Jesus of our sources had much to say about the greatness of His Person, His real oneness with God, His coming again to judge the world. He spoke much about future punishment. He limited the Fatherhood of God to His own disciples. All this has been so much emphasized in recent discussion, that it seems almost unnecessary to allude to it. Of course it is true that Herrman has too much historical sense to try to eliminate all the elements we have mentioned from teaching of the historical Jesus. His point is that if we are to have the same living relation to Jesus which His first disciples had, we cannot conceive of Jesus precisely as they did or even acknowledge all the claims which Jesus Himself may have made. Also the important point for Herrman is just this, viz., that we should have the same living experience of Jesus which His first followers had. But it is none the less true that it is not the real Jesus through whom we are supposed to have communion with God. And if it is not the real Jesus in whom we experience a "revelation" of God, it is difficult to see how we can be sure that the supposed "revelation" is really such. At all events it is certain that this Jesus is unhistorical. He is the Jesus Herrman and his school would like to have, rather than the historical Jesus who really was on earth nineteen centuries ago and the living Lord with whom the Christian holds communion and by whom he has communion with God. If a so-called historical criticism prosecuted under the domination of naturalistic principles has rendered the portrait of the historical Jesus uncertain, that is no reason why we should resort to the Jesus of modern romanticism. It is precisely psychological pragmatism which Herrman wishes to escape and which he thinks he has broken down by his idea of an historical revelation, but if subjective and even apologetic considerations are allowed to play a determining part in our idea of revelation, we come perilously near the very subjectivism which Herrman is so eager to avoid and against which he directed his polemic almost as strenuously as he did against rationalism and what he called the false "intellectualism" of orthodoxy. In a word, he comes dangerously near to the "experiential theology" which he opposed.

In the second place, what has just been said leads naturally to Herrman's view of faith and history. He wished to keep faith independent of the results of historical criticism. To do this he retreated into the citadel of the "inner life of Jesus" as the revelation of God in history. He supposed that this inner life of Jesus was *autopistic* and self-evidencing

as a reality of history. But questions at once arise. Is not the inner life of Jesus an historical datum and open to the assaults of a naturalistic historical criticism? We can know nothing about the inner life of Jesus except from what He said and did. Surely Jesus' inner life is as much the subject of historical investigation as is His resurrection or miracles. And if we investigate Jesus' inner life historically we find His Messianic consciousness and His divine self-consciousness in the sources, and much more that will not fit into Herrman's idea of that which is self-evidencing about Jesus. We are quite ready to grant that the portrait of Jesus in the Gospels is so majestic, so strange, so transcendent, that it does seem impossible that it is an invention of men and not copied from a real life. But it is precisely the entire Gospel portrait of Jesus which so far transcends human thought. We are not at all convinced that the Jesus of modern liberalism could not have been invented. Indeed we believe precisely that it has been. The constructors of the modern liberal Jesus have conceded so much to the principles of a naturalistic criticism that the radicals long ago drove these principles to their logical results. This is an old story now. But we have been brought face to face with the alternative that either the Gospel narratives are so untrustworthy that we can reach no idea of the historical Jesus, or else He made such high claims for His Person that, if we cannot allow their truth, Jesus was a person very different from the Jesus of the modern liberal.

The result of what we have said is that Christian faith cannot be independent of history or of the results of historical criticism just because Christianity is an historical religion. Of course we do not mean that the individual Christian believer must be an historical scholar or that his faith depends on any historical investigations. The Bible bears the marks of its divine origin and under the witness of the Spirit saving faith in Christ can and does arise. We do mean, however, that Christianity is an historical religion, that great historical facts enter into its essence and that the separation between faith and history which Herrman sought is impossible.

In the third place Herrman's view of the relation of faith and doctrine, at least as far as this book is concerned, is far from clear or consistent. Just as in his earlier writings he asserts most emphatically that evangelical faith is not the acceptance of doctrines about Jesus, but a present and vital trust, a voluntary yet compelled surrender to the power of the "inner life" of Jesus. Assent to doctrines about Jesus can never help us to this faith in Jesus. He is never tired of repeating this nor of criticising what he terms the "intellectualism" of "orthodoxy" nor of classing it with both rationalism and Roman Catholicism in this respect. He devotes a whole section to a criticism of the "intellectualistic" idea of revelation. If he meant that saving faith was essentially trust in Jesus and not a mere assent to doctrines about Jesus in which such trust was absent, we could assent. If again he meant to set up the crass antithesis, which we meet in much American liberal theology, between faith in Jesus and knowledge about Jesus, then it would be easy to show that we cannot trust in a person without knowledge of who the person is and whether he

is trustworthy, and without assent of the mind to the truth of such knowledge. In other words the old theologians were right in saying that knowledge, assent, and trust, enter into every act of faith from its lowest to its highest forms, and that the knowledge and assent are necessary to self-commitment to the object of faith or trust in the object. But this criticism would not be a fair criticism of Herrman's statements on this subject. Just after stating that the "orthodox" view of faith includes the three elements of knowledge, assent, and trust, Herrman says that this view is right in three respects (p. 33); first, that the first thing in faith is knowledge (*notitia*) for only that can become a revelation to man with which he is brought into a "spiritual" relation, and though this is all he says on this point, he seems to mean that a real knowledge of the object of faith is involved; second, that faith never can exist without "assent" to the "thoughts" which are first given the believer through the Christian message from the holy Scripture; third, that one can only be a Christian believer when he attains a trust of the heart in God. He then proceeds to say that what is mistaken about the "orthodox" view is the determination to assent to doctrines "prescribed" by the Scripture or the Church although one is not yet persuaded of their truth, that faith cannot have its origin in an act of assent which the "old man" can perform, that the judgment of faith itself is that it never arises through our efforts, but by the power of a revelation given to man. We are not concerned now with the question whether Herrman has fairly described the "orthodox" view of faith in thus allying it with the "implicit faith" of the Romish Church. What does concern us is to call attention to the fact that he asserts in the earlier sections of this book that faith is not at all an assent to any doctrines or truths, but a personal attitude of trust *out of which* the "thoughts of faith," to which it freely assents, arise, i.e., that the trust conditions the knowledge and assent; and that in this section (p. 31) he asserts the contrary, that knowledge and assent precede and condition the trust. This seems to be an antinomy or contradiction which lies unresolved in his view of the relation of faith and doctrine. He seems not to have thought his way through on this point, though we had supposed the former view was a main characteristic of his theological thought. What he really seems to be striving after is to get rid of the idea of authority, of any authoritative truth as binding on faith.

This leads us to remark in the fourth place that there is an unresolved contradiction in Herrman's statements about freedom and authority in respect to religious knowledge. Herrman says (p. 41) that the task of Dogmatics is first to show how faith arises, and second, to state the thoughts or doctrines which spring from faith or in which "faith expresses itself." No unchanging or even self-consistent system of doctrine, therefore, is possible because faith changes and develops, "begetting" ever new thoughts about God. Here it is supposed that faith as a subjective attitude is the source of Christian truth, that it "expresses itself" in certain thoughts or "begets" such thoughts. On the other hand, Herrman states (p. 38) that faith is not the source of Christian truth or

doctrine, it therefore "begets" no thoughts, but must draw them from the Scripture as the classic expression of the Christian life of faith and of the thoughts in which that life and experience expressed itself. There is here a direct contradiction between the freedom of the faith of the individual theologian and the authority of the New Testament doctrines. This antinomy is never resolved throughout this book. It remains unresolved to the end.

But what is more important to remark is that what Herrman does is simply to carry back from the present to the past his mistaken idea of the relation of faith to experience. If the faith of the individual Christian in the present is a receptive attitude of trust and can "beget" no doctrines, then neither can the faith of the New Testament writers "beget" any doctrine. All faith finds its central act in a personal trust which depends on a knowledge and assent to truth about its object. This is true of the faith of the New Testament writers. It was conditioned by a knowledge about Christ derived from revelation. It, therefore, was a faith bound to the authority of that revelation of truth. Christian experience in the case of its expression in the New Testament is dependent on faith. And faith itself in its New Testament expression depends on knowledge and revelation of truth. The idea of the believing reception of revealed truth is involved in all faith, and at all times. Two things follow from this. First, the faith of the individual theologian cannot be a "norm" of Christian truth by which he selects from the New Testament teaching, as Herrman does, only certain elements which he regards as in harmony with "evangelical faith." Faith, though it is at its center personal trust, is none the less bound by the authority of the revelation of truth. Since faith simply receives truth and rests on an object revealed, it has of itself no truth-content which can serve as a norm for selecting from the New Testament doctrine only as much as it pleases.

Secondly, if it were possible to suppose that faith and life and experience did precede doctrine, truth, and knowledge—which we believe an impossible supposition—then it is difficult to see how the record of the New Testament faith and its expression can have the authority which Herrman accords to it. It is precisely the element of immediacy which characterizes experience, and our own faith and experience ought to be our authority, not that of the New Testament writers, if the relation of faith and doctrine is rightly conceived by Herrman. He concedes to the Scripture, especially the New Testament, more authority than he can harmonize with his conception of faith. He must go on to the more complete freedom of Sabatier and his school,¹ to the idea that life precedes doctrine and that doctrine is only symbolical, not finally true, i.e., to a position which must end in scepticism, or else he must go back to the so-called "intellectualism" of Protestant "orthodoxy" against which his whole polemic was directed.

Faith, at its center and at its height, is a personal trust; it does spring from an attitude of the heart; but all this is by no means inconsistent with the fact that its knowledge is bound by authority.

Princeton.

C. W. HODGE.

The Fundamental Principles of the Reformed Conception of the Church. A Lecture, By JOHN DICKIE, D.D., Professor of Systematic Theology in Knox College, Dunedin, New Zealand. Aberdeen: James G. Bisset, 1924. Pp. 24.

This lecture was delivered to a gathering of Ministers of various Churches convened and presided over by the Anglican Bishop of Dunedin, to consider the Lambeth proposals for the re-union of Christendom.

The author's idea is that "if ever the *disjecta membra* of Christendom are to come together again, it must be along the lines of Christian service and not ecclesiastical accommodation, of a courageous grappling with the needs of this present age, and not of a compromise with mediaevalism—in a word, of a self-effacing united effort, in the power of a mighty faith and a Christ-like sympathy, to win the whole of life for the one Lord and Saviour of mankind and make Him King over all relations—social, economic, industrial, and international." (Preface).

The task here expressed, Dr. Dickie believes to be "distinctive" of the Reformed conception of the Church's mission (p. 12). The main purpose of the lecture is to prove this thesis. The lecture does not aim at any full statement of the Reformed idea of the nature of the Church. It is on the practical aspect of the work of the Church that emphasis is laid. The limits of a brief lecture also forbid any complete exhibition of the sources of the Reformed idea, though some of them are briefly discussed, and the "Articles Declaratory of the Constitution of the Church of Scotland in Matters Spiritual" are given at the close of the lecture.

Princeton.

C. W. HODGE.

Theological Studies. Dedicated to Henry Eyster Jacobs on the occasion of his Eightieth Birthday. By J. A. W. HAAS, H. OFFERMANN, A. T. W. STEINHAUSER, J. C. MATTES and C. M. JACOBS. Philadelphia: The United Lutheran Publication House, 1924. Pp. 233.

This substantial volume of theological essays was published, as the title indicates, to commemorate the eightieth birthday of Dr. Jacobs who may be called the Nestor of Lutheran theology in America. The authors are former pupils of Dr. Jacobs.

J. A. W. Haas contributes the first essay entitled "The Soul and Society." The author indicates the difference between the Biblical idea of the soul and that of the individual in the philosophical conception of modern individualism, showing that there is no basis for the latter in the former, and that the Biblical idea gives no basis for any conflict between the claims of the soul and of society. Modern individualistic philosophy is criticised as being first, a philosophy of "pluralism" with no God or only a finite God; second, modern individualism "as commonly accepted" has no place for the idea of sin, so that education and reform take the place of salvation; third, the modern idea of the individual is "anti-social," and in this respect can find no support in the Biblical idea of the soul. With most of the author's conclusions we can agree, though we would dissent from his exegesis of many specific Scriptural passages, too many, in fact, to discuss in a brief notice of this volume.

The second essay by H. Offermann is on "The Jesus of the New Testament." The author asks whether the Christ of faith is the Jesus of history. Modern criticism has raised this question which the author answers affirmatively. The line of argument is as follows:—the Gospels rest on a Gospel, i.e., good news. Paul's idea is that the Gospel is good news of salvation through the Cross and Resurrection of Christ. Paul lays stress on the fact that his Gospel is the same as that of the original Apostles. This is shown by an investigation of the views of primitive Christianity and Paul's attitude toward these beliefs. In the next place the author shows that the Christ of the Apostolic faith is the Jesus of our Gospels and of their hypothetical sources. He then raises the question whether this Jesus is the Jesus of history.

In this closing section the author points to the account of Jesus' ministry in the Gospels as laying an adequate basis for the faith in Him as Divine Saviour, which the authors of the Gospels share with the Epistles. The historical trustworthiness of the Gospels the author rests on his previous discussion of the authorship and date of the Gospels. The essay would have been strengthened, however, if its author had given a brief criticism of the various naturalistic views as to the origin of faith in Jesus as Divine Saviour which, as he shows, appears in the only sources which we have.

The third essay by A. T. W. Steinhäuser is on "The New Testament Idea of Faith." It correctly emphasizes the nature of faith as a personal trust in God and Christ throughout the New Testament. There are a number of points, however, in respect to which we differ with the author. He speaks of Jesus as both the supreme manifestation of the grace of God and the supreme expression of the faith of man. There is an important difference between Jesus' faith as man and ours. Jesus was sinless. His trust in God was not saving faith. We men are sinners. Our faith is trust in a Saviour from sin. This is not brought out. Neither do we find in the Gospels any basis for the idea that Jesus "accommodated" his teaching to the views of his hearers. Quite the contrary seems to be the case. Also when Jesus says that all things are possible if one believes, we see here no reference to the "paradoxical, non-rational element in faith." It seems to us that Jesus meant that all things are possible to faith, not because of anything in faith but because it rests on the omnipotence of God with whom all things are possible.

Another point in respect to which we differ from the author is his statement concerning the significance of Christ's resurrection. He asks how Jesus, "from being the Hero of faith, could become the Object of faith." Having thus erroneously implied that Jesus became the object of faith in some way because he was the hero of faith, the author finds the answer in the resurrection of Jesus. The resurrection, he regards as "the vindication of Jesus' faith," and so the gift by God of the hero of faith, rewarded for his perfect faith, becomes "so identified with the Giver, that for faith there can be no longer any distinction between the two." All this we cannot find in the New Testament teaching. The resurrection is the "vindication" of Jesus' claim to our faith. It is not represented as

the "vindication of Jesus' faith." Even if it were, the transition described is not easily comprehensible to say the least. Neither can we find in the New Testament the subordination of the Son to the Father which the author finds, nor do we think that the statement in John xiv. 1, "Ye believe in God, believe also in me" is to be interpreted "in the light of xiv. 6" as meaning "Believe in God as the goal of your way, believe in me as the way to your goal." Nor would we agree with the author's statement in his closing section that "from the view-point of faith" (i.e., their teaching about faith), Hebrews, James, Jude, and Revelation, appear as *deuterocanonical*. James, for example, is writing against a dead faith or mere intellectual belief. He is not identifying it with the saving faith of Paul's teaching. We cannot agree with the author that James represents any "deviation from the prevailing New Testament idea of faith." The Epistle does not "take its tone" as to faith from its polemic against a dead faith, but in ii. 1, i. 6, and v. 15 shows the common New Testament idea of faith both as to its nature and object. In Jude verse 3 faith is used objectively to denote the doctrine of the Gospel, as also in verse 20. This represents a different use of the term; it is no "hardening of the idea of faith" subjectively considered as a saving trust. It is more correct to say that Jude does not discuss faith in the latter sense. The Epistle to the Hebrews and the book of Revelation do not depart from the New Testament idea of faith. Space does not permit us to go into their rich teaching on the subject.

By far the longest essay is the fourth by J. C. Mattes, a doctrinal study of "The Church and The Mission of Christ." It occupies about 80 pages of the volume. It is quite thorough, and presents very well the Lutheran as opposed to the Reformed idea of the Church. The emphasis, of course, is on the Sacraments as conveying the same saving grace to all who do not resist, and the idea of Predestination in the Reformed Church is objected to because it conflicts with this idea. We agree with the author as to this conflict, though for our part we believe that the Reformed view is the Scriptural one. It would require far too much space to set forth our reasons for this statement and to examine critically this long and thorough essay. With much of it we can agree. We can commend it as a fine presentation of the Lutheran view, notwithstanding the fact that we believe in the Reformed doctrine of the Church.

The fifth and last essay is by C. M. Jacobs on "The Authority of Holy Scripture in the Early Church." This is a study of the view of Scriptural authority in the Patristic literature. It shows a good acquaintance with this literature, and with the work of such writers as Zahn, Harnack, Seeberg, Bethune-Baker, and other historians. The writer of this notice cannot claim an intimate enough acquaintance with the Patristic literature to express an opinion on the author's views.

We congratulate Dr. Jacobs upon the fact that upon his eightieth birthday he had the satisfaction of having trained and inspired the authors of this volume dedicated to him in grateful recognition of his long and conspicuous service as a theological teacher and writer.

Princeton.

C. W. HODGE.

Liberal Christianity. By WILLIAM PIERSON MERRILL. The Macmillan Company, 1925.

This book is quite evidently written in reply to *Christianity and Liberalism*, by Dr. J. Gresham Machen. The author charges Dr. Machen with either false witness or crass ignorance about Liberalism, and quotes passages at length from Dr. Machen's book in an attempt to prove his charge. It is hardly necessary to say that Dr. Machen nowhere in his book restricts his statements to the Presbyterian Church, but is treating of Liberalism in the Christian Church, in its principal phases, in whatever denomination it may be found. Dr. Merrill, on the other hand, restricts Liberalism to what is really the right wing of the Liberalistic movement, and seems all through his book to be defending Presbyterian ministers against the statements made by Dr. Machen as applying to the principal phases of the movement. Now no one charges that the Liberalism inside the Presbyterian Church has left Christianity as far behind as the Liberalism in other denominations, so Dr. Merrill's charge against Dr. Machen would be entirely unjustified even were he to prove that no Presbyterian minister holds the views objected to. But is Dr. Merrill correct in saying that no Liberals in the Presbyterian Church believe these things?

Dr. Merrill attempts to prove that Liberals are true Christians and that they have every right to stay inside their respective denominations; that Liberal Christianity is "essentially in harmony with the New Testament"; and that Liberal Christianity is the religious hope of the world. In other words it is a defense of the right of Liberals to use the term "Christian" of themselves, and to stay inside their own denominations. Since Dr. Merrill is a Presbyterian minister and a Liberal, it is a defense of his right to stay inside the ministry of the Presbyterian Church.

In reviewing this book we shall not enter into any lengthy discussion of the truth or falsity of the Liberal doctrines as set forth in this book, but shall try, fairly and dispassionately, to discover just what the beliefs of Liberals like Dr. Merrill are, to compare these beliefs with the doctrines held by Evangelical Christians, especially with the doctrines set forth in the Presbyterian Confession of Faith, and to form a conclusion as to whether Liberals like the author have a right to stay within the ranks of Presbyterian ministers, or whether Liberalism even of this less outspoken type is essentially a different type of religion from historic Christianity.

Dr. Merrill's statement that "Liberals have paid too little attention to the careful study and close formulation of their positive message," (p. 34), is certainly true of himself, for throughout the book we find haziness of thought and even contradictory statements, so that it is very difficult at times to discover just what it is that he does believe. Take for example the following statement: "Jesus Christ is wholly and absolutely man, as the creeds have declared Him to be; wholly and absolutely God, as the creeds have declared Him to be" (p. 50). This is clear enough, and has a ring to it that would gladden the heart of every Fundamentalist, were it not that in the very next sentences we

read: "For God is personal and man is personal. God is love; and love cannot be one thing in God and another in us. Christ is perfect love, personality at its highest. So the man, Christ Jesus, is God in human experience, God in man." If we take these latter statements at their face value they apparently mean that the reason Christ is God is because the qualities of love and personality present in all men reached their height and perfection in Christ! In other words, wherever we find the qualities of love and personality, we find God! Christ has these qualities in perfection, therefore He is God! The only difference between ordinary men and Christ, is that while all men have these divine qualities, Christ had them in a greater degree than other men! This is certainly startling doctrine. If this is what Dr. Merrill means, he certainly does not believe that Christ is God in the sense that the creeds have declared Him to be! Possibly Dr. Merrill will deny that he means this, but if so, why does he use the English language in such an equivocal and apparently contradictory manner? Is it not either intentional juggling with words to conceal opinions which the author knows would rule him out of the Presbyterian ministry, or else the evidence that the author is hopelessly unable to think or write logically? It is because the book is filled with contradictions such as this that sentences here and there throughout the book can be selected, as has been done by a recent reviewer, which seem to be perfectly orthodox, while the whole paragraph in which the sentences are embedded may have a meaning the reverse from orthodox. It is hard to believe that a writer so intelligent as Dr. Merrill has left such contradictions in the book unintentionally. Perhaps the key to them is to be found in the attitude of mind toward truth displayed in the following sentence. "The Liberal Christian is not barred from the use of most, if not all, of the imagery with which the atoning death on Calvary has been set forth *provided he is free to use it as poetry*" (p. 103; italics mine). A writer who will use orthodox language about the Atonement because it has a soothing sound to the orthodox ear, and not because he believes it to be *true*, will hardly feel himself barred from using "poetical" language about the Deity of our Lord!

Another serious fault of the book is the way in which the Evangelical position is grossly caricatured over and over again in the course of the argument. We will mention only two instances of this. "In practice the theologians and creed-makers laid down the sense in which the Bible should be taken, formulated its doctrines, and then claimed that the authority of the Bible extended to the doctrinal system thus derived by them from the Bible" (p. 73). Who in the history of the church has claimed this? "What a strange incongruity in the use of radio by fundamentalists to broadcast their opposition to science!" (p. 16). Where is the fundamentalist who opposes science? Doubtless Dr. Merrill has evolution in mind, but the fundamentalist who opposes evolution does so not because he is opposed to science, but because he is convinced that the theory of evolution is *not* science in any real sense of the term. Other examples of caricature are found on pages 28, 47, 77, 97, 151, 162, etc.

But let us attempt to systematize Dr. Merrill's theology, much as he would probably resent our trying to "corral his truths where they cannot get away and where we can study them at close range." Let us see what Dr. Merrill has to say about God, the Bible, Christ, Sin, Atonement and the Way of Salvation. We may mention in passing that he regards the Bodily Resurrection of Jesus as unprovable (p. 57), rejects some miracles and accepts others (pp. 21, 24, 49), rejects the physical return of our Lord (pp. 25, 39, 131, 132), thinks the creeds should be revised (p. 34) and regards them as expressions of spiritual experience rather than as attempts to put the doctrines taught in the Bible in systematic form (p. 77), and cares little for historical facts recorded in the Bible (pp. 21, 38, 39). These points are certainly important, but the real heart of Liberalism comes out in Dr. Merrill's views on the six points above mentioned.

In the first place, what does Dr. Merrill say about God? To him the supreme thing about God is that He is personal (p. 40) and he would gladly exchange all the theological definitions of God for the words, "God is a Spirit." He thinks that God is now making heaven and earth, so it is clear that Dr. Merrill regards himself as a theistic evolutionist (p. 41), yet when he tells us that the Liberal sometimes thinks of God as struggling with His world (p. 42) we wonder what kind of theism he believes in. A sentence like the following: "We know God supremely through the Bible not by reason of its . . . inspired bits of theological speculation, but because we find Him in Abraham and Moses, in David, Elijah . . . and above all in Christ Jesus," sounds dangerously close to Roycean pantheism, God coming to consciousness in man, and the personality of God appearing in the personality of man. This conviction that there is a pantheistic strain in Dr. Merrill's thinking about God, is strengthened by passages like the following: "God is to be construed in terms of Jesus, even more than that Jesus is to be construed in terms of God" (p. 50); and "Just because God is to him," i.e. the Liberal, "wholly personal, and can be adequately revealed only in personality, it follows that God is supremely and finally revealed in the supreme and ideal man. All of God that man can know in personal experience is in Jesus" (p. 48). This latter passage shows a pragmatist distrust for any attempt to see God the Creator back of nature, or any attempt to know God, and at the same time shows the pantheistic idea that the personality of man reveals God in it. Of course this is not pure pantheism because it does not hold that God is the sum total of the universe and man, but it tends to regard man as having essential divinity. The quotation already given, "God is love; and love cannot be one thing in God and another in us" (p. 50), bears out this conclusion. Apparently Dr. Merrill's God is quite a different God from the God defined in the Shorter Catechism, from that of the entire Christian Church and from that of the Bible.

Let us now see what Dr. Merrill's attitude toward the Bible is. He tells us that the Bible is the record of personal experiences (p. 46) instead of the revealed Word of God, and that it exhibits the defects of

the persons in it in its very fiber (p. 46). He says that it is to be freely interpreted in the light thrown on it by unfettered investigation and criticism (p. 76), and that it is authoritative not because it is God speaking to us but because it "finds" us (p. 86). According to Dr. Merrill some of the theological constructions of the New Testament were partial and temporary in value and character (p. 93), and if doctrines are only faintly indicated in the New Testament they can be ignored (p. 93). Miracles like the raising of the axe head to the surface of the water, the fish swallowing Jonah, the supernatural crossing of the Red Sea and the bodily resurrection of Jesus, though clearly recorded in the Bible can be disbelieved, turned into parables, rationalized or ignored by the Liberal (pp. 20, 21, 24, 58). Dr. Merrill believes that there was a contradiction between the teaching of Paul and Jesus as to the way forgiveness is to be obtained and that "Paul was one of those intense souls to whom their personal experiences are forever normative and decisive" (p. 122), while the story of the Prodigal shows that God forgives sinners without any such experience as Paul had (p. 129). Dr. Merrill says that there are "dangerous errors contained in the doctrine of an inerrant Bible," but regards the Bible as "the practical guidebook for religious experience" (p. 167).

It is clearly evident from the above that Dr. Merrill takes a totally different view of the Bible from that of the Christian church and from that of Christ and His Apostles. To him the Bible contains errors, contradictions, unbelievable miracles, and outgrown thoughts of God and the world (p. 157). He accepts the results of "modern scholarship," and regards the Bible not as the revealed Word of God, but as the practical guidebook for religious experience. This is as far from the doctrine of the plenary inspiration of the Bible as it could possibly be.

Let us next see what our author says about Christ. "We find God in Abraham, Moses . . . and Christ Jesus" (p. 45), is almost sufficient indication of the kind of deity he attributes to Jesus. It differs only in degree from the deity present in all men. We would naturally expect him to be "indifferent to the problem of the two natures of Christ, to the Virgin Birth, and to the Pre-existence of Christ" (p. 50), and when he tells us that "the whole practical value of the equation 'Jesus is God' is in the knowledge of God to which it leads in terms of the 'warm, sweet, tender' human personality of Jesus" (p. 51), we see God interpreted in terms of the human Jesus, or in other words, God reduced to as much as can be contained in a human being, and then deity attributed to that human being, but deity differing only in degree from the deity present in men like Abraham and Moses! Consequently while it is easy to point out passages throughout the book where the author says that Jesus is God, these passages must always be interpreted in the light of the knowledge which we have of what that equation means to him, and we must remember that the Liberal is not barred from the use of orthodox language about such subjects, provided he is allowed to use it "in a poetic sense"! Certainly this is not the kind of deity attributed to Christ in the Westminster Confession of Faith.

But what does the author say about sin? He rejects the doctrine of imputation (pp. 99, 106, 107). He tells us that the Liberal's view of sin is "mainly a wrong personal relationship between the sinner and God" (p. 54.) and not "a law broken, a judge offended" (p. 100). Because of this view of sin, he naturally holds that the way to God is always open to the repentant sinner, without any mediator being necessary (p. 100), for "Here is sin and here is the present grace of God; let them come together" (p. 53), and "Christ announced the full amnesty of the Father without bargaining or haggling: 'Thy sins are forgiven thee'" (p. 120, quoted from Deissman with approval). "Have you sinned?" says our author in effect, "well, forget about it! God doesn't care what you have *done*! Just accept God's amnesty and stop sinning and everything will be lovely!" How different is the Biblical view of sin: "For without the shedding of blood there is no remission" of sins. The author thinks that he takes a very serious view of sin, especially of social sin, but a person who thinks that there is nothing between the sinner and God to prevent fellowship if only the sinner will come back to God, has not begun to get inside the teaching of the New Testament.

With such a view of sin, there is of course no need of a sin-bearer, for the sin does not have to be borne; so when Dr. Merrill tells us that "He frankly avows that forensic, governmental, and strictly substitutionary theories of how Christ brings about salvation mean little or nothing to him" (p. 99), we are not at all surprised. Christ's death was "not an act to placate God. . . . Atonement is intimately associated with all that is meant everywhere else by death, suffering, sacrifice, martyrdom: above all a deep sounding in the revelation of God as Father, showing how far he will go in dealing with sin and suffering . . . it gives in one supreme object lesson the key to the understanding of what God is doing all the time, saving our souls by living, suffering, dying with us—by full identification of His personal life with ours" (p. 52). Redemption was not a necessary bearing of the penalty for our sins once for all on Calvary, but it is "done . . . again and again, in every human heart that will receive the grace of God" (p. 38). Christ's death was "an overwhelmingly appealing demonstration of how far the love of God will go, and how far the love of man should go in suffering with and for the sinful" (p. 103). Dr. Merrill tells us that Jesus views His own death as "a striking instance of the cosmic principle of sacrifice" (p. 118), and that that death on Calvary was the "one supreme example of the great truth that new fullness of life, the perfect ransom of enslaved souls, comes through death" (p. 133). The fact that the Liberal so frequently uses orthodox language in speaking of the Atonement is explained by the fact that he is using it as "poetry" (p. 103), and so must not be understood as meaning literally what he says!

Dr. Merrill's attempt to exegete redemption out of Paul's Epistles (pp. 121 to 130) would be amusing if it were not so painfully astonishing. This exegetical *tour de force* reaches its climax in the following words: "To put it graphically, Paul does not speak of Christ as one whose crucifixion is over, but as one whose crucifixion is still going on"! (p. 130)

Dr. Merrill tells us that his view of the atonement is "the faith which is preached from liberal evangelical pulpits" (p. 104) ! If that is true, he should not blame fundamentalists for urging men who cannot accept the evangelical Christian doctrines, but believe such doctrines as these, to withdraw from the ministry of creedal churches. A religion that teaches that Calvary was a mere object lesson of what God does all the time, has no place within the Presbyterian Church.

But the most searching test of whether Liberalism, and historic and New Testament Christianity are simply phases of the same religion or whether, as Dr. Machen avers, they are totally different religions, comes when we consider the Liberal "way" of salvation. Dr. Merrill says that the thing that saves is our recognizing God in Christ now working in our souls. Jesus' death on Calvary did not save; it was merely the symbol of God's saving activity! The thing that saves "is an overwhelming recognition of God in Christ, now saving us by His present living grace, of which Calvary is the perfect symbol and expression" (p. 56). He agrees with Phillips Brooks that "Jesus was the first Christian" (p. 60), and tells us that "Christianity is the living of that high, holy, loving, self-sacrificing, personal, eternal life, which God set before us in Jesus" (p. 61). Apparently the Christian life is something that can be lived quite apart from belief or trust in the historic Jesus, according to Dr. Merrill, for "He cannot accept the monstrous notion that life beyond the grave is for those only who consciously 'accept Christ,' or believe a certain creed" (p. 102). In fact the Liberal "way" of salvation is through "*coming* to God, and especially through coming to God as revealed in Christ. It is through obedience, following, doing the will, loving God, having the grace of God in the heart" (p. 115).

Now however much Dr. Merrill may deny that this is nothing but the old way of salvation by character, it is difficult to see just how it differs from it. Of course it is true that Dr. Merrill allows a kind of mystical operation of the grace of God in the life of the believer, but in the last analysis it is the life he leads that counts. He tells us that it is Christ who saves us, but what he means is that it is the mystical influence and power of Christ in our lives assisting us to live the Christ-like life, that really saves. Christ's death did not save by His bearing the penalty for our sins. All that is definitely rejected. It is perfectly plain that the Liberal "way" of salvation and the Christian way, are as far apart as the poles. The New Testament "way" of salvation is, in the words of Paul to the Philippian jailor, "Believe on the Lord Jesus and thou shalt be saved." The notion that Eternal Life beyond the grave depends upon consciously accepting Christ, may be "monstrous" to the Liberals, but it is certainly the New Testament way! Dr. Merrill and his fellow Liberals need to read once more the Epistle of Paul to the Galatians, and to discover again with Luther, the eternal truth that salvation comes by faith in the redeeming work of the Saviour who died in our stead on Calvary. According to Dr. Merrill and his fellow Liberals, the gospel is not the good news that Christ has borne the punishment for my sins on Calvary, and made it possible for me to approach the throne of Grace

through His merit and receive the free gift of Eternal Life. The gospel according to Dr. Merrill is the news that I can live a holy life, by simply following Christ's example, receiving the inspiration of His friendship, and proving in my own experience that God does the same thing in our lives now that He did in Jesus nineteen hundred years ago. Here we have the essence of Liberalism and it is surely "another gospel." There is no consciousness that the guilt of sin keeps us from fellowship with God, and that that guilt and the penalty for sin must be borne by a Saviour on Calvary before our hearts can be renewed by the power of the Holy Spirit, and we be enabled to live holy lives. According to Dr. Merrill, there is nothing now and never has been anything to keep us from God. Christ's work was just an object lesson of how God acts in our lives now! Christianity's "way" of Salvation and Liberalism's "way" are as far apart as the East is from the West.

In closing we cannot but express our sympathy for Dr. Merrill's view of the desperate need of the world for a new life socially, nationally and individually. Dr. Merrill has admirably set forth the need of the world for salvation in the last chapter, especially pages 144 to 150, but we part company with Dr. Merrill as to whether Liberalism will save it. The trouble with Liberalism is that it has cut loose from belief in the factual basis of Christianity, and still expects to have the fruits of Christianity. Here is its fatal weakness. Christ is indeed a living personality in the world today, and the reason He is, is because He is our divine Saviour, the Second Person of the Trinity, who was born of a Virgin, died on Calvary in our stead, and rose again with the self-same body from the grave. Doubtless God *could* have saved us through the merit of Christ without our knowing anything about the historical Christ, but He *does not* do so. He has chosen the way of faith based on knowledge of who Christ is, and of what He has done for us. We must know about Christ, that is, the facts of His life, death and resurrection, before we can put our trust in Him. God *might* have saved us mystically, without knowledge, but He *does not*. Right here is the trouble with Liberalism. It wants salvation without belief in historical facts, and God has not chosen to give salvation that way. If Liberalism should triumph and belief in the factual basis of Christianity be done away with, what would happen? Christian life, the eternal life that Dr. Merrill talks about, would disappear in two generations! The facts of the historical Redeemer would still be unchanged, but since belief in their truth would be destroyed, the Holy Spirit could not apply the redeeming grace to our hearts and lives! Once let me lose sight of the fact that there is a Christ to come to, and I can't come to Him or have my life changed by His power. God changes my life by His almighty power and through His redeeming grace, but He does it by my faith and trust in an historical person, Jesus Christ, and apart from such trust God's power will not act. Take away the trust and the power will automatically stop acting. The only hope of the world is still the "faith of our fathers," and that faith only. The Liberals would have us adapt that faith to the modern mind, but in the words of a friend who recently wrote to me on this subject: "Suppose the first

disciples had listened to such argument, and because their gospel was a stumbling block to the Jews and to the Greeks foolishness had modified their message to make it reasonable to the modern mind (of A.D. 50) and to harmonize with the known facts of science of that date, what would have happened"? Their Christianity would now be as out of date as their science!

Can Liberalism and Christianity exist in harmony in the Presbyterian Church? Not unless Evangelicals cease to believe with their whole hearts that trust in the atoning work of a crucified and risen Saviour, is the only way of salvation! When that time comes there can be peace and harmony between the Liberals and Evangelicals, but if that time does come, the Church will have ceased to be Christian! If Dr. Merrill cannot believe that the Confession of Faith contains the system of doctrine taught in the Holy Scriptures, there is only one honorable thing for him to do—quietly withdraw to a denomination in harmony with his views.

Princeton.

FLOYD E. HAMILTON.

PRACTICAL THEOLOGY

The Constitution of the Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. Revised Edition, 1924. Pp. 504. \$1.50. Published by the Presbyterian Board of Christian Education.

The Westminster Confession of Faith and Catechisms were adopted in 1729. In 1788 the General Synod made a few slight changes; in 1886-87; in 1902-03, certain amendments were made. The Book of Discipline was rewritten in 1884. The Form of Government has undergone various changes between the years 1805 and 1925.

The statements of doctrine of the Confession of Faith have been slowly elaborated and defined by the Church. Those who refuse these, must formulate for themselves the doctrines of Scripture, so that the real question for debate is not between the Word of God and the Creed of man, but between the tried and proved faith of the Church, and the private judgment and unassisted wisdom of the repudiators of the creed.

At one period of the Church's history, one doctrine is emphasized; at another period, another doctrine. Heresies spring up and thus the Church is forced, for her self-preservation, to formulate a creed which shall include the truth and exclude error. These formularies of doctrine are not intended to be tests of Church membership, but only as terms upon which office bearers are admitted to their sacred trust of teaching and ruling.

There is some weak clamor at present for a new subscription formula. This is demanded by the men who do not believe in the doctrines of the Confession. This whole problem was debated in 1729 and in 1835 sequens, and is no new question. No Church can exist that lowers its subscription formula to include all kinds of beliefs and heresies and become an inclusive Church.

The more the writer knows of the great doctrines and the system of

doctrine, and the form of government of the Presbyterian Church, the more he is amazed at the wisdom of the fathers of the Church, and the remarkable plan of representative government.

This new edition of the Constitution contains the Brief Statement which was never intended to be included. The Assembly of 1888 said what should appear on the title page of the Constitution. The writer understands that the Brief Statement will be omitted in the edition to be published after the next Assembly.

All ministers and office bearers and indeed private members of the Church should purchase a copy of the Constitution of the Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. and study it.

Hartsville, Pa.

BENJAMIN M. GEMMILL.

The Law of Apostasy in Islam. Answering the Question Why There Are So Few Moslem Converts, and Giving Examples of Their Moral Courage and Martyrdom. By SAMUEL M. ZWEMER. London, Edinburgh, and New York: Marshall Brothers. 8vo. Pp. 164.

The purpose of this book is to expose the fallacy of the claims made by "recent Moslem writers, especially those of the Woking school" that "Islam always was and is now a religion of tolerance." After quoting passages from the *Islamic Review* and other sources, in which the claim is made that there is in Islam no penalty for apostasy, Dr. Zwemer concludes the Preface with these words: "Such statements cannot be allowed to stand unchallenged. This little book may be considered as a presentation of the facts on the other side of the question; and we leave the decision to the candid reader."

Dr. Zwemer discusses first of all the question why there are so few converts from Islam and he argues that while various explanations may be alleged the true reason is "the law of apostasy." He then proceeds to prove that this law of apostasy is plainly taught in the Koran and in Mohammedan tradition; and he gives abundant evidence that it has been operative throughout centuries of intolerance and persecution, and that it is operative today. He quotes example after example of persecution and martyrdom, pointing out that the history of Christianity in Moslem lands often reads like the eleventh chapter of Hebrews. Indeed he makes the fact of Moslem intolerance so unmistakably clear that the question ceases to be debatable. To assert that Islam is tolerant of other religions and that a Mohammedan is at liberty to become a Christian if he so desires is in the light of the evidence produced by Dr. Zwemer simply absurd.

In view of the attempts which are being so frequently made today to correlate all of the religions of mankind on the theory that they are all the expression of the same universal human impulse differing in value only because of the varying culture, development, and peculiar gifts of the various nations of the world, it is well that we should have our attention called to the fact so plainly taught in the Scriptures and abundantly confirmed by the history of Christian missions, that Christianity is not one of the many ethnic religions, but a religion

which makes exclusive and paramount claims for itself, claims which have found nowhere more emphatic denial or more bitter opposition than in the religion of the false prophet. Dr. Zwemer is abundantly qualified to speak on this subject; he knows the facts and he states them frankly and fearlessly. Consequently when at the close of his volume he tells us that there are indications that the uncompromising stand which Islam has taken against Christianity is being gradually broken down by the unwearied efforts of the soldiers of the Cross, we know that he tells us this not because of any false optimism, not because he has lost sight of the fact that there is no compromise possible between the claims of Christ and of Mohammed, not because he believes that Islam is a "tolerant" religion or is really undergoing a change of heart, but because he has seen the power of the Gospel manifested in Moslem lands and recognizes in the first fruits so scantily and painfully gathered the promise of an abundant harvest.

Princeton.

OSWALD T. ALLIS.

Borderlands of the Mediterranean. By J. GRAY McALLISTER, D.D., LL.D., Professor of English Bible, Union Theological Seminary, Richmond, Va. Richmond: Presbyterian Committee of Publication. Cloth. Illustrated, 8 vo. P. 278. Price \$2.50 postpaid.

This is one of the most attractive, instructive and illuminating among books of modern travel. The lands in review are those which have been of central and absorbing interest in the history of the world. Dr. McAllister was fully prepared for the journey which was the immediate occasion of this volume. He has always been a careful student of the Near East and for years he has been teaching the geography and the history of Bible lands. He travelled with the enthusiasm of one who was undertaking a thrilling and romantic adventure. He proved to be a careful observer and a patient and tireless investigator. The record of his experiences is replete with important facts, statistics and impressions. He has given us a volume which with its scores of illustrations gives a vivid and engaging narrative of the nations and peoples, the glories and the changing fortunes of those lands which surround the Mediterranean Sea. This is a book which will be appreciated by all classes of readers and by none more than by those who belong to the great company of travelers annually projecting the Mediterranean tour.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

Dr. Harry Emerson Fosdick's Book: "The Modern Use of the Bible": A Review. By I. M. HALDEMAN, D.D., Pastor, First Baptist Church, New York. Philadelphia, Pa: The Sunday School Times Company. Pp. 116. \$1.00.

This little book contains a relentless *exposé* of Dr. Fosdick's teachings by one of the outstanding evangelical ministers of America. Dr. Haldeman writes as one who is concerned for souls and he is intense in his opposition to the teachings of Dr. Fosdick because he believes those teachings are leading men to put their trust in an ethical rather than a

saving Christ, because they "repudiate the Bible doctrine of the way of salvation through a penally sacrificial and blood redeeming Christ." Dr. Haldeman has no trouble in showing that the Christ whom Dr. Fosdick preaches is "not the Christ of the New Testament at all." He shows that Dr. Fosdick's Christ lacks omnipotence, that he is "subject to the interpretation of the modern mind," that his "history has been largely invented," that his "supreme claims are fiction" that his "miracles were never performed." He shows, moreover, that according to Dr. Fosdick the Bible is a book which is "contradicted by science, unreliable in history, not always moral, and whose shifting thought-forms, whose uncertain 'framework' make it of avail only as it can be proven by personal experience." There is nothing of the Laodicean about Dr. Haldeman. Men of that type will resent the plainness and vigor of his speech. We are confident, however, that Christ and His apostles would commend him. An excellent book to put in the hands of the ordinary man who has been attracted by the so-called gospel of preachers like Fosdick, or who wonder why so many object to the presence of such preachers in evangelical pulpits.

Princeton.

S. G. CRAIG.

The Bible Doctrine of Wealth and Work. C. RYDER SMITH, D.D.

London: The Epworth Press. 1924. Pp. 282. 6¾ net.

This volume by the author of *The Bible Doctrine of Society* and *The Bible Doctrine of Womanhood* is much better written and printed in much better style than the preceding ones. The paper and type, the arrangement, notes, index, etc., delight the eye and aid in the clarity of the work. The points taken are clear and are scripturally sound. Wealth is a blessing, work is to be transformed into worship, righteousness means ministry and service as well as the keeping of the law. In the discussion many terms now much abused are clarified; Wealth (p. 21), Leisure (pp. 33, 236), Righteousness (pp. 86, 127), Accommodation (p. 86), Responsibility for others (p. 99), Usury (p. 105), Almsgiving (p. 112), Meekness (p. 163ff.). Some passages deserve quoting. Of Hebrew Luxury under the Kings, "Israel was like a coolie woman wearing a diadem" (p. 93). Of the Prophets Preaching. "They required of the city the morality of agriculture" (p. 116). Of the Messianic Vision, "In the perfect society there would be no hirelings" (p. 123). Of the Cross, "Jesus willingly undertook the Cross and so ennobled even its shame, yet in a perfect society there are no crosses" (p. 168). Of Work and Worship, "The word for 'Servants' (Rev. 22:3) is 'bondmen' but the term 'to do him service' means also 'worship.' Bondage finds its euthanasia in love. So 'service' is 'perfect freedom.' There is no idleness in the last leisure of the saints but there is no task either; its work is worship. So pleasure is bliss" (p. 169). Of Charity, "A Christian philanthropy, just because it is Christian, must first be to the soul and then to the body" (p. 186). Of large fortunes, "Life does not cease to be a ministry because a man has 'independant means'" (p. 190).

This book is scriptural. The "Conspectus of Authorities" is an unnec-

essary surrender to the documentary hypothesis and in no way helps the argument of the book. It might have been better omitted. Otherwise the author sanely interprets "The Bible Doctrine of Work." His book deserves hearty commendation and all who look for a Divine solution of our present day Social Questions would do well to study the Divine Word with this book as a commentary.

Rutledge, Pa.

EARNEST E. EELLS.

PERIODICAL LITERATURE

American Church Monthly, New York, October: W. J. SPARROW-SIMPSON, The Christian Sacrifice; KATHERINE M. PEEK, Professor Leuba on Mysticism; CHARLES C. MARSHALL, The Case of John Felton; A. PHILIP McMAHON, Is Religious Art Possible Today?; HAMILTON SCHUYLER, Athletic Games and Sports. *The Same*, November: WILLIAM H. DUNPHY, The Faith and Progressive Scholarship; SELDEN P. DELANY, Discipline of the Laity; E. SINCLAIR HERTELL, Saint Bernard of Clairvaux; JOAN KIRBY, Enemies within the Camp; VICTOR D. CRONK, Catholics and Radicalism. *The Same*, December: Dogma and Life; FRANCIS J. HALL, Suffering and the Will of God; LATTI GRISWOLD, The Mass; CHARLES C. MARSHALL, The Papacy and English Christianity; FREDERICK LYNCH, The Stockholm Conference on Life and Work; ALFRED NEWBERY, The Federal Council on Prohibition; VICTOR L. DOWDELL, The Literature of Interior Prayer.

Biblical Review, New York, October: H. M. DuBOSE, A Constructive Bible Science; G. CAMPBELL MORGAN, Biblical Homiletics; GEORGE STIBITZ, Sanctified by Obedience; E. G. SIHLER, The Older Diaspora; A. T. ROBERTSON, The Meaning of John 1:13.

Bibliotheca Sacra, St. Louis, October: WILLIAM CROWE, The Place of Preaching in the Church Today; W. W. EVERTS, Church Discipline in Theory and Practice; CHARLES E. SMITH, The Book of Esther; J. OLIVER BUSWELL, JR., Sin and Its Punishment; PARKE P. FLOURNEY, Doctor Moffatt's New Translation of the Bible; J. F. SPRINGER, The Synoptic Problem.

Canadian Journal of Religious Thought, Toronto, Sept.-Oct.: RICHARD ROBERTS, Imago Dei; W. G. JORDAN, Hebraism and Hellenism in the Second Century B.C.; J. DICK FLEMING, Earliest Doctrine of the Trinity; J. H. PHILIP, Paul and the Jerusalem Church; H. B. GOODING, Training of Ordinands; E. E. BRAITHWAITE, The Human History of the Bible. *The Same*, Nov.-Dec.: GEORGE C. PIDGEON, Members of Christ's Body; F. HERBERT STEAD, Social Christianity; HENRY MICK, Date and Authorship of the Fourth Gospel; ALEXANDER MACMILLAN, The Twenty-third Psalm in Christian Worship; CHARLES BIELER, Theodor Lafleur and the Theological Crisis in Geneva in 1850; PERCY G. PRICE, Japan and the Christian Movement; W. R. TAYLOR, Evolution and Immortality.

Catholic Historical Review, Washington, October: JOSEPH U. BERGKAMP, Savonarola in the Light of Modern Research; LAWRENCE F. FLECK, What the American has Got out of the Melting Pot from the

Catholic; HUGH GRAHAM, Irish Works and the Transmission of Learning.

Church Quarterly Review, London, July: A. W. REED, Wessex and Literature; H. B. F. COMPSTON, Dr. Moffatt's Translation of the Old Testament; J. S. MACARTHUR, A Plea for the Chalcedonian Christology; A. LUKYN WILLIAMS, The Jews: Christian Apologists in Early Spain; G. H. BOX, Some Recent Contributions to Old Testament Studies; H. D. OAKLEY, The Idea of the Kingdom of Heaven in Human Experience. *The Same*, October: VISCOUNT HALIFAX, The Church of England: Lessons of Fifty Years; HORACE MARRIOTT, A Neglected Point in Prayer Book Revision: the Openings of the Gospels and Epistles; J. O. NASH, A South African Comment on the School Question; CLAUDE JENKINS, A Thirteenth-Century Register: Odo Archbishop of Rouen; ATHELSTAN RILEY, Anglican and Orthodox; ARTHUR C. HEADLAM, The Four Gospels; Lord Phillimore, Clergy Pensions.

Congregational Quarterly, London, October: H. L. GOUDGE, St. Paul's Doctrine of Justification and Its Present Value; J. ARNOLD QUAIL, Christianity and International Relations; W. D. FFRENCH, The Inner Light; A. T. S. JAMES, Dean Church; A. T. CADOUX, The Interpreted Parables; W. MORTON BARWELL, The Task of the Congregational Churches on the Mission Field; WILLIAM ROBINSON, Ministerial Superannuation; A. N. ROWLAND, The United Church of Canada; W. BLACKSHAW, Conference on Life and Work at Stockholm.

East & West, London, October: GILBERT WHITE, Meeting of the Continuation Committee of World's Conference on Faith and Order; DONALD FRASER, Some Thoughts on South African Life; W. BURBIDGE, Group Settlement in the Diocese of Bunbury; M. M. HARDING, Emigration and Church Expansion in Canada; STANLEY H. DIXON, Buddha or Christ for China; P. M. SCOTT, A Church Mission on the Northwest Frontier of China; H. J. MOLONY, The Chinese Church in Troublous Waters; H. D. PEEL, The Church in the Australian Bush; RICHARD A. HICKLING, Singing the Gospel in India; L. H. GWYNNE, Towards a Better Understanding between East and West.

Expositor, London, September: BATTERSBY HARFORD, Since Wellhausen, iii; H. J. FLOWERS, The Fourth Commandment; F. J. MOORE, The Cry of Dereliction; JAMES MOFFATT, Literary illustrations of the First Epistle to Corinthians; *The Same*, October: BATTERSBY HARFORD, Since Wellhausen, iv; J. R. CAMERON, Jesus and Art, i; VINCENT TAYLOR, The Lucan Authorship of the Third Gospel and the Acts; IAN G. SIMPSON, The Holy Spirit in the Fourth Gospel; JAMES MOFFATT, Literary Illustrations of the First Epistle to the Corinthians, v. *The Same*, November: BATTERSBY HARFORD, Since Wellhausen, v; J. R. CAMERON, Jesus and Art; JAMES MOFFATT, Literary Illustrations of the First Epistle to the Corinthians, vi.

Expository Times, Edinburgh, September: FLINDERS PETRIE, History and Criticism; J. P. LILLEY, Hymn-Mending; KENNETH J. SAUNDERS, Buddhism and Christianity, ii; ARTHUR F. TAYLOR, Meditations on the Apocrypha. *The Same*, October: J. RENDEL HARRIS, A Factor of Old

Testament Influence in the New Testament; W. ROBINSON, Psychology and Religion; ARTHUR F. TAYLOR, Meditations on the Apocrypha. *The Same*, November: ADAM C. WELCH, Some Misunderstood Psalms, Psalm lxxxviii; W. BARTLETT, The Coming of the Holy Ghost according to the Fourth Gospel; KENNETH J. SAUNDERS, Buddhism and Christianity, iv; F. CAWLEY, Christ in Paradox; ARTHUR F. TAYLOR, Meditations on the Apocrypha.

Homiletic Review, New York, October: BAYARD DODGE, A New Challenge in the Old East; C. A. BECKWITH, Present-Day Philosophy; Indigenous Churches in Missionary Lands; WM. L. STIDGER, The Symphonic Service—Not Sermon; PAUL F. BOLLER, What is a Good Sermon?; CLAYTON H. RANCK, A Minister's Experiment in Vocational Guidance; E. EARL SULLENGER, What Pastors Should Know about their own Communities; LYNN H. HOUGH, The Music of Words. *The Same*, November: EDGAR J. GOODSPEED, William Tyndale and the English New Testament; WORTH M. TIPPY, England viewed from Country, Village and Town; JOHN R. SCOTFORD, Building your Successor's Success; OLIVER P. AVERY, Attaching the 'Friendly Citizen'; HERBERT B. SMITH, The Church of the Closed Door; HANS LUTHER, Modern Industrial Organization and the Religious Mind; JOSEPH F. NEWTON, The Romance of Reality. *The Same*, December: WORTH M. TIPPY, The Stockholm Conference on Life and Work; JOHN A. FAULKNER, An Alleged Authentic Portrait of the Christ; FRED SMITH, On Beginning a Pastorate; Peril of Religious Selfishness; WM. R. GLEN, What the Minister May Learn from the Banker; C. A. BECKWITH, Mysticism—An Appreciation and a Criticism; LESTER EVANS, Is the World Going to the Dogs?; DOUGLASS BUCHANAN, The Unusual Evening Service; ERICH STANGE, The Youth Movement in Germany; The Church Teaching Its Children.

Journal of Negro History, Washington, October: C. G. WOODSON, Ten Years of Collecting and Publishing the Records of the Negro; JANE E. ADAMS, The Abolition of the Brazilian Slave Trade; ANNE BUSTILL SMITH, The Bustill Family.

Journal of Religion, Chicago, September: A. EUSTACE HAYDON, Modernism in China; PAUL D. TWINEM, Modern Syncretic Religious Societies in China, i; MILES M. FISHER, The Negro Church and the World War; EUGENE W. LYMAN, Ritschl's Theory of Value-Judgments; HENRY N. WIEMAN, Religion in Dewey's "Experience and Nature."

London Quarterly Review, London, October: A. W. HARRISON, Can Society Be Saved by Education?; LESLIE D. WEATHERHEAD, Tennyson's After-World; FRANK BALLARD, The Mystery of Painlessness; H. REINHEIMER, Diet and Evolution; GILBERT THOMAS, A Natural Painter; THOMAS STEPHENSON, Biology and Human Progress; W. WOOD, City of God in Literature and Art; E. H. CARRIER, Evolution of Primitive Societies; P. T. DEMPSEY, Socialism in China Two Thousand Years Ago; O. G. LEWIS, The Anglo-Indian Problem.

Lutheran Church Review, Philadelphia, October: HENRY OFFERMANN, Paul and Hellenism; CHARLES M. JACOBS, Medieval Backgrounds of

Modern History; LUTHER D. REED, Christian Worship just before the Reformation; JOHN H. HARMS, The Clergyman and the Law; E. STANGE, Common Lines of Development in the Protestant World of Today—A German View; JEREMIAH J. SCHINDEL, The Sacraments as Means of Grace; CARROLL H. LITTLE, Is there a Millennium?; FREDERICK R. KNUBEL, A Problem of Religious Education.

Moslem World, New York, October: Islam in Capetown; D. S. MARGOLIOUTH, Textual Variations of the Koran; SAMUEL MACF. ANDERSON, Religious Education in the Dutch East Indies; SAMUEL M. ZWEMER, Two Moslem Catechisms; CALVIN K. STAUDT, Baghdad Today; GEORGE E. KING, Opening up of a Moslem Hospital; J. E. BATEMAN, Medical Evangelism in Cairo; S. A. MORRISON, Modern Types of Moslem Thought; ISAAC MASON, Two Chinese Moslem Magazines; MARGARET HASLUCK, Non-Conformist Moslems of Albania; HARSUM TAYLOR, The Supreme Optimist.

New Church Life, Lancaster, September: RICHARD MORSE, The Soul's Reciprocation; R. J. TILSON, Essentials and Instrumentals; HOMER SYNNESTVEDT, Waiting on the Other Side. *The Same*, October: W. B. CALDWELL, Perceptive Faith; G. W. GUTHRIE, Reflections by a Prospective New Churchman; E. J. E. SCHRECK, Our Apostolic Function. *The Same*, November: ERNST DELTENRE, The Church and Its Worship and Order; Gleanings from New Church History; J. S. PRYKE, Concerning Remains. *The Same*, December: K. R. ALDEN, The Development of a New Church Society; H. L. J. ODHNER, The Development of a New Church Society; J. W. MARELIUS, Seeing Ourselves as Others See Us.

Open Court, Chicago, September: LEWIS P. SHANKS, Jean-Jacques Rousseau; THEODORE SCHROEDER, The Riddles in Bishop Brown's Heresy Case; VICTOR S. YARROS, Trend of Religious Thought; CHARLES KASSEL, A Knight-Errant in the Department of the Gulf. *The Same*, October: W. G. BLAIKIE MURDOCH, Japanese Confucianism; VICTOR S. YARROS, Empiricism and Philosophic Method; EDWARD B. HILL, Religion and Morality; T. B. STORK, Function of Money; ROLAND D. SAWYER, Jesus the Great Teacher; SMITH W. CARPENTER, Origin of Species; WARREN SCHOLL, The Fruit of Conscience. *The Same*, November: W. G. BLAIKIE MURDOCH, Buddhism in Japanese Literature; JOSHUA C. GREGORY, Origin of Magic; VICTOR S. YARROS, Metaphysics, Psychology and Philosophy; WILLIAM BURQUEST, So This Is Fundamentalism; SMITH W. CARPENTER, Tennessee's Aid to Education.

Reformed Church Review, Lancaster, October: HENRY S. GEHMAN, The Prophets and their Message for Today; THOMAS R. BRENDLE, The Skippack Reformed Church; E. WILBUR KRIEBEL, The Competent Church; D. J. WEITZEL, The Spiritual Life; F. W. TESKE, Filling God's House with Worshiping People; CHARLES S. MACFARLAND, The Permanent Contribution of Geneva and John Calvin to Church and State in America.

Review and Expositor, Louisville, October: LUTHER R. CHRISTIE, Academic Ethics; EVERETT GILL, Significance of American and European

Christianity; A. L. VAIL, Significance of the Seventy; JOHN MONCURE, Meaning of KL in Isaiah 1:1-8; A. D. BELDEN, Ministry of Mystery; A. C. GETTYS, Psychological Justification of the Revival; W. W. EVERTS, Kant the Christian Philosopher; E. Y. MULLINS, Christianity in the Modern World.

Union Seminary Review, Richmond, October: CHARLES F. ARROWOOD, William Tyndale; ANDREW W. BLACKWOOD, Grace of Preaching; DUNBAR H. OGDEN, Was Jesus Christ Born of a Virgin?; JAMES I. VANCE, Samuel H. Chester; THORNTON WHALING, The Making of Woodrow Wilson; WARREN H. STUART, The Heavenly Citizenship; GEORGE F. NICOLASSEN, Discussion of John 21: 15-17; HENRY C. HAMMOND, The Song of the Sword; W. TALIAFFERO THOMPSON, The Minister's Test and Inspiration.

Yale Review, New Haven, October: L. P. JACKS, World-Mending; RAYMOND L. BUELL, Future of American Imperialism; CLARA BARRUS, Whitman and Burroughs as Comrades; WILLIAM KENT, In the Mountains of Mendocino; WILBUR CROSS, Laurence Sterne in the Twentieth Century; ALFRED J. SWAN, Russia and Modern Music; S. C. THOMPSON, A Whaling Cruise in *The Sea Fox*.

Biblica, Roma, Septembri: A. VACCARI, Esegese antica ed esegesi nuova; K. SMORONSKI, Inquisitio historico-exegetica in interpretationem textus Gen. 1:2c; M. A. VANDEN OUDENRIJN, De vocabulis quibusdam, termino עֲבָדִים synonymis; P. JOÜON, Notes de lexicographie hébraïque; J. M. BOVER, Iustificata est sapientia a filiis suis Mt. 11:19: *a filiis an ab operibus*; A. MALLON, L'homme préhistorique en Palestine.

Bilychnis, Roma, Agosto: F. A. FERRARI, Precorrimenti dell'idea cristiana: Eros e Psiche in Platone; L. VENTURA, Sul concetto di un "progresso" morale ed educativo; C. RICCI, Teogonie sudamericane. *The Same*, Settembre: E. TROILO, Pomponazzi; U. BRAUZZI, Per la pace sociale; P. ZANFROGNINI, Variazioni sul fato. *The Same*, Ottobre: G. SEMPRINI, L'astrologia ai tempi e nell'opera di Pico della Mirandola; G. LUZZI, Risalendo alle sorgenti: L'avvenire secondo l'insegnamento di Gesù nei Sinottici; M. PUGLISI, Cristianesimo moderno e contemporaneo.

Bulletin de Littérature Ecclésiastique, Toulouse, Juillet-Octobre: GERMAIN BRETON, L'Autorité; JEAN RIVIÈRE, La doctrine de la rédemption au Concile de Trente; LOIS SALTET, Une discussion sur Martial entre un Lombard et un Limousin en 1029; FERDINAND CAVALLERA, Revue d'Histoire de l'ancienne Littérature chrétienne et de la Théologie (fin).

Ciencia Tomista, Madrid, Noviembre-Diciembre: LUIS URBANO, Einstein y Santo Tomás; ALBERTO COLUNGA, El vaticinio de Emmanuel; VICENTE BELTRAN de HEREDIA, Crónica del movimiento tomista; ANTONIO G. PELÁEZ, Boletino de Historia de la Filosofía.

Gereformeerde Theologisch Tijdschrift, Aalten, Sept.: J. A. C. VAN LEEUWEN, "Zuivere objectiviteit"?; F. W. GROSHIDE, Eenige opmerkingen over Hand. 6:1-7; J. G. KUNST, Verslag der Veertiende Algemeene Vergadering van de Vereeniging van Predikanten van Gereformeerde Kerken in Nederland. *The Same*, Oct.: J. A. C. VAN LEEUWEN, "Zuivere objectiviteit"?; J. G. KUNST, Verslag der Veertiende Algemeene Verga-

dering van de Vereeniging van Predikanten van Gereformeerde Kerken in Nederland.

Nieuwe Theologische Studiën, Groningen, 8:5: A. VAN VELDHUIZEN, Bezwaren en gevaren bij het vertalen het Nt.; A. VAN VELDHUIZEN, Nestle's Novum Testamentum Graece in het ambt; A. VAN VELDHUIZEN, Van velerlei uit het Nieuwe Testament. *The Same*, 8:6: A. H. EDELKOORT, De voorstelling omtrent dood en doodenrijk in het *Gilgamés-eros*; HAROLD M. WIENER, Slaughter and Sacrifice in Early Israel; H. H. MEULENBELT, Rabbijnsche psychanalyse?; G. VAN DER LEEUW, Grieksche religie.

Recherches de Science Religieuse, Paris, Octobre: JULES LEBRETON, La Théologie de la Trinité d'après saint Ignace d'Antioche (suite); JEAN CALÈS, Le Psautier d'Asaph; PAUL JOÛN, Notes de Philologie évangélique: Matt. 25:9, Mk. 3:17, Lk. 1: 54-55; FERDINAND PRAT, Le Cours des Monnaies en Palestine au temps de Jésus-Christ; J. DE GHELINCK, A propos de l'hypothèse des deux rédactions successives de la "Somme des Sentences."

Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie, Lausanne, Juin-Aout: AIMÉ CHAVAN, Vinet et le mysticisme; JEAN DE LA HARPE, Les idées sociales politiques de Charles Secrétan; HENRI PERROCHON, Le protestantisme anglais dans les "Lettres philosophiques" de Voltaire; CHARLES MASSON, La personnalité religieuse de William James; ALFRED BOISSIER, La plus ancienne inscription cananéenne; ALBERT-O. DUBUIS, L'histoire religieuse de la révolution française de M. Pierre de la Gorce; MAURICE NEESER, Les Essais d'apologétique et de moral chrétiennes de Philippe Bridel.

Revue d'Ascétique et de Mystique, Toulouse, Octobre: R. DE SINÉTY, La direction des psychopathes, ii; J. DE GUIBERT, La "Méthode des trois puissances" *L'art de contemplation* de Raymond Lull; G. HORN, L'amour divin (eros) dans S. Grégoire de Nysse; F. CAVALLERA, Livres d'autrefois—L'autobiographie du P. Surin, ii.

Revue d'Histoire et de Philosophie religieuses, Strasbourg, Juillet-Aout: MAURICE GOGUEL, La collecte en faveur des Saints de Jérusalem; J. POMMIER, Renan et Strasbourg, vi. A. Réville; GASTON RICHARD, La morale sociologique et la pathologie de la société; A. FRIDRICHSEN, Le problème du miracle dans le christianisme primitif; R. WILL, Le culte.

Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie, Innsbruck, 49:3: F. PANGERL, Zur Jahrhundertfeier des ersten allgemeinen Konzils zu Nizaea; J. STIGLMAYR, Das "Quicumque" und Fulgentius von Ruspe; ST. HILPISCH, Die Quellen zum Charakterbild des heiligen Benedikt; O. ZIMMERMANN, Vom Wesen der Vollkommenheit.

Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, Tübingen, Jahrg. 4:4: KARL HEIM, Der Zen-Buddhismus in Japan; FRIEDRICH DELEKAT, Nationalismus und Mystik; W. STAERCK, Religionsgeschichte und Religionsphilosophie in ihrer Bedeutung für die biblische Theologie des Alten Testaments; THEOPHIL STEINMANN, Zur Frage nach dem Wesen der Religion (Schluss).

THE PASTORAL EPISTLES OF PAUL

By CHARLES R. ERDMAN. The Westminster Press, Philadelphia. \$1.00.

"This book is a new addition to a very goodly number of commentaries on the New Testament. It is characterized by the same sound, helpful, evangelical character as his former commentaries."—*The Presbyterian*, Philadelphia.

THE LORD WE LOVE

By CHARLES R. ERDMAN, D.D., LL.D. New York: George H. Doran Company. Pp. 138. \$1.50 net.

This series of studies deals with the most important events in the life of Christ from his birth to his ascension. The studies are expository in character, and while affirming the central verities of Christian faith they are devotional and practical in spirit and aim.

CHRISTIANITY AND LIBERALISM

By J. GRESHAM MACHEN, D.D. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1923. Price \$1.75.

"This is a book that should be read by every thinking man, whether he calls himself a conservative or a liberal. While evidently the product of a thorough scholar, it is written throughout in simple, non-technical words." S. G. Craig in *The Presbyterian*.

THE ORIGIN OF PAUL'S RELIGION

By J. GRESHAM MACHEN. The James Sprunt Lectures delivered at Union Theological Seminary in Virginia. New York: The Macmillan Company, Second Printing, 1923. Price \$1.75.

"This is a book which it would be difficult to overpraise."—*The Church Quarterly Review* (London).

NEW TESTAMENT GREEK FOR BEGINNERS

By J. GRESHAM MACHEN, D.D. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1923. Price \$2.20.

This textbook is intended both for students who are beginning the study of Greek and for those whose acquaintance with the language is so imperfect that they need a renewed course of elementary instruction.

A DICTIONARY OF THE BIBLE

By JOHN D. DAVIS, PH.D., D.D., LL.D., Professor of Oriental and Old Testament Literature in the Theological Seminary at Princeton, N.J. With Many New and Original Maps and Plans and Amply Illustrated. Fourth Revised Edition. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1924.

"The Dictionary has been subjected to a revision, pervasive yet unobtrusive, in order to incorporate material gathered by biblical research during the past decade and a half. Purposely the book has not been increased in size, nor has the pagination been changed."

IS THE HIGHER CRITICISM SCHOLARLY?

By ROBERT DICK WILSON, PH.D., D.D., Professor of Semitic Philology and Old Testament Criticism in Princeton Theological Seminary. With a Foreword by PHILIP E. HOWARD. Philadelphia: The Sunday School Times, 1922. Price 25 cents. London: Marshall Bros., 1923. Price 1 sh.

"The book is a veritable arsenal of ammunition with which to demolish the critical theories."—Howard Agnew Johnston, in *Scientific Christian Thinking for Young People*.

THE WORK OF THE PASTOR

By CHARLES R. ERDMAN, D.D., LL.D. The Westminster Press, Philadelphia. 1924, 8vo, pp. vii. 257.

"This volume is intended to serve as a handbook to pastors and as a textbook for students of theology. It should be found helpful, however, to many others who are concerned with the organization and activities of the Christian Church. . . . Large portions of the last five chapters have been furnished by other writers, who are recognized as specially trained and qualified for their tasks."

WHAT IS FAITH?

By J. GRESHAM MACHEN, D.D. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1925. Pp. 263.

The Christian preacher is accustomed to say to inquirers about the way of salvation: "Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ, and thou shalt be saved." But it is useless to say that, unless one also tells the inquirers what it means to "believe." This is what the present book endeavors to do; it endeavors to set forth, in the light of New Testament teaching and in comparison with recent discussions, the real nature of Christian faith.